tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-67184545245022597852024-03-05T21:18:41.244+09:00Southern African Peace and Security BlogAdminhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11143142887187013059noreply@blogger.comBlogger168125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6718454524502259785.post-71147051529026445952020-03-28T14:46:00.001+09:002020-03-28T14:46:26.567+09:00Reflecting on the Corona Virus in South Africa: Time for Critical Introspection<br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , serif;"><span style="font-size: small;">by Hussein Solomon </span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , serif;"><span style="font-size: small;">I write this as South Africa enters the first day of a 21-day lockdown period. With South Africa surpassing more than 1000 infections and recording its first deaths from the COVID-19 virus now is a time for critical introspection. The crisis has laid bare the challenges we ignored or papered over for much too long – specifically as it relates to governance. </span></span> </div>
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , serif;"><span style="font-size: small;">For much too long, our porous borders drew too little attention. Yes, Pretoria knew that millions of migrants streamed across these non-existent frontiers and we ignored it. We knew organized crime syndicates trafficked people, drugs and other contraband across these frontiers and we ignored it. As I watched spell-bound as my government, like many other governments cancelled flights from landing and cruise ships from disembarking in the light of the global pandemic, I hope we as South Africans, could once again exert control over our almost 10,000 kilometers of land borders.</span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , serif;"><span style="font-size: small;">For much too long, we knew that our health system was faltering. Despite these failings we have sought to bring about grandiose plans like a National Health Insurance system knowing full well that we were building castles on quick sand. The economic costs were unsustainable and the idea of an inept state controlling such a complex process was apparent to all except the state apparatchiks with their misinformed ideological zeal. Health professionals, meanwhile, were voting with their feet and sought emigration, rather than confront the looming calamity. The shortage of masks to nurses in hospitals as a result of COVID-19 has made these failures all too apparent. This, being perhaps the most visible manifestation of the crisis in this early stage of infections. As the country emerges from this crisis, however, we need to seriously re-examine our health system, how we prioritize our available funds and overcome the various inefficiencies.</span></span></div>
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<a data-flickr-embed="true" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/rafiqs/14869270980/" title="Hospital 69/365"><img alt="Hospital 69/365" height="400" src="https://live.staticflickr.com/3873/14869270980_cf4484854a_z.jpg" width="600" /></a><script async="" charset="utf-8" src="//embedr.flickr.com/assets/client-code.js"></script></div>
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , serif;"><span style="font-size: small;">For too long, South Africa ignored the crisis emanating from our dysfunctional, inefficient and dangerous public transport system. On this first day of the national lockdown, health care workers had difficulty traveling to work. Mini-bus taxi drivers, meanwhile, flouted government regulations on how many passengers they could transport in a single vehicle. </span></span> </div>
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<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="_GoBack"></a> <span style="font-family: "arial" , serif;"><span style="font-size: small;">This flouting of laws has indeed become a national characteristic of South Africans. Whilst complaining about rampant criminality, ordinary South Africans are criminal in their negligence of or deliberately violating the laws of the land – from routine traffic violations to students engaging in violence on the country’s universities to striking workers destroying property. On the first day of the lockdown, several South Africans ignored government warnings to stay home. Such behaviour is not only selfish but constitutes a danger to all South Africans. This is particularly salient in light of the many South Africans who have compromised immunity systems as a result of being HIV positive and/or having tuberculosis. Commentators have noted how countries with law-abiding populations tend to substantially slow down the spread of the virus. This selfish behaviour and more general lawlessness on the part of all South Africans has to end.</span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , serif;"><span style="font-size: small;">Whilst government has deployed police and the defence force, it is increasingly obvious that these forces are spread too thin. Given the need for public order and the inability of South Africans to practice self-discipline, what the country needs is a gendarmerie on the French model to assist the police. </span></span> </div>
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , serif;"><span style="font-size: small;">One hopes that the current pandemic allows South Africans to engage in some critical self-reflections.</span></span></div>
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by Virgil Hawkins</div>
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The novel corona virus (Covid-19), continues to threaten the health and lives of large numbers of people throughout the world. It has also wrought havoc on social and economic activity, most notably in high-income countries in Asia and the West. It has also captured the attention of the world’s media, displacing all manner of domestic and world news in its wake.<br />
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But at a global level, the levels of attention are not necessarily proportionate with the level of the threat to human life. At the time of writing, Covid-19 has infected roughly 180,000 people and killed around 7,000 people worldwide. To put this into perspective, each year, malaria infects more than 200 million, and kills more than 400,000 people worldwide, with more than 90% of these deaths being in Africa. Tuberculosis infects 10 million annually, and kills roughly 1.5 million of those people. And diarrhea, caused by contaminated food and water, kills more than all those who die of malaria, tuberculosis and AIDS combined. All of these diseases, like Covid-19, have a global reach (with the exception of malaria), although they are most heavily concentrated in the Global South.<br />
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These are millions of lives lost each year that are largely preventable, and yet these deaths, and the threat that such diseases continue to pose to humanity, are routinely ignored by the news media. A search of the New York Times website found that, for the entire year of 2019, there were just 6 articles about tuberculosis (containing the word in the article title) and 4 articles about malaria (two of which were about an anti-malaria drug at the 2019 Beijing Expo). From the perspective of the news media, the deaths caused by these diseases, whether preventable or not, have been ‘normalized’, and are ‘acceptable’ to the point that they are neither newsworthy nor noteworthy.<br />
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The obvious conclusion here is that the levels of media and public attention to such diseases are not determined by the loss of, or threat to, human life per se, but are largely dependent upon the question of whose lives it is that are being lost or threatened. Just as can be seen in the massive gaps in terms of the haves and have-nots in terms of media coverage of armed conflict (and of coverage of the world in general, for that matter), the geographic location, nationality, race, ethnicity and socioeconomic status of the victims are major determining factors. Covid-19 impacts high-income Western countries where malaria, tuberculosis and diarrhea-related diseases do not.<br />
<a data-flickr-embed="true" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/sanofi-pasteur/5280405700" title="Tuberculosis (Mycobacterium tuberculosis bacillus)"><img alt="Tuberculosis (Mycobacterium tuberculosis bacillus)" height="400" src="https://live.staticflickr.com/5205/5280405700_715ae4a129_z.jpg" width="600" /></a><script async="" charset="utf-8" src="//embedr.flickr.com/assets/client-code.js"></script><br />
Similarly, the 2014-2016 outbreak of Ebola disease virus in West Africa, which became the worst in history, did not begin to grab worldwide headlines until the disease began to be seen as a threat to people in high-income countries. Those living in these countries could perhaps be forgiven for not noticing that we are just now overcoming the second-worst outbreak of Ebola in history, one that has been ongoing in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) since 2018. It has hardly been making headlines in the Western media.<br />
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But levels of news attention depend not only on location and identity of the victim, but also on novelty – the characteristic of something being ‘new’. Malaria, tuberculosis and diarrhea-related disease kill large numbers of people, but it is a constant stream of threat and tragedy. Covid-19 (like MERS or SARS before it), on the other hand, is a rare occurrence, with outbreaks appearing (at least at current trends) several years apart. New developments, threats and deaths that we have not yet normalized, are considered particularly newsworthy. This applies even in high-income countries. As is already being pointed out by many, annually occurring seasonal influenza kills tens of thousands of people in the US alone each year – far more than Covid-19 has so far, and yet the media is calm and relatively low-key in its response. Although the threat is grave, it is something that has been normalized by society and the media.<br />
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By the same logic, however, the media could be expected to have been responsive to the outbreak of Ebola in the DRC. It is, after all, a major disease that is extremely infectious and deadly, and that only occurs occasionally. The same can be said for the world’s worst measles outbreak, also occurring in the DRC, which, unlike malaria or tuberculosis, is also a new development. The number of people measles has infected and killed in the most recent outbreak there is also comparable to Covid-19. Both Ebola and measles have an additional novel characteristic in the sense that the ongoing armed conflict in the DRC has compounded the problem, hindering efforts to stop both diseases. And yet it has struggled to attract any small measure of media attention. Clearly, who the victims are is more important than the novelty factor.<br />
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But there still remains one final factor that is related to novelty – the fear of the unknown. Ebola and the measles occur as occasional outbreaks, but they have happened before and much about them is already known. Covid-19 is a new strain of corona virus, and as such, its impacts are yet, to a degree, unknown. Scientists are still trying to attempt to understand just how infectious and how deadly it is. Fear of the unknown regarding the virus, and the panic it creates, serves public appetite for constant updates and information, and simultaneously, the interests of the commercial media.<br />
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Interestingly, these patterns in the media are not only seen in the countries greatly impacted by the public health threats, but throughout the world as a whole. The media in Southern Africa, for example, which has been largely spared from Covid-19 so far, is also devoting a considerable amount of its attention to the spread of the virus. Global news flows – the determination of newsworthiness and the spread of information worldwide – are largely determined in the countries in which economic and political power resides.<br />
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This is not to downplay the suffering (actual and potential) caused by Covid-19. The disease does indeed pose a major ongoing threat to people throughout the world, and Africa will undoubtedly struggle to contain the spread and its consequences if the number of cases begins to rise substantively. But by the same token, if preventing the loss of human life – regardless of its location, nationality, race, ethnicity or socioeconomic status – is the prime goal in stopping Covid-19, then it is perhaps time to remember that other major public health crises also desperately await our attention.<br />
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<br />Adminhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11143142887187013059noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6718454524502259785.post-33630818484435762852020-02-28T08:05:00.000+09:002020-03-18T08:09:44.153+09:00Exploring South Africa’s Governance Challenges<div style="text-align: center;">
by Sanet Madonsela</div>
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On 14 February 2018, former African National Congress (ANC) leader and master tactician, Jacob Zuma, resigned as the fourth democratically elected President of the Republic of South Africa. This decision stemmed from internal pressure from his political party to step down and hand over the reins. Zuma’s tenure was marked by economic decline, corruption scandals, and numerous accusations of misconduct which resulted in him becoming the posterchild for corruption. At the time of his resignation the country experienced a reduction in its export and commodity prices, the unemployment rate was 26.7 per cent, the country’s economy was weak and its’ image tainted. Many believed that his resignation marked the end of the country’s relationship with corruption and mismanagement.<br />
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Nonetheless, Zuma’s resignation held further implications for the country. It resulted in former trade union leader and Deputy President, Cyril Ramaphosa, taking over as the country’s acting President. Ramaphosa’s entry into office sparked a wave of optimism and hope for an economic revival which many referred to as Ramaphoria. It is important to note that he had a steep curve ahead of him. Ramaphosa was faced with addressing the country’s internal challenges, attracting foreign investment, rebuilding the country, and mending the divisions within the ruling party. During his first state of the Nation Address, he promised the South African people a new dawn. He stressed job creation which resulted in him hosting job summits, investment conferences and accelerated infrastructure projects, but very little was achieved. Twelve months later the country was still faced with a stagnant economy and high unemployment rates. Some hoped that this would change after the May 2019 national elections which cemented Ramaphosa’s position as President – now with a popular but weak mandate. <br />
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The 2019 national election highlighted the growing disillusion with the country’s political system, as it was the weakest electoral showing since the start of democracy in 1994. This may be due to the distrust that citizens have in government and the country’s political parties. The 2020 Edelman Trust Barometer found that 57% of the country’s general population believes that government serves the interest of a selected few, while only 30% believe that government serves the needs of the entire population. This mistrust may eventually result in a crisis of governance. <br />
<a data-flickr-embed="true" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/governmentza/41971585345" title="President Cyril Ramaphosa addresses inaugural Drakensberg Inclusive Growth Forum"><img alt="President Cyril Ramaphosa addresses inaugural Drakensberg Inclusive Growth Forum" height="400" src="https://live.staticflickr.com/1766/41971585345_93581698c5_z.jpg" width="600" /></a><script async="" charset="utf-8" src="//embedr.flickr.com/assets/client-code.js"></script><br />
Government has been warned that the country may be facing a probable collapse due to its inability to pay service providers, manage appointments, carry out disciplinary action and prevent corruption. In addition to that, poor governance, maladministration, a lack of investment, stagnating economic growth and reckless spending has resulted in government’s debt-to-GDP ratio reaching 69.1%. The country’s economy managed to grow by a mere 0.2% for 2019 before being brought to its knees by Eskom’s – the national utility - power outages during the last quarter of 2019. The country suffered two consecutive quarterly economic declines in 2019, which meant that it ended the year off in a technical recession. The World Bank, International Monetary Fund and the French International banking group BNP have all cut the country’s growth forecast for 2020. This and other reasons have resulted in South African companies planning to cut over 10,000 jobs during the first three months of 2020. This may aggravate the already devastating unemployment rate of now 29.1%. <br />
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In addition to that, the country’s cities and rural towns are on the brink of collapse as many of the country’s capitals are either in a state of disarray or under administration, and companies are moving out of rural towns that display poor management. Moreover, the government has been accused of not rendering basic services to their citizens. This has resulted in service delivery protests reported on by media outlets. South Africa has been displaying more serious governance challenges such as an increase in criminal and political violence, weakened state institutions, disintegrated roads, failing power plants, an erosion of investor confidence, a collapsing health system, gender based violence and an ever declining GDP. It is worth noting that these are characteristics of failing and failed states. While South Africa may not currently count as one, it is definitely flirting with the idea. South Africa needs to engage in serious introspection if it seeks to rectify its challenges. <br />
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The country is in need of inspirational leadership and action. It needs leadership that will prosecute those accused of weakening and destroying government departments and state-owned enterprises. Government needs to enforce expenditure cuts, address structural challenges, focus on institutional strengthening and continuity, and invest in infrastructure as this may stimulate the economy, restore domestic and foreign investors’ confidence and ultimately create jobs. This shift towards better or good governance is needed to achieve better social and economic outcomes such as poverty alleviation and sustainable development. It should be noted that continuous governance failures have the ability to diminish a governments’ legitimacy and this is certainly not something the country should aim towards. <br />
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Calamity beckons, as South Africa’s political leadership dithers.Adminhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11143142887187013059noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6718454524502259785.post-11870974682920817952019-03-14T10:45:00.000+09:002020-03-18T08:15:21.953+09:00Is Zimbabwe Poised for Another GNU?<div style="text-align: center;">
by Darlington Tshuma</div>
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Although not necessarily a new trend in political practice, Governments of National Unity (GNUs) seem to have gained popularity in the recent past, consequently becoming a preferred method of resolving electoral and political disputes in Africa. African diplomats, regional bodies and in some instances international actors like the African Union (AU) and the United Nations (UN) have been instrumental in establishing or encouraging the formation of GNUs or similar mechanisms in countries like Zimbabwe, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, South Africa and Zanzibar to mention a few. However; the efficacy of these arrangements have not been a subject of serious academic an policy debate hence very little theoretical and empirical evidence seem to suggest that GNUs can be effective mechanisms for resolving national disputes. <br />
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<a data-flickr-embed="true" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/worldeconomicforum/39843086932" title="An Insight, An Idea with Emmerson Mnangagwa"><img alt="An Insight, An Idea with Emmerson Mnangagwa" height="427" src="https://farm5.staticflickr.com/4668/39843086932_abb68c8d99_z.jpg" width="640" /></a><script async="" charset="utf-8" src="//embedr.flickr.com/assets/client-code.js"></script><br />
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Early in February 2019, the President of Zimbabwe, Emmerson Mnangagwa invited political parties that participated in the in July Harmonised Election to a ‘national dialogue’ at his state residence to discuss ‘a Framework for Post-Election Dialogue by Political Parties’. The invitation was snubbed by the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) leader Nelson Chamisa who argued that the purported dialogue was meant to give a veneer of legitimacy to Mnangagwa and his ZANU-PF party he accuses of ‘illegitimacy’ arising from a ‘stolen election’. Some 19 or so opposition parties responded positively to the President’s invitation. MDC is Zimbabwe’s biggest opposition party since the turn of the millennium and the leadership’s decision not to attend the dialogue is significant for anyone with an interest in Zimbabwean politics. The MDC argued that dialogue is not a monologue and ZANU-PF cannot simply preside over an election it stole. The MDC leadership tabled terms and conditions which ZANU-PF should first meet before any talks can resume. Among them was the release of its members charged with dubious ‘crimes’ during the January fuel protests and the importance of a neutral mediator to oversee and facilitate dialogue. While chances of a GNU seem unlikely in the short to medium term, it is important to examine the efficacy of a GNU in resolving Zimbabwe’s multiple crises. In this regard, I pose two different but complimentary questions. First; can a GNU transform Zimbabwe’s crisis? Second; if we agree that dialogue is important what form and shape should it take? <br />
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I attempt to unpack these important questions in two parts. First; I provide a context of GNUs and the various circumstances that le[a]d to their formation. This is important because it enables us to critically engage the efficacy of GNUs by asking important questions relating to the crisis in Zimbabwe. Second, I argue that while national dialogue is important, it must not coalesce around the idea of a GNU. I support this position by arguing that a GNU will not be a panacea to the Zimbabwean crisis and those calling for it probably misunderstand the nature of the crisis or simply want a quick fix to a complex problem. In advancing this point, I am in no way denying the magnitude of the crisis in Zimbabwe. In fact the crisis has reached a stage where national dialogue is not only urgent but desirable too. But what are the issues the dialogue must tackle? <br />
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With the exception of South Africa’s interim government that ushered a new democracy in 1994, most GNUs on the continent have emerged following electoral disputes between leaders of opposing political parties. This was the case in Kenya involving a disputed election between Mwai Kibaki’s Party of National Unity (PNU) and Raila Odinga’s Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) in 2007 and in 2008; Robert Mugabe’s ZANU-PF and the two MDC formations led by the late Morgan Tsvangirai and Arthur Mutambara. From a pragmatic perspective, GNUs are temporary ‘compromise governments’ formed between opposing parties following a dispute usually an electoral dispute. From a conflict transformation angle; GNUs are power-sharing mechanisms created to end hostilities between disputants and also to pave way for unity and stability in the hope of achieving positive peace. However, the reality is that they achieve none of this. In this regard, the experience of both Zimbabwe and Kenya is poignant. <br />
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However, this is not to suggest that GNUs are of no consequence. There are positives that the GNU in Zimbabwe brought and to dismiss these gains would be dishonest. For example, it stopped the mass killing of opposition supporters although incidents of sporadic political violence, land grabbing and intimidation of opposition supporters continued even during the GNU. It also stabilised the economy and arrested a run-away inflation. However, political tensions carried over from the pre-2008 period continued to threaten and have a negative impact on the economy. Accusations of deliberate sabotage were constantly raised by political leaders. Counter accusations somewhat gave the impression that political leaders are not signing from the same hymn while policy inconsistencies kept potential investors on their feet. This among other factors threatened full economic recovery. The GNU was also criticized for failing to resolve power imbalances. For example, there are claims that power was not evenly distributed; with ZANU-PF retaining all important security portfolios and the MDC getting less important and influential ministries. This arrangement frustrated security sector reforms that were key to GNU. The most cited criticism of the GNU is that it retained an election loser as state president. This gave Mugabe the leeway to make unilateral decisions, sometimes without consulting his principal in complete violation of the Global Political Agreement (GPA). <br />
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Having highlighted contentious issues involving GNUs, I now turn to one of the questions posed earlier; can a GNU transform Zimbabwe’s crisis? The answer is not so much! To create a context for my argument, I draw on few but key lessons from history. While Zimbabwe’s crisis is multifaceted, there is no denying that the crisis is first and foremost political. The nature of the crisis in Zimbabwe makes political reform a priority and as such any arrangement that fails to address this important aspect is tantamount to rearranging decks in a sinking ship. In both Kenya and Zimbabwe, GNU negotiations failed to adequately address the power and leadership questions (political question). In a classic case of ‘change without change’, the negotiations in both Zimbabwe and Kenya retained election losers as presidents. There is no reason to believe another GNU in Zimbabwe would have altered this trend. Related to that is the criticism that GNUs have a tendency to reconcile political elites while leaving the masses divided. The point here is that Zimbabwe does not need a GNU but a complete overhaul and restructuring of a system that breeds violence, intolerance, corruption and mismanagement. Chances that a GNU can undo these vices are close to none. There is also no evidence that the GNU in Zimbabwe (2009-2013) tackled common people’s problems like corruption and governance malpractice. Instead the GNU morphed into a power contestation where focus was on sharing political spoils and not the political and social transformation of a state structure that had bred the crisis in the first place. <br />
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By way of conclusion, I share some reasons why a GNU today would be a hard sell even to the most sympathetic and moderate interlocutors. First, the circumstances that led to the GNU in 2008 are at variance with the situation obtaining in the country today. First, the June 2008 election in which Mugabe controversially declared himself winner contravened regional and international best practice on elections and governance. Tsvangirai’s pull out solidified this claim. However, in the July election pitting Mnangagwa against Chamisa, not only did the latter participate but various international and regional election observer teams applauded both parties for holding what they deemed to have been a ‘peaceful election campaign in decades’. This was of course in comparison to past election campaigns enveloped in fear and uncertainty. In addition, Mnangagwa accredited election observer teams from over 40 countries including some previously banned by Mugabe. The motivations behind are a discussion for another day. Most importantly, the international goodwill that carried Mnangagwa through the elections saw him receive less condemnation for the post-election violence that claimed six lives and injured dozens. <br />
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Last, the political climate leading to the election in July was relatively stable. Opposition parties were for the first time ‘allowed’ to campaign in known ZANU-PF strongholds. In the June 2008 runoff, not only where MDC leaders persecuted but their followers and supporters killed, raped and abducted in broad daylight. The human rights abuses attracted international condemnation forcing Mugabe to negotiate with the opposition to save both his reputation and that of his party. In contrast; SADC and AU’s deafening silence over human rights abuses in January as well as the post-election violence (PVE) in August may have convinced Mnangagwa and ZANU-PF that it is possible to get away with murder and human rights abuses. <br />
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Darlington Tshuma is a PhD Candidate in the Peacebuilding Programme at Durban University of Technology, South Africa. He is a graduate of the Durban Transformational Leadership Programme and a Canon Collins scholar. He writes in his own capacity. Adminhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11143142887187013059noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6718454524502259785.post-463817179474587132018-08-15T10:42:00.000+09:002020-03-18T08:16:26.878+09:00Lesotho’s rule of law and judicial independence under threat: attempts to politicise the Judiciary<div style="text-align: center;">
<span class="post-labels">by M. K. Mahlakeng</span></div>
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Lesotho is a sovereign democratic kingdom. This denotes that the country, through constitutional provisions, acknowledges, encourages and protects civilian rule, and human rights and freedoms. Moreover, it further encourages and commits itself to the principles of separation of powers. The principle and/or doctrine of separation of powers is of importance within the constitutional framework of a democratic state, and it entails a strict separation of the functions, duties and responsibilities of three main branches of government (i.e. legislative, executive and the judiciary), in which state functions are allocated to distinctive institutions with a defined means of ‘competence’ and ‘jurisdiction’. This is evident in the nature and organisational structure of government. As such, the country’s constitution subsequently encourages and enhances ‘judicial independence’ in an effort to ensure ‘judicial review’.<br />
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The notion of judicial review enables the judicial branch, particularly the courts, to supervise the legislative and executive branches when they appear to exceed their authority; provide for effective checks and balances in the separation of powers; protect human rights and freedoms; and, invalidate laws and decisions that are incompatible with a higher authority. Both judicial review and judicial independence, which are made possible by the strict separation of powers and an adherence to constitutional provisions, emphasise the importance of the politics-law divide, and the need to maintain such a divide. <br />
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However in recent years, Lesotho has witnessed persistent breach of ‘separation of powers’, with either political branch of government (i.e. legislative and/or executive) attempting to politicise the judicial branch of government by dominating and dictating its operational work. The increasing blatant and brazen attacks of Lesotho government on courts, particularly the office of the Chief Justice, serves as an example of this. This growing attempt by government to influence judicial administration and decision-making is more and more becoming a norm subsequently undermining the principle of separation of powers, rule of law and threatening the safety of judicial officers.<br />
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And any attempt to challenge and address this phenomenon is failing due to the fact that the Lesotho Law Society, which in most part is expected to defend and protect the independence of the Judiciary, is gradually becoming the surrogate of any government of the day. As a result, this subsequently threatens the rule of law vis-à-vis judicial independence. Therefore, any successful domination of judicial administration and decision-making by the executive will ultimately question short, medium and long-term adequacy and legitimacy of judicial proceedings, rulings and/or verdicts etc. Moreover, this will be detrimental to the country’s judicial review processes. The Law Society and the Judiciary are the custodians of the constitution, and the assurance of constitutionalism (i.e. the practice of a limited government ensured by the existence of an effective constitution). And such an effective constitution can only exists when government institutions and political processes are effectively constrained by constitutional rules.<br />
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It goes without saying that in a democratic state, especially one which has obliged to conform to international human rights, judicial independence is of a national rather than any specific political party and/or organisations’ interests. In addition, the judiciary is entitled by law to run its own affairs in an effort to adequately promote and protect human rights among other aspects.<br />
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In both the 2012 the All Basotho Convention (ABC), Basotho National Party (BNP) and Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD), and the 2017 ABC, Alliance of Democrats (AD), BNP and Reformed Congress for Lesotho (RCL) coalition governments respectively with Tom Thabane as Prime Minister, the executive has been seen and accustomed to attempting to influence and dominate legal and judicial decision-makings. On more than one occasion, the Thabane-led administration has taken upon itself to directly decide on the appointments, tenure and decision-makings of the Judiciary and judges. And this has had negative implications on Lesotho’s judiciary and commitment to protecting human rights.<br />
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Firstly, on the 15th January 2015, PM Thabane unlawfully appointed Kings’ Council (KC) Kananelo Mosito as the new President of the Court of Appeal. A decision which was later nullified during the subsequent 2015 PM Pakalitha Mosisili-led coalition government due to Thabane’s administration being deemed a “caretaker government” which therefore made this appointment unlawful.<br />
Following the dissolution of Lesotho’s parliament on the 5th December 2014, it was decided by the electoral agreement (i.e. the Maseru Facilitation Declaration) that that coalition government will only act in its capacity as a “transitional or caretaker government” pending the 28th February 2015 general snap elections to eventually determine a legitimate government. It therefore meant that, Thabane’s government in its status as a caretaker government, failed to abide by the powers and functions of a caretaker or transitional government by making prominent appointments during this period, and therefore breached the electoral code. This immensely threatened the possibility of holding elections and placed dire ramifications on the country’s judicial system.<br />
The consequences for such an appointment included the resignation of four foreign Court of Appeal judges, that is, Justice Doughlas Scott, Justice Craig Howie, Justice Wilfred Thring and Justice Roger Cleaver, on the 30th January 2015, reducing the country’s apex court to only two South African judges, namely, Justice Winfred Louw and Justice Ian Farlam. However, the appointment of Mosito failed.<br />
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Nonetheless, domestically, regionally and internationally, this dealt Lesotho’s integrity a heavy blow. Moreover, Thabane’s actions and related outcomes of meddling with the judiciary formed part of other underlying political issues (i.e. poor leadership, and tensions and misunderstandings that occurred between coalition partners) that led to the 2015 collapse of his government which was only in office for 2 years. His government was replaced by another coalition government (i.e. the Democratic Congress (DC), LCD, Marematlou Freedom Party (MFP), Basotho Congress Party (BCP), National Independent Party (NIP), Lesotho People’s Congress (LPC) and Popular Front for Democracy (PFD) led by PM Pakalitha Mosisili. Similarly, this government collapsed at the backdrop of a no-confidence vote in Mosisili with only 2 years in office. And this led to the 3rd June 2017 elections which witnessed Thabane at the helm of government again. <br />
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<a data-flickr-embed="true" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/governmentza/40959000524" title="SADC Double Troika Summit, 23 to 24 April 2018"><img alt="SADC Double Troika Summit, 23 to 24 April 2018" height="377" src="https://farm1.staticflickr.com/871/40959000524_0f563b939b_z.jpg" width="640" /></a><script async="" charset="utf-8" src="//embedr.flickr.com/assets/client-code.js"></script><br />
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And secondly, on the 27th April 2018, barely a year in his presidency, Thabane sought to recommend, through a ‘show cause’ letter, for the suspension of Chief Justice Nthomeng Majara (i.e. Chief Justice of Lesotho since 2014 and the first woman to hold this office in Lesotho’s judicial history) over allegations of misconduct ranging from corruption to failure to preside over cases and an alleged plot to assist the opposition in toppling the government among others. This decision witnessed the support of the Minister of Law Lebohang Hlaele who is coincidentally married to Thabane’s daughter, ‘Mabats’oeneng Hlaele. Moreover, this move saw the support and threats from some cabinet ministers, principal secretaries and public demonstrations by individuals referred to as “Hands off Mosito” campaigners – who demand an urgent swearing in of Mosito as President of the Court of Appeal.<br />
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However, these distinctive but yet interrelated incidents cannot be isolated. Two things are certain and evident. On the one hand, Thabane highly intends to appoint Mosito as President of the Court of Appeal, while enabling him influence and absolute control over judicial decision-making on the other hand. Two behavioural phenomenon are common with the domination of the executive over judicial admiration. Firstly, by controlling and/.or influencing judges and/or judiciary translates to influencing the judicial judgments, agenda and general decision-making. In many instances, this often leads to “totalitarian governance” which tends to result in unchallenged and persistent cross violation of human rights and freedoms. And secondly, governments, particularly the President in a presidential government and/or the Prime Minister in parliamentary government, tend to use this influence to ultimately change the structure, nature and provisions of the constitution to extend their tenure in government. Essentially both these behavioural phenomenon often threaten human rights and freedoms, and restrict citizen participation vis-à-vis regular electoral processes.<br />
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The intensity of attempts to politicize the Judiciary, and the subsequent detrimental threats to judicial independence and the rule of law in the country eventually led to the 7th May 2018 intervention by the “Southern African Chief Justice’ Forum (SACJF)” and the “International Commission of Jurists (ICJ)” in an effort to protect and maintain judicial independence as per the principles of separation of powers. The SACJF has made calls on the government to uphold the independence of the judiciary arguing that matters relating to judiciary vis-à-vis judicial office bearers need to be handled in accordance with the law (i.e. constitutional provisions, principles of natural justice and due process).<br />
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According to Justice Peter Shivute, SACJF chairperson and Namibian Chief Justice, “the matter needs to be handled in accordance with the law and in a way that preserves the independence, integrity and dignity of the courts and one that reinforces rather than undermines the principles of separation of powers and the rule of law”. In addition, the ICJ has become critical over the slow pace of judicial reforms in Lesotho which is seen to be detrimental to the administration of justice. ICJ’s African director, Mr Arnold Tsunga, “reforms are critical in addressing ongoing problems within the judiciary….the leadership must realise that reforming the judiciary is of national rather than of political party interests”. <br />
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In June 2018, various Commonwealth judicial bodies additionally gave support to Justice Majara in an attempt to nullifying the allegations and reasons by the government to have her ousted from office. Moreover, this move aims to protect Lesotho’s judicial independence, judicial officials, and preserve the credibility and legitimacy of the rule of law by restricting the restructuring of the judiciary which is seen to be politically motivated. These bodies include the Commonwealth Lawyer Association (CLA), the Commonwealth Legal Education Association (CLEA), and the Commonwealth Magistrates and Judges Association (CMJA). Their joint venture to maintain an apolitical judiciary in Lesotho is a result, mainly, of Lesotho being a former British colony, and a current active member of the Commonwealth.<br />
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In this instance, government and/or state institutions are required to uphold provisions of “Commonwealth principles” (known as “Latimer House Principles”) which, among other key issues, govern the relationship between the three branches of government. Furthermore, these principles are the cornerstones of commonwealth values. And these includes fair disciplinary proceedings which will ensure that: a judicial officer in question is fully informed of the charges against him or her; a judicial officer in question is represented at any hearing; and, that the judicial officer in question is judged by an independent and impartial tribunal.<br />
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These judicial bodies have issued a joint statement which is also in support of the stance and remarks made by the SACJF in particular. They jointly argued that “any measure on the part of the Executive which is capable of being seen as eroding the independence and impartiality of the judiciary is a matter of serious concern and will erode public confidence in the legal system as a whole”.<br />
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These interventions were intended to preserve the politics-law divide. It is evident that the threat posed by the executive to Lesotho’s judiciary independence is not only a domestic concern, but also a regional and international one. And these bodies, especially the African Judges and Jurists Forum (AJIF), have went as far as to actively participate in the ongoing political, security and judicial reforms in Lesotho.Adminhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11143142887187013059noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6718454524502259785.post-48143790762744957192018-07-31T10:31:00.000+09:002019-03-20T10:36:04.104+09:00Understanding Lesotho’s political-security discourse and its historical and contemporary relevanceOne important notion regarding Lesotho’s persistent political and security instability evolves around the politicisation of the security sector and/or the vulnerability of the security sector to political influence. It is true that the security sector (i.e. the LDF and the LMPS) in Lesotho is politicised, as a result it often interferes in political affairs at which it tends to become involved directly and/indirectly in high-level political battles, with one of these institutions and/or sectors respectively supporting either the government and/or the opposition.<br />
The security sector is actively and openly involved and/or used in high-level political disputes. That is, to either intimidate, torture and/or kill politicians, and suppress political activism. However, this can be attributed to the historical relationship between politics and the military, but more significantly and to a large extent, to events following post-colonialization. Post-colonial Lesotho (1965-present), especially between 1965 and 1993, is a period within which the deep-rooted political-military linkages, and subsequent politicisation of the security sector were established. <br />
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Lesotho’s socio-political discourse and nature is unique in two ways. Firstly, Lesotho is an ‘enclave’ landlocked state. The only state in Africa with such a unique and uncomfortable geographic landscape. This means that it is entirely surrounded by a country (i.e. South Africa), thus making its problems and survival in the global political economy more delicate and serious than other states because its mere socioeconomic and political survival depends upon its encircling neighbour. And secondly, leading to and subsequent to this geographic situation, Lesotho was largely characterised by armed conflict (i.e. the Lifaqane/ Difaqane / Mfecane Wars (1818-1835); and, the Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) etc.). Thus making it highly depended on militaristic capabilities.<br />
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<a title="OER Africa [CC BY 2.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0)], via Wikimedia Commons" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Maseru_from_Parliament_Hill.jpg"><img width="512" alt="Maseru from Parliament Hill" src="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/0/09/Maseru_from_Parliament_Hill.jpg/512px-Maseru_from_Parliament_Hill.jpg"></a><br />
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In an attempt to understand Lesotho’s contemporary political and security landscape vis-à-vis political and security instability, it is important to understand the abovementioned, but particularly, the postcolonial political and security nature of Lesotho. This will significantly help stakeholders and policy-makers (i.e. civil society, governments, NGOs and IGOs etc.) in their attempts to provide lasting short, medium and long-term solutions to the prevailing political and security instability in the country. <br />
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The current social, economic, political, peace and security situation in Lesotho is a result of the events, situations and environment of Lesotho following independence from Britain in 1966. A comprehension of these events and the environment during the post-colonial era will also address misinformation and misunderstanding (i.e. which have resulted in failed solutions) by those participating in the peacebuilding processes. The nature and politics of post-colonial Lesotho is largely the basis of the current political agenda vis-à-vis political culture.<br />
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However, the politicisation of the military in Lesotho is not a new phenomenon. This political–military relationship can be traced back and/or attributed to a number of socio-political events which can be categorised into two (2) notable eras, namely the “autocratic rule” (1965-1986), and “military rule” (1986-1993). In these periods, force (i.e. notably that of the security branch) was used more or less to access, maintain and/or exercise government power vis-à-vis “maintaining the political and social status quo”. What is later experienced in the current “democratic civilian rule” [1993-present] is a result and consequence of these two eras.<br />
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The first decades of the 20th century led to the emergence of structurally organised anti-colonial and/or nationalist movements in resistance to colonial rule globally. This was also the case in Lesotho (i.e. the then Basutoland – a protectorate of Britain), with political pressure resulting in Britain to concede in granting Lesotho independence (i.e. equality and native self-driven social, economic and political governance and control). However, given the British desire to maintain its control over Lesotho’s socio-political and economic affairs and its favour of “chieftainship” (i.e. social, political and economic entitlement) over “commoners”, power rested with those who were monarchical.<br />
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As a result, under British-Catholic influence and with support by the chiefs, the Basutoland National Party (BNP) (later renamed the Basotho National Party – largely dominated and driven by local chiefs) was formed in 1958/9. Its sole purpose was to counter the Basutoland Congress Party’s (later renamed Basotho Congress Party) radical socialist rhetoric and its advancement of the interest of commoners at the expense of chiefs, which threatened the protection and security of Britain’s social, political and economic interests. What was instrumental about British colonial rule, like any other colonised territory in Africa and the World, was its domination over and exclusive control of domestic affairs (i.e. social, judicial, security, political and economic).<br />
Following Lesotho’s independence from the British’s 100 year rule (1866-1966), the socio-political landscape was marked by “intensive politically motivated military and/or police brutality”.<br />
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In April 1965 ahead of independence which was scheduled for the 4th October 1966, Lesotho held its first democratic elections. The elections were contested by the BNP led by Chief Jonathan Leabua, the BCP led by Ntsu Mokhehle and the Marema-Tlou Party (MTP – later referred to the Marema-Tlou Freedom Party (MFP) – which also opposed the ideological inclinations of the BCP).<br />
The BNP narrowly defeated the BCP in the elections, winning 31 parliamentary seats to the BCP’s 25 and the MFP’s four out of a total of 60. The BNP, with Leabua as Prime Minister, led Lesotho to Independence. However, these election results were characterised by protests from the opposition BCP and MFP who now wanted independence postponed alleging that the BNP had rigged the process with implicit collaboration of the British colonial administration. This was followed by violent conflicts with many lives lost. In maintaining the Leabua-British 60s rule, the need for the establishment of a security branch became crucial. Thus making the use of force (i.e. in the form of a police unit or paramilitary) order of the day. And the motives were explicitly political. This led to the establishment a “Police Mobile Unit” or ”Paramilitary police”.<br />
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The subsequent elections of 1970 were won by Mokhehle’s BCP with 36 seats to BNP’s 23, while MFP only secured one seat. However, the elections were nullified and the country’s multi-party democracy was suspended. Chief Jonathan seized power and declared a state of emergency. This resulted in the arrest, torture and killing of political activists (i.e. particularly BCP members), and the exile of King Moshoeshoe II. <br />
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Between the periods (1970-1986), the Lesotho Paramilitary Force (LPF), also known as a “paramilitary youth league”, was established as a separate entity from the paramilitary police. The LPF was formally declared an “army” in August 1979. Leabua’s administration used and relied on this army to supress, intimidate, torture and/ or assassinate political activists and associated activism. <br />
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However, in January 1986, Leabua was ousted in a military coup by General Metsing Lekhanya. This resulted in a military regime (1986-1991) which similarly depended and used military force to acquire and maintain government power. Following the coup, the LPF was renamed to “The Royal Lesotho Defence Force (RLDF)” subsequently assuming the status of a defence force. The army was similarly used to suppress political activity, especially that of the BCP. Moreover, the success of the 1986 coup symbolised the army’s significant role in internal power politics. This administration and consequent era was symbolic, as far as the political-military relations are concerned, in that it effectively and legislatively (i.e. through the “1986 Order No.4”) put in place laws that allowed military presence in cabinet further prohibiting political activities.<br />
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The importance of military force in acquiring and/or accessing government power is further evidenced in the 1991 military coup by Colonel Elias Ramaema which ousted Lekhanya. Despite that this military administration (2nd May 1991 – 2nd April 1993) resulted in the transformation of Lesotho back to democratic civilian rule (1993-present), military force became a means in achieving internal political ends and/or outcomes.<br />
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Currently, the democratic civilian rule is similarly not immune to military dependence and/or allegations of military politicisation. A few realities are testament to this. On the one hand, the former Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili’s (2015-2017) administration has been suspect and largely seen to be supported by the army under the LDF’s former commander Lieutenant-General Tlali Kamoli. And on the other hand, PM Thomas Thabane’s (2012-2015) administration was viewed to be supported by the late and former LDF commander Lt-Gen Maaparankoe Mahao. In essence, the security sector has been perceived essential to Lesotho’s political elites in influencing the distribution of power and resources, evidently with numerous security personnel, civilian and official casualties occurring in the process. <br />
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The assassinations of the LDF’s commanders (i.e. Lieutenant-General Mahao and Motšomotšo in 2015 and 2017 respectively) and military personnel in less than two years is testimony to the extent and depth of the political-military relations. Furthermore, the killing of the second commander in 2017 (i.e. Motšomotšo) despite numerous peacebuilding initiatives by various stakeholders and policy-makers to stabilise the political and security situation in the country following the assassination of Mahao in 2015 also points to the misunderstanding and/or ignorance of the entrenched historical political-military relations, thus resulting in failed and/or poor solutions in their respective initiatives.<br />
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In conclusion, if the abovementioned political-military relations continue to be ignored and misunderstood, Lesotho’s political and security sector will continue to worsen and casualties will increase rapidly. Moreover, governmental policies such as the 1995 Lesotho Ministry of Defence policy; state-driven military training operations such as the 1998 Operation Maluti training operation, and the 2001 Indian Army Training Team (IATT) operation; regional and institutional–driven civilian workshops and seminars such as the 2000 Institute of Security Studies (ISS) civil-military relations dialogue; and, regional initiatives such as the 2014-2018 Southern African Development Community (SADC) preventive mission which, among other key issues, aim to stabilise the political landscape and transform the LDF into an apolitical and accountable defence force will constantly fail to achieve respective desired political and security outcomes. Adminhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11143142887187013059noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6718454524502259785.post-89541432052614603962018-02-18T01:31:00.001+09:002018-02-18T01:31:59.799+09:00State of the Nation Address by the President of the Republic of South AfricaSTATE OF THE NATION ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, MR CYRIL RAMAPHOSA<br />
<br />
16 FEBRUARY 2018<br />
PARLIAMENT<br />
<br />
Speaker of the National Assembly, Ms Baleka Mbete,<br />
Chairperson of the National Council of Provinces, Ms Thandi Modise,<br />
Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly and Deputy Chairperson of the NCOP,<br />
Former President Thabo Mbeki,<br />
Former Deputy President FW de Klerk,<br />
Chief Justice Mogoeng Mogoeng and all esteemed members of the judiciary,<br />
Ministers and Deputy Ministers,<br />
Premiers and Speakers of Provincial Legislatures,<br />
Chairperson of SALGA and all Executive Mayors present, <br />
The Heads of Chapter 9 Institutions,<br />
Chairperson of the National House of Traditional Leaders,<br />
Leaders of faith based organisations,<br />
Former Speaker Dr Frene Ginwala,<br />
Former Speaker Mr Max Sisulu,<br />
Invited Guests<br />
Veterans of the struggle for liberation,<br />
Members of the Diplomatic Corps,<br />
Honourable members,<br />
Fellow South Africans,<br />
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It is a great honour and privilege to deliver this State of the Nation Address.<br />
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This Address should have been delivered last week, but was delayed so that we could properly manage issues of political transition.<br />
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I wish to thank Honourable Members and the people of South Africa for their patience and forbearance.<br />
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I also wish to extend a word of gratitude to former President Jacob Zuma for the manner in which he approached this difficult and sensitive process.<br />
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I wish to thank him for his service to the nation during his two terms as President of the Republic, during which the country made significant progress in several areas of development.<br />
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Fellow South Africans,<br />
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In just over 150 days from now, the peoples of the world will unite in celebrating the 100th anniversary of the birth of Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela. <br />
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It is a day on which we, as South Africans, will remember the life of one of the most remarkable leaders this country and this continent – and indeed, the world – has known.<br />
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We will recount Madiba’s long walk to freedom, his wisdom, his unfailing humility, his abiding compassion and his essential integrity.<br />
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We have dedicated this year to his memory and we will devote our every action, every effort, every utterance to the realisation of his vision of a democratic, just and equitable society.<br />
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Guided by his example, we will use this year to reinforce our commitment to ethical behaviour and ethical leadership. <br />
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In celebrating the centenary of Nelson Mandela we are not merely honouring the past, we are building the future.<br />
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We are continuing the long walk he began, to build a society in which all may be free, in which all may be equal before the law and in which all may share in the wealth of our land and have a better life. <br />
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We are building a country where a person’s prospects are determined by their own initiative and hard work, and not by the colour of their skin, place of birth, gender, language or income of their parents. <br />
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This year, we also celebrate the centenary of another giant of our struggle, Albertina Nontsikelelo Sisulu.<br />
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Through her remarkable life and outstanding contribution, she defined what it means to be a freedom fighter, a leader and a diligent and disciplined servant of the people.<br />
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Through her leadership, she embodied the fundamental link between national liberation and gender emancipation.<br />
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As we mark her centenary, we reaffirm that no liberation can be complete and no nation can be free until its women are free.<br />
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We honour this son and this daughter of the African soil in a year of change, in a year of renewal, in a year of hope.<br />
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We honour them not only in word, but, more importantly, in direct action towards the achievement of their shared vision of a better society.<br />
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We should honour Madiba by putting behind us the era of discord, disunity and disillusionment.<br />
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We should put behind us the era of diminishing trust in public institutions and weakened confidence in leaders.<br />
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We should put all the negativity that has dogged our country behind us because a new dawn is upon us. <br />
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It is a new dawn that is inspired by our collective memory of Nelson Mandela and the changes that are unfolding. <br />
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As we rid our minds of all negativity, we should reaffirm our belief that South Africa belongs to all who live in it.<br />
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For though we are a diverse people, we are one nation.<br />
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There are 57 million of us, each with different histories, languages, cultures, experiences, views and interests.<br />
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Yet we are bound together by a common destiny.<br />
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For this, we owe much to our forebearers – people like Pixley ka Seme, Charlotte Maxeke and Chief Albert Luthuli – who understood the necessity of the unity and harmony of all the people of this great land.<br />
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We are a nation at one.<br />
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We are one people, committed to work together to find jobs for our youth; to build factories and roads, houses and clinics; to prepare our children for a world of change and progress; to build cities and towns where families may be safe, productive and content.<br />
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We are determined to build a society defined by decency and integrity, that does not tolerate the plunder of public resources, nor the theft by corporate criminals of the hard-earned savings of ordinary people.<br />
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While there are many issues on which we may differ, on these fundamental matters, we are at one.<br />
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We know that there is still a lot that divides us.<br />
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We remain a highly unequal society, in which poverty and prosperity are still defined by race and gender.<br />
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We have been given the responsibility to build a new nation, to confront the injustices of the past and the inequalities of the present.<br />
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We are called upon to do so under difficult conditions.<br />
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The state we are in as a nation is that while poverty declined significantly following the democratic breakthrough of 1994, we have seen reverses in recent years. <br />
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Poverty levels rose in 2015, unemployment has gone up and inequality has persisted.<br />
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For several years our economy has not grown at the pace needed to create enough jobs or lift our people out of poverty.<br />
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Public finances have been constrained, limiting the ability of government to expand its investment in economic and social development.<br />
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Despite these challenging conditions, we have managed – working together – to achieve progress in improving the lives of our people.<br />
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Even under conditions of weak growth, our economy has created jobs, but not at the pace required to absorb new entrants into the labour market. <br />
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This means that as we pursue higher levels of economic growth and investment, we need to take additional measures to reduce poverty and meet the needs of the unemployed.<br />
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Since the start of the current Parliament, our public employment programmes have created more than 3.2 million work opportunities.<br />
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In the context of widespread unemployment, they continue to provide much needed income, work experience and training.<br />
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We have taken measures to reduce the cost of living, especially for the poor. <br />
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Government’s free basic services programme currently supports more than 3.5 million indigent households.<br />
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More than 17 million social grants are paid each month, benefiting nearly a third of the population.<br />
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We know, however, that if we are to break the cycle of poverty, we need to educate the children of the poor.<br />
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We have insisted that this should start in early childhood.<br />
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Today we have nearly a million children in early childhood development facilities.<br />
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We are seeing improvements in the outcomes of our basic education system. <br />
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The matric pass rate increased from 60.6 percent in 2009 to 75.1 percent last year.<br />
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There are currently almost a million students enrolled in higher education, up from just over 500,000 in 1994.<br />
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As we enter a new era, we are determined to build on these achievements, confront the challenges we face and accelerate progress in building a more prosperous and equitable society.<br />
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We have seen a moderate recovery in our economy and a broader, sustained recovery in the global economy.<br />
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Commodity prices have improved, the stock market has risen, the rand has strengthened and there are early indications that investor confidence is on the rise.<br />
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We have taken decisive measures to address concerns about political instability and are committed to ensure policy certainty and consistency.<br />
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There is a greater sense of optimism among our people.<br />
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Our people are hopeful about the future.<br />
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Business confidence among South African companies has improved and foreign investors are looking anew at opportunities in our country.<br />
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Some financial institutions have identified South Africa as one of the hot emerging markets for 2018.<br />
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Our task, as South Africans, is to seize this moment of hope and renewal, and to work together to ensure that it makes a meaningful difference in the lives of our people.<br />
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This year, we will be initiating measures to set the country on a new path of growth, employment and transformation.<br />
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We will do this by getting social partners in our country to collaborate in building a social compact on which we will create drivers of economic recovery.<br />
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We have to build further on the collaboration with business and labour to restore confidence and prevent an investment downgrade. <br />
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Tough decisions have to be made to close our fiscal gap, stabilise our debt and restore our state-owned enterprises to health. <br />
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At the centre of our national agenda in 2018 is the creation of jobs, especially for the youth.<br />
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We are going to embark on a number of measures to address the unemployment challenge.<br />
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One of the initiatives will be to convene a Jobs Summit within the next few months to align the efforts of every sector and every stakeholder behind the imperative of job creation.<br />
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The summit will look at what we need to do to ensure our economy grows and becomes more productive, that companies invest on a far greater scale, that workers are better equipped, and that our economic infrastructure is expanded.<br />
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We will expect this summit to come up with practical solutions and initiatives that will be implemented immediately.<br />
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We will make a major push this year to encourage significant new investment in our economy.<br />
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To this end, we will organise an Investment Conference in the next three months, targeting both domestic and international investors, to market the compelling investment opportunities to be found in our country.<br />
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We are going to address the decline over many years of our manufacturing capacity, which has deeply affected employment and exports.<br />
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We will seek to re-industrialise on a scale and at a pace that draws millions of job seekers into the economy.<br />
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We are going to promote greater investment in key manufacturing sectors through the strategic use of incentives and other measures.<br />
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To further stimulate manufacturing, we will forge ahead with the localisation programme, through which products like textile, clothing, furniture, rail rolling stock and water meters are designated for local procurement.<br />
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We have already spent more than R57 billion on locally-produced goods that may have been imported from other countries.<br />
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Special economic zones remain important instruments we will use to attract strategic foreign and domestic direct investment and build targeted industrial capabilities and establish new industrial hubs. <br />
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The process of industrialisation must be underpinned by transformation.<br />
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Through measures like preferential procurement and the black industrialists programme, we are developing a new generation of black and women producers that are able to build enterprises of significant scale and capability.<br />
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We will improve our capacity to support black professionals, deal decisively with companies that resist transformation, use competition policy to open markets up to new black entrants, and invest in the development of businesses in townships and rural areas.<br />
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Radical economic transformation requires that we fundamentally improve the position of black women and communities in the economy, ensuring that they are owners, managers, producers and financiers.<br />
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Our most grave and most pressing challenge is youth unemployment.<br />
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It is therefore a matter of great urgency that we draw young people in far greater numbers into productive economic activity.<br />
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Young South Africans will be moved to the centre of our economic agenda.<br />
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They are already forming a greater proportion of the labour force on our infrastructure projects and are the primary beneficiaries of programmes such as the installation of solar water heaters and the war on leaks. <br />
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We continue to draw young people in far greater numbers into productive economic activity through programmes such as the Employment Tax Incentive. <br />
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Working in partnership with business, organised labour and community representatives, we are creating opportunities for young people to be exposed to the world of work through internships, apprenticeships, mentorship and entrepreneurship. <br />
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Next month, we will launch the Youth Employment Service initiative, which will place unemployed youth in paid internships in companies across the economy.<br />
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Together with our partners in business, we have agreed to create a million such internships in the next three years.<br />
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If we are to respond effectively to the needs of youth, it is essential that young people articulate their views and are able to engage with government at the highest level.<br />
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I will therefore be establishing a Youth Working Group that is representative of all young South Africans to ensure that our policies and programmes advance their interests.<br />
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Infrastructure investment is key to our efforts to grow the economy, create jobs, empower small businesses and provide services to our people. <br />
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We have invested heavily in new roads, power stations, schools and other infrastructure. <br />
<br />
As some of our projects are taking time to get off the ground and to enhance our efforts, I will assemble a team to speed up implementation of new projects, particularly water projects, health facilities and road maintenance. <br />
<br />
We have learnt some valuable lessons from our experience in building all the new infrastructure, which will inform our way ahead. <br />
<br />
We will focus on improvements in our budget and monitoring systems, improve the integration of projects and build a broad compact on infrastructure with business and organised labour. <br />
<br />
Mining is another area that has massive unrealised potential for growth and job creation is mining.<br />
<br />
We need to see mining as a sunrise industry.<br />
<br />
With the revival in commodity prices, we are determined to work with mining companies, unions and communities to grow the sector, attract new investment, create jobs and set the industry on a new path of transformation and sustainability.<br />
<br />
This year, we will intensify engagements with all stakeholders on the Mining Charter to ensure that it is truly an effective instrument to sustainably transform the face of mining in South Africa. <br />
<br />
By working together, in a genuine partnership, underscored by trust and a shared vision, I am certain we will be able to resolve the current impasse and agree on a Charter that both accelerates transformation and grows this vital sector of our economy.<br />
<br />
Processing of the MPRDA Amendment Bill through both houses of parliament is at an advanced stage, with an indication by Parliament that the Bill will reasonably be finalised during the first quarter of 2018. <br />
<br />
The Bill, once enacted into law, will entrench existing regulatory certainty, provide for security of tenure and advance the socio-economic interests of all South Africans. <br />
<br />
We are extremely concerned about the rise in mining fatalities last year.<br />
<br />
We call on mining companies to work together with all stakeholders to ensure that mine accidents are dramatically reduced. <br />
<br />
One mining fatality is one too many.<br />
<br />
Fellow South Africans,<br />
<br />
Ultimately, the growth of our economy will be sustained by small businesses, as is the case in many countries.<br />
<br />
It is our shared responsibility to grow this vital sector of the economy.<br />
<br />
We will work with our social partners to build a small business support ecosystem that assists, nourishes and promotes entrepreneurs.<br />
<br />
Government will honour its undertaking to set aside at least 30 percent of public procurement to SMMEs, cooperatives and township and rural enterprises. <br />
<br />
We will continue to invest in small business incubation.<br />
<br />
We encourage business to do the same.<br />
<br />
The establishment through the CEOs Initiative of a small business fund – which currently stands at R1.5 billion – is an outstanding example of the role that the private sector can play.<br />
<br />
Government is finalising a small business and innovation fund targeted at start-ups.<br />
<br />
We will reduce the regulatory barriers for small businesses.<br />
<br />
We are also working to expand economic opportunities for people with disabilities. <br />
<br />
Among other things, the Small Enterprise Finance Agency – SEFA – has launched a scheme to develop and fund entrepreneurs with disabilities called the Amavulandlela Funding Scheme. <br />
<br />
Agriculture presents one of the greatest opportunities to significantly grow our economy and create jobs.<br />
<br />
Agriculture made the largest contribution, by a significant margin, to the improved growth of our economy in the second and third quarters of 2017.<br />
<br />
This year, we will take decisive action to realise the enormous economic potential of agriculture.<br />
<br />
We will accelerate our land redistribution programme not only to redress a grave historical injustice, but also to bring more producers into the agricultural sector and to make more land available for cultivation.<br />
<br />
We will pursue a comprehensive approach that makes effective use of all the mechanisms at our disposal.<br />
<br />
Guided by the resolutions of the 54th National Conference of the governing party, this approach will include the expropriation of land without compensation.<br />
<br />
We are determined that expropriation without compensation should be implemented in a way that increases agricultural production, improves food security and ensure that the land is returned to those from whom it was taken under colonialism and apartheid.<br />
<br />
Government will undertake a process of consultation to determine the modalities of the implementation of this resolution.<br />
<br />
We make a special call to financial institutions to be our partners in mobilising resources to accelerate the land redistribution programme as increased investment will be needed in this sector.<br />
<br />
Tourism is another area which provides our country with incredible opportunities to, quite literally, shine.<br />
<br />
Tourism currently sustains 700,000 direct jobs and is performing better than most other growth sectors.<br />
<br />
There is no reason why it can’t double in size.<br />
<br />
We have the most beautiful country in the world and the most hospitable people.<br />
<br />
This year, we will enhance support for destination marketing in key tourism markets and take further measures to reduce regulatory barriers and develop emerging tourism businesses.<br />
<br />
We call on all South Africans to open their homes and their hearts to the world.<br />
<br />
Our prosperity as a nation depends on our ability to take full advantage rapid technological change.<br />
<br />
This means that we urgently need to develop our capabilities in the areas of science, technology and innovation.<br />
<br />
We will soon establish a Digital Industrial Revolution Commission, which will include the private sector and civil society, to ensure that our country is in a position to seize the opportunities and manage the challenges of rapid advances in information and communication technology.<br />
<br />
The drive towards the digital industrial revolution will be underpinned by the availability of efficient networks. <br />
<br />
We will finalise our engagements with the telecommunications industry and other stakeholders to ensure that the allocation of spectrum reduces barriers to entry, promotes competition and reduces the cost to consumers.<br />
<br />
South Africa has acceded to the Tripartite Free Trade Area agreement, which brings together SADC, COMESA and the East African Community.<br />
<br />
The free trade area will combine markets of 26 countries with a population of nearly 625 million.<br />
<br />
It will open market access opportunities for South African export products, contribute to job creation and the growth of South Africa’s industrial sector. <br />
<br />
Negotiations towards the Continental Free Trade Agreement are progressing at a brisk pace, and it is expected that the framework agreement could be concluded soon. <br />
<br />
South Africa will this year take over the chair of the BRICS group of countries, and will give priority to the promotion of value-added trade and intra-BRICS investment into productive sectors.<br />
<br />
Fellow South Africans,<br />
<br />
On the 1st of May this year, we will introduce the first national minimum wage in South Africa.<br />
<br />
This historic achievement – a realisation of one of the demands of the Freedom Charter – is expected to increase the earnings of more than six million working South Africans and improve the living conditions of households across the country.<br />
<br />
The introduction of a national minimum wage was made possible by the determination of all social partners to reduce wage inequality while maintaining economic growth and employment creation.<br />
<br />
It stands as another example of what is possible when South Africans engage in meaningful dialogue to resolve differences and confront challenges.<br />
<br />
To ensure greater coherence and consistency in the implementation of economic policy – and to ensure that we are better equipped to respond to changing economic circumstances – I will be appointing a Presidential Economic Advisory Council.<br />
<br />
It will draw on the expertise and capabilities that reside in labour, business, civil society and academia.<br />
<br />
The country remains gripped by one of the most devastating droughts in a century, which has severely impacted our economy, social services and agricultural production.<br />
<br />
The drought situation in the Western Cape, Eastern Cape and Northern Cape has been elevated to a national state of disaster. <br />
This gives national government the authority to manage and coordinate our response nationally with support from all provinces. <br />
<br />
This will ensure that we also heighten integrated measures to support the provinces that are hardest hit. <br />
<br />
We are looking at activating the necessary extraordinary measures permitted under the legislation. <br />
<br />
I commend the people of Cape Town and the rest of the Western Cape for diligently observing water saving measures.<br />
<br />
We call on everyone in the country to use water sparingly as we are a water-scarce country that relies on this vital resource to realise our development aspirations.<br />
<br />
Honourable Members,<br />
<br />
On 16 December last year, former President Jacob Zuma announced that government would be phasing in fully subsidised free higher education and training for poor and working class South Africans over a five-year period.<br />
<br />
Starting this year, free higher education and training will be available to first year students from households with a gross combined annual income of up to R350,000.<br />
<br />
The Minister of Higher Education and Training will lead the implementation of this policy, while the Minister of Finance will clarify all aspects of the financing of the scheme during his Budget Speech next week.<br />
<br />
In addition to promoting social justice, an investment of this scale in higher education is expected to contribute to greater economic growth, reduce poverty, reduce inequality, enhance earnings and increase the competitiveness of our economy.<br />
<br />
Government will continue to invest in expanding access to quality basic education and improving the outcomes of our public schools.<br />
<br />
The Funza Lushaka Bursary programme plans to award 39,500 bursaries for Initial Teacher Education over the next three years.<br />
<br />
In an historic first, from the beginning of this year, all public schools have begun offering an African language.<br />
<br />
Also significant is the implementation of the first National Senior Certificate examination on South African Sign Language, which will be offered to deaf learners at the end of 2018.<br />
<br />
The Accelerated Schools Infrastructure Delivery Initiative programme continues to deliver modern facilities to schools in rural and underprivileged urban areas across the country, with at least 187 schools being complete to date. <br />
<br />
The programme will complete all outstanding projects by the end of the next financial year.<br />
<br />
Social grants remain a vital lifeline for millions of our people living in poverty.<br />
<br />
We will urgently take decisive steps to comply with the all directions of the Constitutional Court.<br />
<br />
I want to personally allay fears of any disruption to the efficient delivery of this critical service, and will take action to ensure no person in government is undermining implementation deadlines set by the court.<br />
<br />
We will finalise work on a permanent public sector-led hybrid model, which will allow a set of public and private sector service providers to offer beneficiaries maximum choice, access and convenience.<br />
<br />
This year, we will take the next critical steps to eliminate HIV from our midst. <br />
<br />
By scaling up our testing and treating campaign, we will initiate an additional two million people on antiretroviral treatment by December 2020. <br />
<br />
We will also need to confront lifestyles diseases such as high blood pressure, diabetes, cancers and cardiovascular diseases. <br />
<br />
In the next three months we will launch a huge cancer campaign similar to the HIV counselling and testing campaign. <br />
<br />
This will also involve the private sector as we need to mobilise all resources to fight this disease. <br />
<br />
The time has now arrived to finally implement universal health coverage through the National Health Insurance. <br />
<br />
The NHI Bill is now ready to be processed through government and will be submitted to Parliament in the next few weeks. <br />
<br />
Certain NHI projects targeting the most vulnerable people in society will commence in April this year.<br />
<br />
In improving the quality of life of all South Africans, we must intensify our efforts to tackle crime and build safer communities.<br />
<br />
During the course of this year, the Community Policing Strategy will be implemented, with the aim of gaining the trust of the community and to secure their full involvement in the fight against crime.<br />
<br />
The introduction of a Youth Crime Prevention Strategy will empower and support young people to be self-sufficient and become involved in crime fighting initiatives. <br />
<br />
A key focus this year will be the distribution of resources to police station level. <br />
<br />
This will include personnel and other resources, to restore capacity and experience at the level at which crime is most effectively combated. <br />
<br />
In recognising the critical role that NGOs and community-based organisation play in tackling poverty, inequality and related social problems, we will convene a Social Sector Summit during the course of this year.<br />
<br />
Among other things, this Summit should seek to improve the interface between the state and civil society and address the challenges that NGOs and CBOs face.<br />
<br />
Fellow South Africans,<br />
<br />
Growth, development and transformation depend on a strong and capable state.<br />
<br />
It is critical that the structure and size of the state is optimally suited to meet the needs of the people and ensure the most efficient allocation of public resources.<br />
<br />
We will therefore initiate a process to review the configuration, number and size of national government departments.<br />
<br />
Many of our state owned enterprises are experiencing severe financial, operation and governance challenges, which has impacted on the performance of the economy and placed pressure on the fiscus.<br />
<br />
We will intervene decisively to stabilise and revitalise state owned enterprises.<br />
<br />
The recent action we have taken at Eskom to strengthen governance, root out corruption and restore its financial position is just the beginning.<br />
<br />
Government will take further measures to ensure that all state owned companies fulfil their economic and developmental mandates.<br />
<br />
We will need to confront the reality that the challenges at some of our SOEs are structural – that they do not have a sufficient revenue stream to fund their operational costs.<br />
<br />
These SOEs cannot borrow their way out of their financial difficulties, and we will therefore undertake a process of consultation with all stakeholders to review the funding model of SOEs and other measures.<br />
<br />
We will change the way that boards are appointed so that only people with expertise, experience and integrity serve in these vital positions.<br />
<br />
We will remove board members from any role in procurement and work with the Auditor-General to strengthen external audit processes.<br />
<br />
As we address challenges in specific companies, work will continue on the broad architecture of the state owned enterprises sector to achieve better coordination, oversight and sustainability.<br />
<br />
This is the year in which we will turn the tide of corruption in our public institutions.<br />
<br />
The criminal justice institutions have been taking initiatives that will enable us to deal effectively with corruption.<br />
<br />
The commission of inquiry into state capture headed by the Deputy Chief Justice, Judge Raymond Zondo, is expected to commence its work shortly.<br />
<br />
The Commission is critical to ensuring that the extent and nature of state capture is established, that confidence in public institutions is restored and that those responsible for any wrongdoing are identified.<br />
<br />
The Commission should not displace the regular work of the country’s law enforcement agencies in investigating and prosecuting any and all acts of corruption. <br />
<br />
Amasela aba imali ka Rhilumente mawabanjwe.<br />
<br />
We must fight corruption, fraud and collusion in the private sector with the same purpose and intensity.<br />
<br />
We must remember that every time someone receives a bribe there is someone who is prepared to pay it.<br />
<br />
We will make sure that we deal with both in an effective manner.<br />
<br />
We urge professional bodies and regulatory authorities to take action against members who are found to have acted improperly and unethically.<br />
<br />
This requires that we strengthen law enforcement institutions and that we shield them from external interference or manipulation.<br />
<br />
We will urgently attend to the leadership issues at the National Prosecuting Authority to ensure that this critical institution is stabilised and able to perform its mandate unhindered.<br />
<br />
We will also take steps to stabilise and strengthen vital institutions like the South African Revenue Service.<br />
<br />
We must understand that tax morality is dependent on an implicit contract between taxpayers and government that state spending provides value for money and is free from corruption.<br />
<br />
At the request of the Minister of Finance, I will shortly appoint a Commission of Inquiry into Tax Administration and Governance of SARS, to ensure that we restore the credibility of the Service and strengthen its capacity to meet its revenue targets.<br />
<br />
Our state employs one million public servants. <br />
<br />
The majority of them serve our people with diligence and commitment.<br />
<br />
We applaud them for the excellent work they do.<br />
<br />
However, we know the challenges that our people face when they interact with the state.<br />
<br />
In too many cases, they often get poor service or no service at all. <br />
<br />
We want our public servants to adhere to the principle of Batho Pele, of putting our people first.<br />
<br />
We are determined that everyone in public service should undertake their responsibilities with efficiency, diligence and integrity.<br />
<br />
We want to instil a new discipline, to do things correctly, to do them completely and to do them timeously.<br />
<br />
We call on all public servants to become agents for change.<br />
<br />
During the course of the next few months, I will visit every national department to engage with the senior leadership to ensure that the work of government is effectively aligned.<br />
<br />
I will also find time to meet with provincial and local government leaders to ensure that the state, in its entirety, responds to the pressing needs of our people. <br />
<br />
Fellow South Africans,<br />
<br />
Our country has entered a period of change.<br />
<br />
While change can produce uncertainty, even anxiety, it also offers great opportunities for renewal and revitalisation, and for progress.<br />
<br />
Together we are going to make history.<br />
<br />
We have done it before and we will do it again – bonded by our common love for our country, resolute in our determination to overcome the challenges that lie ahead and convinced that by working together we will build the fair and just and decent society to which Nelson Mandela dedicated his life.<br />
<br />
As I conclude, allow me to recall the words of the late great Bra Hugh Masekela.<br />
<br />
In his song, ‘Thuma Mina’, he anticipated a day of renewal, of new beginnings.<br />
<br />
He sang:<br />
<br />
“I wanna be there when the people start to turn it around<br />
When they triumph over poverty<br />
I wanna be there when the people win the battle against AIDS<br />
I wanna lend a hand<br />
I wanna be there for the alcoholic<br />
I wanna be there for the drug addict<br />
I wanna be there for the victims of violence and abuse<br />
I wanna lend a hand<br />
Send me.”<br />
<br />
We are at a moment in the history of our nation when the people, through their determination, have started to turn the country around.<br />
<br />
We can envisage the triumph over poverty, we can see the end of the battle against AIDS.<br />
<br />
Now is the time to lend a hand.<br />
<br />
Now is the time for each of us to say ‘send me’.<br />
<br />
Now is the time for all of us to work together, in honour of Nelson Mandela, to build a new, better South Africa for all.<br />
<br />
I thank you.<br />
Adminhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11143142887187013059noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6718454524502259785.post-31788324139678584572018-02-17T23:00:00.000+09:002018-02-18T01:27:25.985+09:00Lesotho and the SADC intervention and Democracy in the Region<div style="text-align: center;"><b>by M. K. Mahlakeng</b></div><br />
“That there are men in all countries who get their living by war, and by keeping up quarrels of Nations is shocking as it is true” Thomas Paine<br />
From 20 November to 2 December 2017, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) deployed a 260-strong battalion regional force to address security concerns following the 5 September 2017 killing of Lieutenant General and Lesotho army chief Khoantle Motsomotso, Colonel Bulane Sechele and Brigadier Tefo Hashatsi. The SADC force comprised military, police, intelligence and civilian components from seven SADC countries; Angola, Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The underlying purpose of the force was to provide protection to the Prime Minister Tom Thabane-led coalition government while it implemented SADC’s previous recommendations to arrest military officers accused of alleged gross violations of human rights. Political and security concerns by the regional body over Lesotho are not recent. The regional body’s concerns over Lesotho’s political and security stability and/or instability emerged following the killing of Lt. General Maaparankoe Mahao.<br />
<br />
In response to Mahao’s killing, SADC established a commission of inquiry under the leadership of retired Judge Mpaphi Phumaphi. The purpose of a commission of inquiry is to employ independent individuals, during conciliation, to clearly and adequately investigate the facts of a particular dispute and to submit a report stating the facts and proposing terms. Furthermore, this commission must make recommendations and/or official suggestions about the best thing to do. However, in spite of forming a commission of inquiry to clearly and adequately investigate facts, more so in light of the killing of three high ranking Lesotho Defence Force (LDF) soldiers, SADC decided to send a battalion. This initiative may further exacerbate the already fragile political and security environment in Lesotho.<br />
<br />
The deployment consumed R87 million (M87 million) of the SADC budget, funds that could have been used to address climatic and socioeconomic hardships in the region Furthermore, such a deployment, as opposed to an inquiry, is perceived to be a tool to suppress citizens and political opinion rather than investigating and addressing the political and security issues in Lesotho. Such a perception emanates from the 1998 SADC intervention in Lesotho, commonly known as “Operation Boleas”, which instead of clearly, adequately and humanely addressing the political and security situation in Lesotho, it acted in favour of a supposedly “sitting government”, suppressing citizens and political opinion and killing 134 Basotho.<br />
<br />
These actions are not new to the region, where SADC will deliberately act as an armed force for ruling elites and/or turn a blind eye to the oppression of citizens. For instance, if Swaziland and Zimbabwe, highly dictatorial and undemocratic regimes, were allowed to chair and presumably provide leadership for SADC simply by virtue of them being member states, then yes it is highly possible that SADC can deliberately ignore gross violations of human rights in the region. It is in this instance that no SADC decisions can ever be fully democratic if its leadership is left in the hands of authoritarian leaders. It therefore becomes difficult, if not impossible, to commend SADC’s political decisions and actions in the region.<br />
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<a data-flickr-embed="true" href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/governmentza/28747265096" title="Southern African Development Community Ministerial Committee of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation meeting, 5 Aug 2016"><img src="https://farm9.staticflickr.com/8330/28747265096_236e104d0b_z.jpg" width="640" height="426" alt="Southern African Development Community Ministerial Committee of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation meeting, 5 Aug 2016"></a><script async src="//embedr.flickr.com/assets/client-code.js" charset="utf-8"></script><br />
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The escalation of tensions and disputes in Lesotho, Zimbabwe and many other SADC member states, to a point where lives are being lost are, are privy to SADC, given their Defence Intelligence Standing Committee. SADC’s inadequacy in numerous member state’s political, economic and security issues is equivalent to ignorance and/or support of such issues at the behest of sitting governments. Much of SADC’s actions in the region have never been made with adequate political and financial will. SADC has ignored the Democratic Republic of Congo’s (DRC) conflict which has prolonged and affected not only the political and socioeconomic stability of the region but the entire continent. It has further failed to address President Joseph Kabila’s overstaying his mandate, which has in many ways exacerbated the political and socioeconomic upheavals in the DRC.<br />
<br />
SADC has also continued to support King Mswati III’s despotic monarch rule which has for decades prohibited political autonomy and democratic principles. And this has been done at the expense of constant calls for representative democracy. Surprising how regional democracy can be achieved and conveyed in the region given that the same country [Swaziland], in August 2016, that endorses authoritarianism in contrast to popular support was made to chair an organisation [SADC] that endorses democracy. Moreover, same party rule – maintained through intimidation and oppression, is widespread and prevalent in the region. Tanzania, Mozambique, Botswana, Namibia, Angola and Zimbabwe serve as examples of this.Adminhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11143142887187013059noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6718454524502259785.post-13961893101289393532017-11-17T16:46:00.000+09:002017-11-17T16:50:00.027+09:00Zimbabwe’s Military Coup in Perspective<div style="text-align: center;">
<b>by Leon Hartwell</b></div>
<br />
Regardless of statements by Zimbabwe’s military leaders, a coup d'etat has taken place. Some Zimbabweans are already openly celebrating the removal or President Robert Mugabe, who has ruled the country since 1980. How did this military coup come about? What can we expect in the coming months? <br />
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<b><br />
The Role of Securocrats</b><br />
For those who have been close observers of the situation in Zimbabwe, this military coup did not come as a complete surprise. The king maker role of the so-called “securocrats” has been fundamental to Zimbabwe’s political establishment for decades. In fact, there is an old joke in Zimbabwe: “Why do they call it ‘general elections’? Because the generals determine the outcome of elections.” <br />
<br />
Since the beginning, Mugabe carved out an important role for the security sector to maintain order and to keep his regime intact. From 1982 to 1987, he used the notorious North Korean-trained Fifth Brigade to crack down on opposition in Matabeleland. It is said that Emmerson Mnangagwa, a crucial figure behind the current coup, was also a key player during that period when almost 20,000 Ndebele were massacred. For a period after that, the military was sent back to the barracks. However, by 2008, Mnangagwa reactivated the military to help secure Mugabe’s victory during the controversial run-off election.<br />
<b><br /></b>
<b>The Timing of the Coup</b><br />
Many of the securocrats who fought for Zimbabwe’s independence and who kept Mugabe in power, are the same people who have now turned against him. A key factor in the timing of the coup has been the ascendency of Mugabe’s wife, Grace within the ruling party, the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF).<br />
<br />
Since Grace entered public life, Zimbabweans have viewed her as a sexually promiscuous, uneducated former typist whose only interest is luxury shopping. By 2014, Grace went into high gear to beautify her image. The state-owned, ZANU-PF-controlled media, constructed an image of a person with a good heart (through her support for young orphans), a sophisticated businesswoman, an intellectual (the University of Zimbabwe controversially awarded her a PhD within two months of enrolment), and a shrewd politician. <br />
<br />
By the end of 2014, Grace became ZANU-PF’s head of the Women’s League and she helped to push out Vice President Joice Mujuru, who at the time stood a good chance of becoming Mugabe’s successor. It was a warning to other potential successors. <br />
<br />
More than anything else, Grace’s rise to the top in Zimbabwe threatened the interests of Zimbabwe’s establishment, which includes the security sector. She wanted to establish a dynasty and to replace prominent securocrats with Generation 40 (G40), a relatively younger crop of Zimbabweans who showed loyalty towards her. <br />
<br />
The removal of Grace was therefore a matter of urgency. In Zimbabwe, power is money, and the being shunned has major financial implications. The coup has nothing to do with genuinely restoring the constitutional order or anything noble, it is an attempt to protect the establishment’s political and financial interests. <br />
<br />
Besides, this coup came at a time when Grace’s public image took yet another nose dive, which means there will not be a huge outcry if she is removed from the political scene. In August, Grace viciously assaulted a model in a luxury apartment rented by her sons in South Africa. The incident reinforced Grace’s bad reputation for public outbursts and it sparked greater scrutiny over the First Family’s opulent lifestyles. <br />
<br />
Grace’s problem is that she was punch drunk on victory, but little did she realise that she was overplaying her hand. Her most drastic move to date was her open intentions to get rid of Vice President Mnangagwa, arguably one of the most important securocrats in Zimbabwe. Whether her preferred method was poisoning him through thallium, or by convincing her husband to sack him remains unclear. Nonetheless, after Mnangagwa was unceremoniously fired, the security sector had to act rapidly. If Mnangagwa truly believes that he was poisoned by Grace’s minions, the coup was also a matter of life and death as well as revenge. Over the years, Mugabe has thrown too many struggle ‘comrades’ under the bus and this was, “the last straw” as one Zimbabwean described it to me. <br />
<br />
The timing of this coup was also perfect, given the state of Mugabe’s health and his extensive traveling. He is 93 years old, and he has increasingly been caught stumbling and sleeping in front of cameras. In 2017 alone, Uncle Bob spent an enormous amount of time (almost 57 percent of his time by mid-May), outside of Zimbabwe, sometimes for medical reasons. This gave the securocrats plenty of time to plot their coup, and if need be, an excuse to say that Mugabe is not medically fit to be President. <br />
<br />
A third factor that precipitated the coup, is that the Zimbabwean economy is once again “in the intensive care unit” as some would say. At the end of October, economist Steve Hank noted that the country’s annual inflation rate stood at 348 percent. It is possible that the coup makers calculated that most Zimbabweans will not lose much sleep over the removal of Uncle Bob. In fact, some individuals from Harare to Beijing, might even welcome it. <br />
<br />
<b>Looking Into the Crystal Ball</b><br />
The top four priorities for the coup makers will be maintaining order, controlling the message, cloaking the military takeover in civilian clothes, and rolling out measures to improve the economy. All these issues are ultimately intertwined.<br />
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With regards to maintaining order, already, police officers have been rounded up throughout Zimbabwe and Mugabe has reportedly been placed under house arrest. It is unlikely that there will be heavy infighting within the security sector given the broad support for General Constantino Chiwenga (commander of Zimbabwe’s Defence Forces), Air Marshal Perence Shiri, Lieutenant-General Valerio Sibanda (Commander of the National Army) and Mnangagwa.<br />
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War veterans have also been brought in to provide legitimacy to the coup. Their role should not be underestimated. For years, Zimbabwean propaganda has praised them as the liberators of the country. The War Veterans, then under the leadership of the late Chenjerai "Hitler" Hunzvi, were also the ones who were instrumental in the country’s land grab. <br />
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Current chairman of the War Veterans Association, Chris Mutsvangwa, has thus far praised the military coup leaders for setting Zimbabwe on a path to restore “genuine democracy” after it was captured by rogue elements. It is probable that Mutsvangwa will also play an important role in terms of presenting a friendly face on behalf of the ‘new’ regime. He is a prominent businessman, politician, and diplomat. He was instrumental in developing Mugabe’s Look East Policy where Zimbabwe began to focus increasingly on China to replace Western businesses after the country was hit by sanctions. At the same time, Mutsvangwa has served as a diplomat in the Western world, and he has a positive reputation among Western diplomats. <br />
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As for messaging, the coup makers moved rapidly to take over the state-owned media in order to control the message. Their main focus has been, and will continue to be, to legitimise the military coup. This will involve justification of the coup by for example saying that this has been done in the name of national interest and ultimately for the greater good. <br />
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At the same time, the coup makers will satanize Grace Mugabe and other G40 members like Jonathan Moyo, Saviour Kasukwuere and Ignatius Chombo. They will parade their wealth and all their dirty laundry in front of the television cameras so as to demonstrate that these individuals were looting Zimbabwe at the expense of the average Zimbabwean. The lines between “us” and “them” and “good” and “evil” will become more pronounced in the coming days. <br />
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Another big part of the gaining popular support for the coup will be to make economic development a key priority. For a start, coup makers will have to dampen the country’s hyperinflation. They will also do their best to court Zimbabwean, South African and Western businesses. One can expect them to stress the importance of private property rights in order to bring some form of predictability back into the economy. <br />
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The coup makers will also have to call on some favours from China. Despite his Look East Policy, Chinese companies have reportedly had a difficult relationship with Mugabe after they were recently accused by him of siphoning off $15 billion in diamond revenue. Less than a week ago, G40 attempted to finger Mnangagwa for looting the revenues, but in truth, they were all in it together. Chinese companies will therefore have to cough up some diamond revenues in exchange for guarantees that their interests in Zimbabwe will not be harmed. It is likely that this was a central issue that Chiwenga ironed out with the Chinese during his recent visit to the country shortly before the coup. China could also provide Zimbabwe with some protection within the United Nations Security Council if need be, especially if issues such as sanctions of military intervention are raised. <br />
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<b>Legitimising the Military Coup and Scenarios</b><br />
Despite the evidence, the military has claimed that what has transpired in Zimbabwe is not a coup. This is a crucial issue, given that both the African Union (AU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) generally react negatively towards coups d'état. Their reactions to past coups in the region have ranged from membership suspension to military intervention. The latter move is unlikely at present, but there will definitely be a lot of pressure by SADC and the AU to return the levers of power to civilian hands. <br />
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Military coups can be flued, but broadly speaking, there are three scenarios to remove Mugabe and to install a civilian government (even if the latter will merely be window dressing). One, coup leaders could force Uncle Bob to resign in exchange for security guarantees for him and his family. They could strategically demand that Mnangagwa be reinstated as Vice President before his resignation. Legally speaking, that would make it easier for the Crocodile, as Mnangagwa is nicknamed, to become President. <br />
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In a second scenario, should Mugabe fail to cooperate, coup makers, with the help of their friends in ZANU-PF, could also argue that Mugabe has become “incapacitated” over the past few weeks, which is when Grace became the de facto President. This means that Mnangagwa’s dismissal as Vice President was unconstitutional, and instead of being fired, he should have legally become President of the country. As a result, he will simply be ‘reinstated’ in his ‘rightful’ position. <br />
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A third scenario would be to call for an extraordinary ZANU-PF conference. Mugabe can then be officially removed as president of the party (and subsequently also the country) and ‘democratically’ replaced by Mnangagwa or a compromise candidate. This by no means entails that succession will be easy, as succession rules are very murky. But, with G40 out of the way and the military in control, there is a greater chance that ZANU-PF will unite behind one candidate. <br />
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Finally, coup leaders could form some sort of a Government of National Unity (GNU) akin to the one birthed by the Global Political Agreement after the violent 2008 elections. This would make the military coup more attractive to Zimbabwe as a whole at it would give the illusion of inclusivity and hope. In this effort, they will attempt to construct another GNU by bringing in representatives, not only from ZANU-PF, but also from opposition parties. One can expect that the military will engage a wide-ranging group of players, including Joice Mujuru, Morgan Tsvangirai, Tendai Biti, and Welshman Ncube. They will also likely promise free and fair elections within a reasonable time period. <br />
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Some opposition figures might respond favourably to the coup makers for two reasons: Firstly, after a long absence from government, they will be tempted to be part of it given that it would provide them with access to some form of power and resources. Secondly, they might hope that the military coup represents the possibility to effect change. However, they should not be blinded as to how this military coup came into being. This is the same security sector that helped to keep Mugabe in power for nearly four decades, the very man who is about to be vilified. In the absence of serious institutional changes, the risk is that they will again be disposed as soon as the next general election is announced, and we know why they call it general elections.<br />
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<b>What If the Crocodile Comes Out on Top? </b><br />
As seen, in several of the scenarios, Mnangagwa stands a good chance to replace Mugabe as President. I remember meeting him at a function at the end of 2012 or beginning of 2013 at the Rainbow Towers in Harare. It was during the country’s Constitution making process and I was keen to gage his perspective on the matter. After exchanging a few pleasantries, I asked him about his background in law. I said to him, “They say you are well versed in legalese”, to which he icily responded, “I am a military man.” <br />
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Mnangagwa has been a key player within the security establishment from the very beginning. He also has strong links with the political and security establishment in SADC as well as China. But it is his political unpopularity that should raise the most serious red flags. As a candidate, he has proven to be unpopular in past elections. It means that should he be fielded as ZANU-PF’s presidential candidate at some point in the future, he will most likely resort to familiar methods that have served him well in the past - threats, violence and extreme electoral manipulation - in order to stay on top. <br />
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In the coming weeks though, the military coup leaders will attempt to soften Mnangagwa’s image. They will present him, not as a “military man” as he put it to me, but as a victim and a humble politician ready to serve the nation. His background and experience in law will certainly come in handy to perform legal gymnastics to legitimise this coup. <br />
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Those who already rejoice over the removal of Mugabe in the hope that something better is on the horizon will most likely be disappointed. What has happened represents merely a readjustment of the old older rather than a new beginning. <br />
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<span style="font-size: x-small;">Leon Hartwell was the Senior Policy Adviser for Political and Development Cooperation at the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Harare from 2012-2013. He is currently a PhD candidate at Stellenbosch University focusing on conflict resolution and mediation.</span>Adminhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11143142887187013059noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6718454524502259785.post-59048108673195762972017-11-13T01:21:00.003+09:002017-11-13T01:21:52.756+09:00Can South Africa Escape its Economic Stagnation?<div style="text-align: center;">
<b>by Philippe Burger</b></div>
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(Professor of Economics, University of the Free State, South Africa)</div>
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South Africa has a triple challenge of high unemployment, high poverty and high inequality. The latest official unemployment rate falls just shy of 28%, while the so-called broad unemployment rate exceeds 36%. In addition to people actively searching for a job, the broad unemployment rate also includes those who want a job but because of job scarcity stopped looking for one (they are also called discouraged work-seekers). Whereas in other countries typically six out of ten working-age individuals work, in South Africa it is just a bit more than four out ten. That increases the dependency ratio in South Africa of non-working individuals (of all ages) to working individuals significantly. <br />
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In 2009, during the global financial crisis, 796 000 workers lost their jobs. Broad unemployment increased by 918 000 people during this period. After the crisis subsided employment started to increase, but at a very slow pace. From the end of 2008 to the end of 2016 the number of employed workers increased by 1.3 million. But unemployed people seeking jobs increased by 1.7 million, while discouraged work-seekers increased by 1.1 million. Thus, using the broad definition of unemployment, the number of unemployed people increased by 2.8 million. This is more than double the increase in employed workers. Clearly South Africa does not create enough jobs. Furthermore, unemployment and non-participation in the labour market are the largest contributors to poverty and inequality in the South Africa. Thus, reducing unemployment will go far to deal with reducing poverty and inequality.<br />
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Empirical evidence shows us that higher economic growth translates into higher employment growth. However, historically the growth in employment resulting from economic growth in South Africa has not been very strong (economists call this a low employment intensity of economic growth). Over the period 1982 to 2017 for every 1% that the economy grew employment grew on average by only between 0.23% and 0.3%. In many countries this is closer to 0.5%. <br />
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South Africa also suffers from stagnating, low growth. Whereas the economy grew in excess of 5% in the mid-2000s, by 2016 growth fell to 0.5%. This is less than the population growth rate of 1.61% in 2017, indicating that per capita income is actually falling. Unlike earlier recessions, such as the recession in the late 1990s that followed the Asian crisis, and the so-called Great Recession of 2008/9 that followed the global financial crisis, the recessionary conditions characterising South Africa currently seems mostly of its own making. <br />
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Policy uncertainty and a seeming longstanding unwillingness of the government to address a number of deep structural problems characterising the South African economy has contributed to a loss of confidence among both investors and consumers, and hence to the fall in economic growth. To reduce unemployment, poverty and inequality requires that economic growth be inclusive. However, it is often forgotten that for growth to be inclusive, there first needs to be growth.<br />
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At the conclusion of its most recent visit to South Africa in November 2017, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) highlights the need for the South African government to address issues causing the loss of confidence. The IMF also opines that to restore confidence, an announcement on much-needed reforms that increase competition and reduce input costs to businesses and households should be made sooner rather than later. <br />
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Confidence is further weakened by fears that rampant corruption and so-called state capture is undermining the democratic structures of the country. Indeed, the need to roll back corruption and state capture is increasingly seen as a prerequisite to restoring investor confidence. Only then will economic growth stand a chance of returning to levels last seen in the mid-2000s; only then can the triple challenge of high unemployment, high poverty and high inequality be addressed. <br />
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Standard growth theory tells us that economic growth depends in the first instance on a country’s levels of physical and human capital. South Africa lacks fixed (physical) capital investment. And its poor school performance means that it fails dismally in the creation of human capital.<br />
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The lack of fixed investment is not a new phenomenon. From 1992 to 2007 the total public and private capital stock of the country, expressed as a ratio of total income earned in the country, fell from almost 353% to just more than 256% in 2007. It then rebounded to reach 275% in 2015 (mostly as a result of the construction of the Medupi and Kusile power stations). To restore these capital stock levels requires much higher levels of fixed investment than is currently characterising the economy. In addition, given that the drop in the country’s capital-to-income ratio resulted from a drop in both public and private capital, investment is needed in both the public and the private sectors.<br />
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To restore private investment requires the roll back of corruption and the implementation of policy reforms that address the economy’s deep structural problems. Public investment in the form of infrastructure development is also necessary. However, the state of finances of South Africa’s state-owned enterprises and the growing public debt-to-GDP ratio of the national government put a limit on government’s ability to expand infrastructure investment. To cut debt and increase public sector investment will require a cutback in government’s current expenditure, of which government’s salary bill constitutes a large proportion (larger than is usual in South Africa’s emerging market peer-group countries). Given the limit on government’s borrowing capacity, policy should also consider supporting private investment in what traditionally was considered the realm of public investment. Examples include renewable energy sources such as wind and solar power.<br />
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The structural reform policies that the government needs to implement, must also include policies that ensure inclusivity – otherwise economic growth will not be inclusive. Key inclusive policies that also support growth include tenure rights reform on communal land, policy to significantly improve South Africa’s dismal education system, and policy to support investment. <br />
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More than 30% of South Africans still live on communal land, mostly located in the former apartheid homelands. Most of this land is still controlled by traditional leaders, with individuals living on the land lacking proper tenure rights to the land. Tenure reform must ensure that communities gain control of communal land and that individuals farming plots of land have tenure security that they can leverage to access commercial and development finance. To reduce input costs and improve market access, the government must also facilitate the development of proper supply chains within which small-scale farmers can be embedded. <br />
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<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
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<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Farmers in South Africa (by Solidarity Center)</td></tr>
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In the longer run inclusion in both urban and rural areas will depend on education. According to StatsSA almost half of the unemployed did not complete high school, with a further 11% having completed only primary school or less. This contrasts with just more than a third of the employed not having completed high school and a further 13% completing only primary or less. Only 7.8% of the unemployed hold a tertiary qualification. This contrasts with 20.3% of employed workers holding a tertiary degree. The mismatch between the qualifications of the employed and the unemployed shows that lower levels of education coincides with a higher probability to be unemployed. In addition, research by Hanushek and Woessmann clearly shows that countries whose children score better in mathematics and science are also countries that grow much faster. And note that it is not only rich countries that grow fast. To the contrary, many emerging market countries appear on the list of fast growers.<br />
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Even though education will contribute to faster economic growth, given the time it takes to educate people, education remains a long-term policy (though with a short-term urgency to implement it). To spur growth in the short- to medium term requires higher levels of fixed investment. Ensuring policy certainty, business-friendly economic policy and a willingness to see the business sector as a true partner in developing the economy, will spur the business sector to invest. The government should then encourage a recursive investment policy, i.e. a policy that not only encourages investment, but also the reinvestment of the returns made on investment. Irrespective of whether such investment takes place in labour- or capital-intensive industries, employment will increase. We know this from the all too brief growth spurt of the mid-2000s when, even though South Africa has a low employment intensity, economic growth of between 3% and 5.5% reduced the unemployment rate from about 29% to 21% between 2003 and 2008.Adminhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11143142887187013059noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6718454524502259785.post-69759124774836379112017-11-11T13:29:00.001+09:002017-11-11T13:29:52.339+09:00Zimbabwe’s Watershed Moment After the Axing of Vice-President Mnangagwa<div style="text-align: center;">
<b>by Mlandvo Ndwandwe</b></div>
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A country once called the breadbasket of Southern Africa has constantly failed under the autocratic leadership of President Robert Mugabe. His disdain for his own people was demonstrated when President Mugabe sacked his popular long-serving Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa. Mnangagwa was seen as a leading contender to succeed President Mugabe and his removal appeared to clear the way for the First Lady, Grace Mugabe, to take over. Mnangagwa’s dismissal follows a familiar pattern. The former Vice President Dr. Joyce Mujuru was dismissed as a result of false accusations of not being loyal to Robert Mugabe and wanting to overthrow him. Similar charges were levelled at Mnangagwa.<br />
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Hailed as the military mastermind of the 1970 war against settler-colonialist forces of the Ian Smith regime, Mnangwana, gained tremendous popularity within the ranks of ZANLA, the former military wing of the Zimbabwe African National Union, ZANU. We’re not talking about a peace-time hero here but a war veteran who spent more than 10 years in prison for fighting against colonialism and a freedom fighter that proved his endurance during difficult times by passing important examinations for his junior law degree whilst incarcerated. As a result, Mnangagwa’s popularity and subsequent dismissal raises questions as to Zimbabwe’s future stability.<br />
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<b>Why was Mnangwana fired just now? </b><br />
Mnangwana is one of the few public servants who has served as a minister since the first administration in 1980, as a Minister of State Security, to the Ministry of Defence, Rural Housing and Social Amenities, Speaker of Parliament and again Minister of Justice before being appointed Vice President three years back by President Mugabe. Being loyal, committed and performing from 1980 surely we cannot accept the lame excuse given by the Information Minister Simon Khaya Moyo, “It had become evident that his conduct in the discharge of his duties had become inconsistent with his official responsibilities,” who announced the dismissal. Mnangwana is an extremely experienced bureaucrat who cannot be recalled from office without concrete evidence or at least a formal investigation. The question is, why is the Vice President displaying undesirable conduct 37 years in the same government he helped to build?<br />
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The context is important in dispelling the official narrative that the loyal Vice-President was incompetent and therefore needs to be dismissed. On 12th August 2017, Emmerson Mnangwna was reportedly poisoned during the Zanu-PF rally in Gwanda which is in the southern part of Zimbabwe. On his return to his office on the 19th August, rumors were spread that he was planning to take power ‘unconstitutionally’. These rumours were allegedy spread by top ranking members of the ruling party including Mrs Grace Mugabe. The level of infighting within ZANU-PF is intimately related to post-Mugabe succession politics. As the spokesperson of the opposition People’s Democratic Party (PDP) asserted, Zanu-PF is, "simply a group of cannibals who feast on each other's political blood." <br />
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<b>What does this mean to the political future of Zimbabwe?</b><br />
Democratic structures are grossly undermined and political insurrection is inevitable. We see an institutionalization of the Mugabe dynasty in the same pattern as we have witnessed dynastic succession in same as we saw it entrenched in North Korea and Gabon. Speculation is rife that Mnangagwa’s removal is part of the elaborate plan to get the First Lady to succeed her ailing husband. Zimbabwe is at the brink of total political collapse and the destruction to come will reduce the country to a kleptocratic dictatorship maintained only by state repression. The future of the country looks increasingly abysmal and socio-economic recovery is unlikely to be achieved. <br />
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<b>What should Zimbabweans do?</b><br />
The masses of the people should start participating in the country’s politics, especially during local and national elections. The people of Zimbabwe are their own saviors and should take their voting powers seriously. To avoid what happened in the 2008 rigged national elections they should fully participate in the electoral processes – and not boycott them. This includes campaigning for a democratic dispensation, fixing their accountability structures and casting and counting of votes. Sacrifices are unavoidable, the regime will victimize some citizens but they cannot stop the collective will of the people as we witnessed during the Arab Spring. Zimbabweans should take control of their destiny or suffer the consequences of complacence in a kleptocratic dictatorship.<br />
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The international community were wrong-footed with Mnangagwa’s ouster. Western countries, in particular, supported Mnangagwa on account of his proposed business-friendly policies. The international community should speak with one collective voice and exert pressure on Harare to ensure that any future poll is free and fair – so that the voice of ordinary Zimbabweans are heard. <br />
<br />Adminhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11143142887187013059noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6718454524502259785.post-21954387215800946502017-10-19T16:13:00.002+09:002017-10-19T16:13:54.485+09:00A Call for Free Education by South African Students<div style="text-align: center;">
<b>by Moitshepi MoAfrika Lipholo</b></div>
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<div style="text-align: center;">
(Student Leader, University of the Free State, South Africa)</div>
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In 2015, South Africa was subjected to significant student driven protest actions in the higher education sector. This was based in the form of various social movements beginning with the #Rhodes Must Fall campaign at the University of Cape Town (UCT). The actions of a postgraduate student at the UCT pouring human waste over the campus statue of the colonialist Cecil John Rhodes gave birth to the #Rhodes Must Fall movement. The demand for eradication of colonialist and Apartheid symbols such as buildings, statues, artworks, and names in the higher education spaces linked to the apartheid past, can be regard as the first phase for the students’ revolt. This first phase was pregnant with the call for free education under the hash tag Fees must Fall. <br />
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A new phase of the student movement started at Wits University after the leaked information that the Johannesburg university was about to increase its fees by 10. 5%. On 14 October 2015 South Africa was trending with #FeesMustFall. The students used social media as the tool to mobilize other students to protest against the increase of fees. On the same day students also started to shut down campuses across the country. On this day too, the former Minister of Higher Education and Training Dr Blade Nzimande was hosting the Summit on Transformation in Higher Education in Durban with different stakeholders. The students boycotted the summit. This was a sign of problems ahead regarding the affordability of fees in higher education for poor deserving students. At the end of October that year, students closed almost all campus around the country. They also managed to bring the country to a standstill and forced a freeze on fees increase. The call for free education was the fight against the commodification of education in South Africa. The notion that the only way to access higher quality education is by paying a premium for it was very wrong and dangerous. This was the perception of students fighting for free education.<br />
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The government of President Jacob Zuma started to realise that what they now were confronted with in the student movement was much more serious than they initially assumed. The call for free decolonized quality education was marked by the eruption of violent protests around university campuses. The main reason violence was adopted by students in their protests was because of the decision by government to militarize the university campuses. Students saw the entry of police on campuses as part of the government strategy to stop the call of free education by the students. University campuses were transformed into ‘police stations’ because of the high number of police officers and private security guards around campuses. Others started to blame the ANC government for using the same strategies as the Apartheid government under PW Botha, by using state security as the solution to bring stability. For the rest of 2016, universities adopted the strategy to fight with fire. The student protestors took fire to lecture rooms, cars, computer laboratories, statues, university paintings, administration buildings, residences, and the offices of vice-chancellors. The justification behind their actions was that the only language the government understood was violence and burning.<br />
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Throughout the South African history, intellectuals and academics have often played a key role in struggle for the modernisation of societies, national liberation and social justice. But the question was why they now failed to play a role in this call for free education? Is South Africa facing the pitfall of the intellectuals or had they forgotten that they still have to play part in solving this social inequality? The students continued to question why do the poor have to pay for higher education in the country that is blessed with natural resources? The corruption and maladministration in the government was some of the reasons why the government failed to provide for free education. <br />
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Free education in South Africa is a constitutional right. So, when students protest they indeed fight for a noble cause. South African politicians routinely sell dreams and make promises of free education to the electorate. The call for free education by the students was a way to remind the ruling government what they promised the poor and the students. When President Zuma was re-elected for his second term as the president of the ruling African National Congress (ANC) in Manguang, he mobilized support under the message of ‘delivering free higher education.’ Even the historic documents of the ANC indicate that the ANC supported free education. The most celebrated ANC historic document ‘The Freedom Charter’ is the testimony that the ANC had been promising the people of South Africa free higher education. The Freedom Charter was adopted at the Congress of the People in Kliptown on 26 June 1955. In this document under the heading ‘The Doors of Learning and Culture Shall be Opened’, the fourth line highlights that “Education shall be free, compulsory, universal and equal for all children; Higher education and technical training shall be opened to all by means of state allowances and scholarships awarded on the basis of merit.”<br />
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At the close of the 2016 academic year, government officials, heads of universities, leaders from the private sector, and civil society met once again to find ways for providing free high quality education. An agreement was concluded to fully fund poor students and to provide aid to the missing middle class students. These are students who are not rich enough to pay their fees and on the other hand not poor enough to qualify for state funding. In 2017 President Zuma established a commission to find ways to provide for free education. The commission submitted the report in the middle of 2017, but even now the president has not made the report public. As the nation is waiting for the response from the president, October 2017 witnessed different universities announcing that they will increase fees by 8 percent. The University of Stellenbosch was the first to make the announcement of an 8 percent increase followed by the Central University of Technology in the Free State with the same percent. The country can expect that all universities around the country will follow the same pattern of 8 percent.<br />
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The nation has to wait to see if the students will submit or challenge this decision of increase fees by 8 percent. The question that is dominating the conversation around South Africa is what the students will do to put pressure on the president to make the report public. Only time will tell, whether the country will go back to the phase of students closing campus around the country or whether the president will give them what they what - free education.Adminhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11143142887187013059noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6718454524502259785.post-26851818246639023062017-10-09T22:53:00.003+09:002017-10-09T22:53:36.423+09:00South Africa’s Leadership Crisis: A Dire Need for Political Reform <div style="text-align: center;">
<b>by Michaela Elsbeth Martin</b></div>
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The emergence of a democratic South Africa in 1994 marked the beginning of a transition period from the brutal Apartheid-government to a newly democratised state. The first president of the new South Africa, the late Nelson Mandela, played an instrumental role in unifying the country and establishing democratic values with human rights at the forefront of his administration. Former President Nelson Mandela thus succeeded in creating responsive and accountable state institutions. The ANC at the time had a type of leadership calibre that spoke directly to the democratic project the country desperately needed. The leadership that followed consequently built on the established democratic values projected in 1994 with a more pragmatic approach to economic, social and political development in South Africa and Africa as a whole. <br />
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Under the leadership of former President Thabo Mbeki, South Africa’s economic growth was at 4.2 percent per annum, and South Africa also contributed to the rejuvenation of Africa’s most pivotal institutions such as the transformation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to the African Union (AU) in 2002. This reformation was coupled with additional institutions such as the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), Africa’s Peer Review Mechanism, and the formation of the bloc of developing countries BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). These institutions helped ensure the complete integration of South Africa into the international system and global economy. South Africa, under President Mbeki’s tenure displayed an image of strong leadership at a local, regional and international level. It can be argued that South Africa’s leadership style between 1994 and 2007 led to a large degree of democratic consolidation within the state, and an integration of the state and its institutions into regional and international bodies.<br />
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However, the calibre of the political elites that emerged in the post-Polokwane Conference in 2007, proved to be lacking in capacity and integrity. The Zuma administration’s capacity to lead state institutions and serve ordinary citizens has not been strong. In response to this decline, and the perception that radical economic policies are only benefiting party elites, the rhetoric of revolution has been growing louder. Ordinary citizens, especially the youth and women are economically marginalised. Moreover, there exist general feelings among government structures that if you are not with us, you are against us, and if you are against us, there is very little you can do to influence the country’s policy. <br />
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<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi7nqYiob8GWMQlm4RK6yRjKV-le5jojTisazMDcZFAyTXz9YPllpPkkqUO2R_2mf4GppQg8Pl14P2MEUv3HmPCp9ey7KCdcrH2cuIt7-taxnsp3fLdi_hpxHCPdsODIbsCRZijQMXcEzl2/s1600/23175893114_8df08e0686_z.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="426" data-original-width="640" height="266" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi7nqYiob8GWMQlm4RK6yRjKV-le5jojTisazMDcZFAyTXz9YPllpPkkqUO2R_2mf4GppQg8Pl14P2MEUv3HmPCp9ey7KCdcrH2cuIt7-taxnsp3fLdi_hpxHCPdsODIbsCRZijQMXcEzl2/s400/23175893114_8df08e0686_z.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">President Jacob Zuma</td></tr>
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More problematically, consultation with the population means consultation with the African National Congress (ANC) branches and structures. Ordinary citizens outside these structures have limited spaces to make known their grievances. In essence then, the people are taken to be the members of the ANC and conversely the ANC is regarded as the people. It is this kind of high-handed hegemonic project and the persona of President Zuma that is having a serious impact on the South African state. The leadership crisis is coupled with intense factional battles fuelled by the desire to benefit from state coffers and this has led to the repurposing of state institutions to benefit power elite in the government. Moreover, President Zuma is hell-bent on staying in power, with his faction preparing itself to destroy the ANC and the national government to do so. The political and economic implications of the mismanagement of state resources and the lack of state capacity have left the South African state in a dire position. The economy has been seriously affected by the leadership crisis, with South Africa operating in junk status and an economic crisis; ordinary citizens are barely surviving with the unemployment rate at 27 percent.<br />
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With the upcoming ANC electoral Conference in December 2017, there has been much debate on who will be the next president of South Africa. The hope amongst the much of the general public, the opposition and the ANC, is that the challenges that beset the country will abate with the departure of the current President and that the constitutional fabric of post-apartheid democracy will be restored. The top six, referring to the ANC’s most senior leaders are known, appear to be evenly split. One faction consists of President Zuma, ANC Deputy Secretary-General Jessie Duarte, and Baleka Mbete, who is both the National Assembly speaker and party chairwoman. In opposition to the Zuma faction are the 'reformers' consisting of Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa, ANC Secretary-General Gwede Mantashe, and ANC Treasurer-General Zweli Mkhize. <br />
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It is imperative to note that without a serious change in leadership in the ANC the party might lose complete power of South Africa in the 2019 General Elections. The popularity of the ANC under the Zuma presidency has already declined significantly and has been criticised for being out of touch with its constituents and is associated with poor local administration.Adminhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11143142887187013059noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6718454524502259785.post-61084746909296311482017-09-16T00:04:00.002+09:002017-09-16T00:04:40.080+09:00The Lesotho Defence Force in Turmoil<div style="text-align: center;">
<b>by M. K. Mahlakeng</b></div>
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On 5 September 2017, Lesotho experienced yet another killing of the Lesotho Defence Force’s (LDF) commander, Lieutenant-General Khoantle Motšomotšo. This is the second killing of Lesotho’s army commander in just two years. Brigadier Maaparankoe Mahao, who was appointed as LDF commander to replace the then LDF commander Lt-Gen Tlali Kamoli, was shot dead by LDF members who had come to arrest him for allegedly being leading a mutiny to oust the army command.<br />
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<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3ALesotho_Defence_Force_Deputy_Commander_Maj._Gen._Motsomotso_Medical_Readiness_Excercise_14-1.jpg" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;" title="By US Army Africa (Flickr: Medical Readiness Excercise 14-1) [CC BY 2.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0)], via Wikimedia Commons"><img alt="Lesotho Defence Force Deputy Commander Maj. Gen. Motsomotso Medical Readiness Excercise 14-1" src="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/b/ba/Lesotho_Defence_Force_Deputy_Commander_Maj._Gen._Motsomotso_Medical_Readiness_Excercise_14-1.jpg/512px-Lesotho_Defence_Force_Deputy_Commander_Maj._Gen._Motsomotso_Medical_Readiness_Excercise_14-1.jpg" width="512" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">The late Lieutenant-General Khoantle Motšomotšo</td></tr>
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Lt-Gen Motšomotšo was gunned down in his office at the Ratjomose barracks by Colonel Tefo Hashatsi and Brigadier Bulane Sechele. The duo who were implicated in Lt-Gen Mahao’s killing had come to confront Lt-Gen Motšomotšo on issues pertaining to the investigation of the January 2014 bombing of the homes of PM Tom Thabane’s wife MaIsiah Thabane and that of the then Lesotho Mounted Police Service (LMPS) commissioner (ComPol) Khothatso Tšooana; the May 2014 shooting of Lisebo Tang and Tšepo Jane by former LDF commander Lt-Gen Kamoli’s bodyguards in which the respective Lisebo and Tšepo were sitting in a car that was parked near Lt-Gen Kamoli’s residence; and, the June 2015 killing of Lt-Gen Mahao. All of which were part of the SADC mandate.<br />
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The concern by both Col Hashatsi and Brig Sechele over Lt-Gen Motšomotšo’s facilitation and cooperation with the LMPS in investigating these unique but yet related issues was that they felt exposed to conviction if these matters were investigated further. Moreover, they felt that the commander was, in contrast to protecting army personnel implicated in these events, selling them out. Hence he [Motšomotšo] came to be branded a “sell-out” among several military personnel. Given his close relationship with the duo [Hashatsi and Sechele] and former army commader [Kamoli], Motšomotšo was expected to ignore the SADC mandate and recommendations implicating them [Hashatsi and Sechele] and/or other military personnel in these incidences.<br />
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According to the Public Relations Officer who was with Lt-Gen Motšomotšo at the time of his confrontation with Col Hashatsi and Brig Sechele, the duo enjoyed frequent access to Lt-Gen Motšomotšo and always had their firearms with them given their status as senior and/or high-ranking officers. During their encounter with Motšomotšo, Hashatsi and Sechele aggressively questioned the former as to why he was cooperating with Prime Minister Thabane and the LMPS, in particular regarding the SADC mandate to investigate numerous members of the LDF involved in atrocities under Lt-Gen Kamoli’s tenure. It is alleged that in his response, Motšomotšo stated that the investigation into these acts is in fulfilment of a mandate by SADC and any aspect relating to the SADC’s mandate is not exempt from investigation.<br />
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For many within and outside the military forces, this statement would mean two possible realities. Firstly, Motšomotšo would proceed with the SADC’s recommendations (in an attempt to signal a sense of legitimacy from his part as the new army commander), but eventually create a cover-up to save his colleagues. And/or secondly, he [Motšomotšo] would see the investigation processes through to their finality, to a point where all members of the LDF implicated cases of murder, attempted murder and treason were suspended and/or convicted. This would also be an attempt to signal a sense of legitimacy from his part as the new army commander. However, for Hashatsi and Sechele, the latter possibly appeared to be rising. Following this confrontation with the army commander, Sechele then took out his firearm and fatally shot Motšomotšo. Subsequent to this, Motšomotšo’s bodyguards shot both Sechele and Hashatsi, with the former dying on the spot and the latter succumbing to his wounds and dying later that day in hospital. What was later found at the scene of the shooting was a hand grenade on Sechele and Hashatsi respectively.<br />
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Following the killing of Lt-Gen Motšomotšo, Major General Lineo Poopa was then appointed as acting LDF commander by virtue of his ranking as second in command to Motšomotšo’s. However, given the intense divisions within the military, his role, popularity and either success and/or demise will be highly tested. Moreover, given his part in the LDF command that killed Lt-Gen Mahao, Maj-Gen Poopa and the LDF’s future raises further concerns.Adminhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11143142887187013059noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6718454524502259785.post-24636375908450989452017-07-02T23:57:00.002+09:002017-07-02T23:57:50.717+09:00South Africa’s “Rot” Runs Deep<div style="text-align: center;">
<b>by Michaela Elsbeth Martin</b></div>
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As South Africa’s political and economic environment continues to deteriorate, the phenomenon of State Capture remains at the heart of its institutional decay. This came after an explosive cache of emails form inside the Gupta Empire (South Africa’s alleged captors), revealed how the family obtained several businesses from the government. The series of emails additionally revealed the extent of the Gupta family’s control over state owned companies and their CEOs, as well as their board members. This evidence could not have come at a more appropriate time. President Jacob Zuma’s political clock is quickly running out, amid mounting confirmation of state capture and growing opposition within the African National Congress (ANC).<br />
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The correspondence within the Gupta-compound provided insight into the critical role of the President’s son, Duduzane Zuma, in presidential matters. Mr D Zuma remains a close Gupta associate, even after reports last year circulated that he cut ties with the family. Moreover, President Zuma continuously defends his association with the controversial family, as well as his son’s business partnership with them. It is believed that Mr D Zuma has made billions through this strategic partnership. <br />
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<a href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3AAtul_Gupta_protest_banner_-_Cape_Town_Zuma_must_fall.jpg" title="By Discott (Own work) [CC BY-SA 4.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0)], via Wikimedia Commons"><img alt="Atul Gupta protest banner - Cape Town Zuma must fall" src="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/d/dc/Atul_Gupta_protest_banner_-_Cape_Town_Zuma_must_fall.jpg/512px-Atul_Gupta_protest_banner_-_Cape_Town_Zuma_must_fall.jpg" width="512" /></a><br />
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The cache of emails reflected the following about the Gupta family’s influence within the South African government. Firstly, it became known that the résumé of Mr Mosebenzi Zwane’s, Minister of Mineral Resources, was emailed to the Gupta’s just a month before his appointment. The emails revealed that Mr Zwane had close ties with the family prior to his appointment in July 2015. Just three months after his appointment, the minister was on a working trip in Zurich where he helped to facilitate the sale of the Optimum Coal Mine in Mpumalanga to a company owned by the Guptas and Mr D Zuma. Since Mr Zwane’s appointment as Mineral Resource Minister, South Africa’s Mining Industry has been at its lowest, which is directly attributable to draconian labour legislation, corruption, political demagoguing, and the reluctance of organisations to adhere to the law.<br />
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Secondly, the leaked emails revealed that former Minister of Communications, now Minister of Public Services, Faith Muthambi, in 2014, directly forwarded a presidential proclamation to Tony Gupta detailing her powers before it was signed by President Zuma. The regulations listed in the email gave the communications minister wide-ranging power over the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa, including the power to make policies, and issue policy direction and oversee applications pertaining to network licences, radio frequency plans and commercial broadcasting licences. Ms Muthambi was appointed Public Service and Administration Minister in the cabinet reshuffle in March this year. As Communications Minister, she was accused of allowing the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), to be plundered and run into the ground.<br />
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The emails additionally shed light on President Zuma’s decision to replace former Finance Minister, Nhlanhla Nene with Des van Rooyen in the autumn of 2015. Email correspondences show that Mr Van Rooyen repeatedly gave false testimony when he asserted to have paid for a private trip to Dubai, just shortly after his appointment to the cabinet in December 2015. However, the leaked emails revealed that the trip was financed and sponsored by the Gupta’s, and booked just a day before his departure on December 2015. Mr Van Rooyen however vehemently denied that this trip was planned in a short period of time, and asserted that it was planned long before his appointment as member of cabinet. Relatedly, on arrival as Finance Minister, Mr Van Rooyen was accompanied by advisers, Mohamed Bobar and Ian Whitley, who is said to be also affiliated to the Guptas. It is on this basis that it is claimed that Mr Van Rooyen’s appointment as Minister of Finance was influenced and instigated by the Captors of the South African state.<br />
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The leaked Gupta emails demonstrate how entrenched the family has become in the South African government. They reveal that President Zuma is not only incapable of leading the country, but also that he continues to place his own needs before those of the nations. This point is not an empty rhetoric as it speaks to the point that the Gupta family had bought President Zuma a R330-million retirement home in the upmarket suburb of Emirates Hills in 2015, in the same year that the President’s son bought an apartment valued at R18-million in the Burj Khalifa. Analysts concur that this approach of give and take between the two families in particular, emanates from the Gupta’s primary goal of gaining access, control and influence over South African state institutions and mechanisms.<br />
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From the above it is apparent that the once celebrated African nation, commended for its courage of fighting vigorously against an oppressed system, has now backslid into another classical example of an African state characterised by corruption, political, economic and institutional decay. <br />
<br />Adminhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11143142887187013059noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6718454524502259785.post-51579833063174239412017-06-27T17:07:00.001+09:002017-06-27T17:07:26.969+09:00Thabane Back in Power in Lesotho: Hope or Despair for the Kingdom?<div style="text-align: center;"><b>by M. K. Mahlakeng</b></div><br />
All Basotho Convention (ABC) leader and former Prime Minister, Thomas Thabane, has returned to power. This is following 3 June 2017 elections which came at the background of a no-confidence vote in Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili and his seven-party coalition government. This no-confidence vote led to the dissolution of the ninth Parliament in Lesotho on 6 March 2017. Dissolving parliament was one of two options PM Mosisili had at the face of the success of the motion. Contrary to this, the PM would have had to resign as PM and allow for his party deputy to lead the Democratic Congress (DC) - a leading partner in the 2015 coalition government- in Parliament and subsequently becoming the PM. However, opting for the dissolution of parliament meant that an election date must be announced. As such, elections should be held within a period of three months of the dissolution.<br />
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The outcome of the results saw Thabane leading the race despite failing to gain an outright majority thus forcing him to form a coalition government with other political parties (i.e. Alliance of Democrats (AD), Basotho National Party (BNP) and Reformed Congress for Lesotho (RCL)). This sees the formation of the third coalition government in Lesotho in just five years (i.e. 2012, 2015 and 2017 respectively). Following the 26 May 2012 elections, Lesotho witnessed its first ever coalition government. This pact comprised of three political parties i.e. the All Basotho Convention (ABC), Basotho National Party (BNP) and Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD). <br />
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<a title="By OER Africa (https://www.flickr.com/photos/oerafrica/8700563741) [CC BY 2.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0)], via Wikimedia Commons" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3AChinese_Lesotho_project_Lesotho_Parliament_II.jpg"><img width="512" alt="Chinese Lesotho project Lesotho Parliament II" src="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/5/50/Chinese_Lesotho_project_Lesotho_Parliament_II.jpg/512px-Chinese_Lesotho_project_Lesotho_Parliament_II.jpg"/></a><br />
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This coalition government collapsed only two years in office as a result of poor leadership, and tensions and misunderstandings that occurred between coalition partners (especially between the ABC and LCD). This collapse of government led to the 28 February 2015 general snap elections which resulted in a second coalition government comprising of seven parties, i.e. the Democratic Congress (DC), Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD), Marematlou Freedom Party (MFP), Basotho Congress Party (BCP), National Independent Party (NIP), Lesotho People’s Congress (LPC) and Popular Front for Democracy (PFD). Following the 3 June election in 2017, Thabane’s ABC combined its 48 seats with the AD’s 9, BNP’s 5 and RCL’s 1, thus enabling them to pass the 61-seat threshold required to form government in the 120-seat National Assembly (NA).<br />
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However, in just two days before Thabane’s inauguration, his estranged wife, Lipolelo Thabane, was shot dead on Wednesday 14 June at about 6:40 pm as she was about to enter her premises. Thabane and Lipolelo had been living separately since 2009. Subsequent to this was a divorce filed by Thabane in 2012. However, Lipolelo, through legal measures, never stopped pushing for her privileges as first lady.<br />
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In mid-January 2015, the High Court of Lesotho rule that “Lipolelo Thabane is the country’s official first lady and should be immediately afforded all benefits she is entitled to including a Chauffer driven government vehicle and a bodyguard”. This judgement appeared to be a major setback for the PM’s partner and current wife MaIsaiah Thabane, formerly known as Liabiloe Ramoholi whom Thabane customarily married as it effectively did not recognise her as the rightful wife of Thabane and first lady.<br />
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Nonetheless, the inauguration of PM-elect Thabane went ahead as scheduled on 16 June despite security claims, uncertainties and tempers flaring over the killing of Lipolelo. It is however still not clear on the actual cause of the assassination of Lipolelo Thabane. Nonetheless this hasn’t deterred people from either connecting the killing to PM-elect Thabane and his current wife who are seen to have had a lot to lose in the existence of his former wife post inauguration; or, to the outgoing government who it is perceived to cause instability in the country following their defeat in elections.<br />
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It must be noted however that, the PM, the Tranformation Resource Centre (TRC), Christian Council of Lesotho (CCL), and other development partners have been silent on the killing of Lipolelo Thabane. This is contrary to their firm role in high profile assassinations, human rights violations and other security breaches in Lesotho. And the subsequent continuation of the inauguration further exacerbates these claims and uncertainties.Adminhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11143142887187013059noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6718454524502259785.post-78745334608010156272017-04-26T11:55:00.001+09:002017-04-26T11:55:12.736+09:00Lesotho’s Upcoming Elections: The Collapse of a Second Coalition Government<div style="text-align: center;">
<b>by M. K. Mahlakeng</b></div>
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The dissolution of the ninth Parliament in Lesotho on 6 March 2017 as a result of a successful vote of no-confidence against Prime Minister (PM) Pakalitha Mosisili, has put an untimely end to the seven party coalition government. As such, Lesotho is expected to hold its general elections on 3 of June 2017. The no-confidence vote against the PM meant two realities. Firstly, the PM, who is the leader of the Democratic Congress (DC) - a leading partner in the coalition government, would have to resign as PM and allow for his party deputy to lead the DC in Parliament and subsequently becoming the PM. And secondly, the passing of this motion meant that the PM acting according to section 83(1) and (4)(b) would have to advise the King as Head of State to prorogue and/or dissolve parliament. And if the option in this case become the dissolution of parliament, then an election date must be announced. As such, elections should be held within a period of three months of the dissolution. Therefore, the PM opted for the latter which is to advise the King to dissolve parliament and announce an election date.<br />
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According to section 83(1), “the King may at any time prorogue or dissolve Parliament”. Moreover, section 83(4)(b) states that “in the exercise of his powers to dissolve or prorogue parliament, the King shall act in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister: provided that if the National Assembly passes a resolution of no confidence in the Governement of Lesotho and the Prime Minister does not within three days thereafter either resign or advice a dissolution the King may, acting in accordance with the advice of the Council of State, dissolve parliament”. <br />
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<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhJs_ldSOrTzXs1QLgDIQMWT19u_-D3Kfp1IwfLd_y7hyphenhyphen9g_UhY9Fb81t-gB3j8nIu0dflfRN6IHC5_VUuPNmoS68kfKV80N1fH2lFuCHh1CAW2upbWEHZSbcILR9eaKg9KEZoED6fJo9iL/s1600/King_Letsie_III_and_Queen_Masenate_Mohato_Seeiso_of_Lesotho.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="424" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhJs_ldSOrTzXs1QLgDIQMWT19u_-D3Kfp1IwfLd_y7hyphenhyphen9g_UhY9Fb81t-gB3j8nIu0dflfRN6IHC5_VUuPNmoS68kfKV80N1fH2lFuCHh1CAW2upbWEHZSbcILR9eaKg9KEZoED6fJo9iL/s640/King_Letsie_III_and_Queen_Masenate_Mohato_Seeiso_of_Lesotho.jpg" width="640" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">King Letsie III and the Queen of Lesotho. Photo: IAEA Imagebank (CC BY-SA 2.0)</td></tr>
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This relationship between the PM (i.e. Head of Government) and the King (i.e. Head of State) and the role afforded to the King relates much to the system of governance used in Lesotho. In contrast to the Presidential system of government where the Head of State is also Head of Government, Lesotho uses a Parliamentary system of government. Given the existence of a Monarch, Lesotho is a parliamentary constitutional monarch and in this instance, in due respect of history and culture the Monarch simply plays a ceremonial role. A role meant to symbolize a unified nation. The Monarch’s existence in Lesotho’s sociopolitical environment means that he plays the role of being head of state and plays no part in the political affairs of the country.<br />
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This sees the collapse of a second coalition government in Lesotho, with each coalition government barely completing its expected term of governance. The 2012 Thabane-led three party coalition government collapse in 2014. This pact comprised of the All Basotho Convention (ABC), Basotho National Party (BNP) and Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD). This coalition government collapsed only 2 years in office as a result of poor leadership, tensions and misunderstandings that occurred “between coalition partners” (especially between the ABC and LCD).<br />
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This collapse therefore led to the 28th February 2015 general snap elections which resulted in a second coalition government comprising of 7 parties i.e. the Democratic Congress (DC), Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD), Marematlou Freedom Party (MFP), Basotho Congress Party (BCP), National Independent Party (NIP), Lesotho People’s Congress (LPC) and Popular Front for Democracy (PFD). However, in contrast to the causes of the collapse of the Thabane-led government (i.e. a fall-out between coalition partners), the prolonged “power struggle within parties” (i.e. particularly in two major coalition partners – the DC and LCD) was a major factor. These power struggles led to the formation of factions within these parties and subsequently causing splinter groups to emerge thus affecting the stability and size of government to rule legitimately as a majority government.<br />
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Now with an election date of 3 June confirmed, there is a further indication of a possible coalition government. This is made evident of electoral pacts already being formed signifying the possibility that one party alone cannot win government power. And the cause of this has been the rapid emergence of splinter parties which have successfully broken down major parties and further broadened electoral choice. These election pacts are witnessed on the one hand between the ABC, Alliance of Democrats (AD), BNP and Reformed Congress for Lesotho (RCL), and on the other hand between the DC, LCD and the Popular Front for Democracy (PFD). Although signs of a successive coalition are imminent, however, to clearly determine which coalition government with which party as a partner will largely depend on a successful election campaign to make a party in either pact an important partner worth working with.Adminhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11143142887187013059noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6718454524502259785.post-10659301928294770702017-04-14T10:41:00.000+09:002017-04-14T10:41:12.937+09:00Zambia: On the Brink of Dictatorship<div style="text-align: center;">
<b>by Hussein Solomon</b></div>
<br />
Under the strong-man leadership of President Edgar Lungu of the ruling Patriotic Front (PF), Zambia is increasingly displaying authoritarian tendencies whilst the economy is in free fall under the weight of corruption and gross incompetence. One indicator of this latter point according to Transparency International is the fact that 60 percent of the population are illiterate and poor whilst corruption is so endemic in society that 78 percent of the populace has admitted to paying bribes.<br />
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Amongst the first to suffer under Lungu’s growing authoritarianism was the media. In August 2016, for instance, the so-called Independent Broadcasting Authority suspended the broadcasting licenses of Muvi TV, Komboni Radio and Itzehi Itzehi Radio ostensibly because they posed a threat to national peace and stability. What all these media houses had in common was the fact that they spoke truth to power. The former Editor-in-Chief of the independent The Post newspaper (which has been rebranded as The Mast), Dr Fred M’membe, was personally threatened with death by President Lungu whilst the PF filed more than 50 lawsuits against Dr. M’membe.<br />
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This authoritarianism is best seen in the political sphere, where the leader of the opposition United Party for National Development (UPND), Hakainda Hichilema has been routinely harassed by the authorities. “HH” as he is popularly known has been a thorn in the side of the ruling party for some time. In the August 2016 elections he was narrowly defeated by President Lungu in an election which was described as fraudulent by many. Since then the UPND was targeted as a major threat to the PF’s political control. Permission for party campaigning and rallies on the part of the UPND is therefore routinely denied. Last October, for instance, HH and his vice-president Geoffrey Mwamba were arrested for unlawful assembly. This past week, HH’s home was raided by police who indiscriminately fired teargas into the house causing his wife and daughter who suffer from asthma to faint. Then HH was arrested for treason on the flimsy basis that he obstructed the convoy of President Lungu. It should be noted that treason is a non-bailable offence in Zambia with a minimum jail term of 15 years and a maximum sentence of death.<br />
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjM-yvD8KnD_G7nPEYZtXsuXaOPnQGsAmEXkCJPFkpTY6W1-iKQih47GUj1MaLq9BNh0EwqkZe699Cj0ubQCzVG8zY0iV6vfESlW8ABvSlDacvjEtjpLTEiVIAOKoOwkZAai_XGjL5c9hBu/s1600/Upnd+rally.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="300" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjM-yvD8KnD_G7nPEYZtXsuXaOPnQGsAmEXkCJPFkpTY6W1-iKQih47GUj1MaLq9BNh0EwqkZe699Cj0ubQCzVG8zY0iV6vfESlW8ABvSlDacvjEtjpLTEiVIAOKoOwkZAai_XGjL5c9hBu/s400/Upnd+rally.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">UPND rally, 2016. Photo: Likezz (CC BY-SA 4.0)</td></tr>
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In all this, the international community has been silent. The regional body, the Southern African Development Community’s (SADC) silence has been deafening. If one is to prevent another Zimbabwe in this blighted region, the international community has to act now. The easiest lever to affect change may well rest in the economic realm. The parlous state of the Zambian economy has resulted in a shortfall of US $1.3 billion in the 2017 Zambian budget. Zambian Finance Minister Felix Mutati intends to borrow this amount from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the form of an Extended Credit Facility. The IMF should refuse to assist Lungu and his regime until they begin exercising democratic governance.Adminhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11143142887187013059noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6718454524502259785.post-65198969664342462062017-04-09T09:10:00.001+09:002017-04-09T09:11:25.249+09:00South Africa under Cardiac Arrest<div style="text-align: center;">
<b>by Michaela Elsbeth Martin</b></div>
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On the evening of 29 March 2017, the South African state took an unexpected turn for the worse. It has been a whirlwind few days in South Africa, with a cabinet reshuffle resulting in what has been described as a complete state capture by opposition parties. The reshuffle of President Zuma’s cabinet included the dismissal of Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan and his Deputy, Mcebi Jonas. This move is set to have far-reaching political consequences as President Zuma and his allies have their hands firmly on the wheel of the National Treasury, with the appointment of former Home Affairs Minister, Malusi Gigaba, in place of Gordhan. The reshuffle comes three days after President Zuma informed the ANC top five that he wanted to get rid of the Minister and Deputy Finance Minister due to an alleged Intelligence Report claiming that the leadership of the Treasury Department wanted to overthrow the Zuma government. <br />
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgvjX2d1bU0ffyJHQN77p8r0r7vLYtvRt14TyAuwka9nONwn7D6DSZCEBWgk7WOWhS3n88lCCfXFFyqzmGatrBKt1JRurHrweH02USP_8_1-NpUdKJPmTv-hZWM6EkyJ8T9Xv9BPat2dStL/s1600/Gordhan+Feb+2017.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="281" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgvjX2d1bU0ffyJHQN77p8r0r7vLYtvRt14TyAuwka9nONwn7D6DSZCEBWgk7WOWhS3n88lCCfXFFyqzmGatrBKt1JRurHrweH02USP_8_1-NpUdKJPmTv-hZWM6EkyJ8T9Xv9BPat2dStL/s400/Gordhan+Feb+2017.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Former Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan in February 2017 (Photo: GCIS)</td></tr>
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The dismissal of Gordhan has been a long anticipated move since 2016, in which the South Africa’s National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) head, Shaun Abrahams laid criminal charges against, and announced to prosecute the country’s Finance Minister. The Finance Minister was accused‚ in his previous capacity as head of South African Revenue Services (SARS), of fraudulently approving an early retirement for then Deputy Commissioner Ivan Pillay and re-hiring him as a consultant. Additionally, Minister Gordhan was attacked by the Gupta Family (South Africa’s alleged captors) after he submitted an explosive affidavit at the Pretoria High Court that details a list of allegedly suspicious transactions which led to four major banks closing the family’s accounts in April last year. The National Treasury’s investigations in South African Airways (SAA), Eskom, Denel and the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) as well as the Nuclear Procurement Programme, have become a threat to President’s Zuma’s patronage networks, thus the intense efforts that has eventually led to the recent axing of the Finance Minister. It becomes therefore increasingly evident that President Zuma’s cabinet reshuffle is driven by the ambition to appoint a Zuma-aligned Finance Minister. <br />
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The cabinet reshuffle is therefore politically driven and widely regarded as flimsy. This is an attack on the institution of the Treasury and as such has triggered multiple downgrades. While there are some fiscal attacks, what increasingly worrisome is the Treasury’s potential role in procurement, preventing corruption and oversight of state-owned enterprises, including nuclear and banking. <br />
The Secretary General of the African National Congress (ANC), Gwede Mantashe asserted that the cabinet reshuffle plans were not done in consultation with the ANC, but were drawn up “somewhere else” and then handed over to them for their consideration. Further, Mr Mnatashe noted that the matters concerning the Finance Minister and His Deputy were discussed on Monday last week and some changes were effected to initial proposals made by President Zuma, but the rest of the reshuffle was shocking news even to the ANC's top leadership. The reshuffle of the cabinet has intensified the factionalism within the ANC. This point is reiterated by Deputy Minister of the ANC Cyril Ramaphosa, in which he described the phenomenon as a government that wages war with itself. On the one end of the spectrum exists a large rural-based faction of patronage politicians surrounding President Jacob Zuma. The other faction includes with no doubt, the National Treasury, represented by the beleaguered former Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan, ANC stalwarts, the media, nongovernmental organisations and business leaders.<br />
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The cabinet reshuffle has similarly exacerbated the economic climate of the country. Just 90 hours after President Zuma axed Mr Gordhan as finance minister, Standard and Poor (S&P), announced that South Africa’s long-term foreign currency sovereign credit rating would be downgraded to sub-investment grade or junk status. The downgrade to junk status came as result of divisions in the ANC-led government that have led to changes in the executive leadership, including the finance minister, that have put policy continuity at risk. Standard and Poor has asserted that South Africa’s political risks will remain evaluated this year and that policy shifts are likely, which could undermine fiscal and economic growth outcomes more than the company currently project. The decision pertaining to the cabinet reshuffle thus created a dire loss of institutional knowledge and raises legitimate and alarming concerns regarding issues of fiscal discipline, the protection of state institutions and the scope of state capture.<br />
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The question therefore arises of the criminalisation of the South African state, in which the President has unconstrained and unlimited political power, and where the state is used as a criminal enterprise where those in power abuse state power to loot state resources. This is power is shown by Jacob Zuma’s ability to implement and enforce decisions regarding the future of South Africa without the consultation of the ANC and the society at large. The recent developments in South Africa additionally highlight the notion of state capture in which the South African state has been captured by corrupt government officials. Despite an admirable constitution and vibrant civil society, it appears that South Africa may well be following the path of neighbouring Zimbabwe, where a predatory state enriches the elite, while investors flee, unemployment rises and government institutions collapses.Adminhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11143142887187013059noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6718454524502259785.post-57091964446953388562017-02-06T23:37:00.003+09:002017-02-06T23:38:31.816+09:00Lesotho Splinter Parties: Cause and Effect<div style="text-align: center;">
<b>by M. K. Mahlakeng</b></div>
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Since the emergence of political parties, there has always been a challenge of “splinter parties”. Splinter parties are “small organisations, typically, a political party, that have broken away from a larger political party”. And the reason, as it has been for many years, for parties to split and subsequently lead to the formation of a totally new party has always been ideological.<br />
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However, this typical thinking has proved to limit the understanding of the political cycle and politicians that entertain it. Two other reasons have emerged as contemporary causes of splinter parties. Firstly, it has become a common notion that disputes between a party leader and one of his subordinates or possible successors would result in the emergence of factions within the party thus leading to either of them abandoning the party to form a new political organisation. In numerous instance, party leaders, fearing that they might be ousted out of power by their subordinates or possible successor, tend to make it impossible for the latter to survive within the party solely to force him out of the party. As a result, leaving the subordinate and/or successor to leave with his supporters and eventually forming a new party.<br />
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Secondly, the decision of many politicians to split from the mother body and form a new political organisation can also be closely linked to the greed of politicians. Politicians have often been seen to pursue the formation of a new party as a result of acquiring a seat in parliament solely because this translates to a monthly cheque as opposed to pursuing perceived party policies. However, these two reasons are not to say ideological differences are not central to the divisions within political parties, but, they have rather become secondary.<br />
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The problem that comes with splinter parties is two-fold. Firstly, these new parties tend to experience and identity and/or ideological crisis. This is often reflected by their manifestos, party regalia etc. Secondly, splinter groups increase the number of already existing parties in a specific country. Although perceived by many to be a sign of a healthy democratic practice, however, they cause more instability than they attempt to prevent. This leads to the division of electorate votes thus failing to establish a party as a dominant party. Hence, eventually the emergence of “coalition systems of governance” or “power-sharing governments”.<br />
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3AChinese_Lesotho_project_Lesotho_Parliament_II.jpg" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;" title="By OER Africa (https://www.flickr.com/photos/oerafrica/8700563741) [CC BY 2.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0)], via Wikimedia Commons"><img alt="Chinese Lesotho project Lesotho Parliament II" src="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/5/50/Chinese_Lesotho_project_Lesotho_Parliament_II.jpg/512px-Chinese_Lesotho_project_Lesotho_Parliament_II.jpg" width="512" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">The Lesotho Parliament. By <a href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/oerafrica/8700563741" target="_blank">OER</a> Africa [<a href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0)" target="_blank">CC BY 2.0</a>], via Wikimedia Commons</td></tr>
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The case of Lesotho, among other cases, provides the best example in which all these conditions hold. That is, it is confronted by the challenge of splinter parties as a result of factions within a party as a result of political contestation and/or greed. For instance, in less than two months between end of November 2016 and early January 2017, three splinter parties were born. First, Alliance of Democrats (AD) led by former Democratic Congress (DC) Deputy Leader Mr Monyane Moleleki is a break-away party from the DC.<br />
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Second, Movement for Economic Change (MEC) led by former Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) secretary-general Mr Selibe Mochoboroane is a break-away party from the LCD. And third, True Reconciliation Unity (TRU) former All Basotho Convention (ABC) Deputy Leader Mr. Tlali Khasu is a break-away party from the ABC. In addition, these splinter parties suffer from an identity and/or ideological crisis. Furthermore, splinter parties have divided the electorates’ votes thus shifting Lesotho’s political landscape from a dominant-party system of governance to a coalition system of governance.<br />
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This challenge of splinter parties in Lesotho is not a new phenomenon and can be traced as far back as 1997 when the Basotho Congress Party (BCP) (which led Lesotho to multiparty democratic rule in 1993 to 1998) split and the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) was formed and led Lesotho from 1998 to 2012. And it didn’t end there. The LCD split four times in 2001, 2006, 2011 and 2017 and led to the formation of the Lesotho People’s Congress (LPC), All Basotho Convention (ABC), Democratic Congress (DC) and Movement for Economic Change (MEC) respectively. Furthermore the ABC (which led Lesotho from 2012 to 2015 in a coalition government with the Basotho National Party (BNP) and LCD) and DC (currently leading Lesotho since 2015 in a coalition government with LCD, Marematlou Freedom Party (MFP), BCP, National Independent Party (NIP), LPC and Popular Front for Democracy (PFD)) faced splinter parties respectively. The former split and saw the formation of TRU and the latter saw the formation of AD.<br />
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The emergence of these splinter parties in Lesotho has caused a division of votes as far as every party is concerned ultimately giving rise to power-sharing systems of governance. Subsequently, they are largely responsible for the leadership and stability crisis experienced today in Lesotho.</div>
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Adminhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11143142887187013059noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6718454524502259785.post-730712185104358692016-10-31T13:18:00.001+09:002016-10-31T13:18:18.412+09:00Do African Lives Matter for African Leaders?<div style="text-align: center;">
<b>by Hussein Solomon</b></div>
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Africans have grown accustomed to the West ignoring their suffering. This is hardly a new phenomenon. Consider the fact that Belgian King Leopold II’s atrocities was historically ignored in Europe at the time and barely gets a footnote in recent European books on its African colonies. To be clear, 15 million Congolese were murdered and numerous others were mutilated by this ‘civilized’ European king as he sought to extract rubber from this blighted country. More recently, more than 6 million Congolese have been killed since the 2nd August 1998. Once again, there is scarcely a mention on the front pages of The Washington Post or the New York Times. <br />
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At one level, perhaps, this is understandable. According to psychologists one is supposed to have greater empathy for one’s in-group as opposed to the proverbial other. What is particularly galling for Africans, however, is when their own leaders display such callous disregard for their lives. Worse, still, is the hypocrisy accompanying the callousness on the part of Africa’s leadership. Consider for instance the events surrounding the 7 January 2015. This was the date of the brutal terrorist attack on the Charlie Hebdo offices which resulted in 17 people being killed on the streets of Paris. The world rallied with the French and a mass march of 1,6 million people took to the streets of Paris. This march also included 40 world leaders, including several African leaders who mourned the lives of the innocent savagely cut short. This is as it should be. <br />
At the same time, of the Paris killings, however, there was another atrocity taking place. In the dusty town of Baga, northern Nigeria, Boko Haram militants slaughtered 2000 innocent people. There was no similar Paris march. No African leader took to the streets to commemorate the lives of those lost. Even the Nigerian President at the time, Goodluck Jonathan, did not immediately respond to the tragedy which took place on his own territory where his own citizens lost their life in such a cold-blooded way. This prompts the question: Do African lives matter to African leaders?<br />
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I asked this question several times following the decision by my own government – South Africa - to withdraw from the International Criminal Court (ICC). The South African decision may well be related to domestic politics. According to Anton du Plessis of the Institute for Security Studies, the Zuma administration is attempting to protect itself from an imminent Constitutional Court hearing in relation to the 2015 visit of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir when Pretoria refused to arrest him as it was obligated to do under the Rome Statute. Instead Bashir and his entourage were whisked out of the country by the South African authorities.<br />
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<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Peacekeepers in Darfur (Aekkaphob / Shutterstock.com)</td></tr>
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To be clear, the arrest warrant for Bashir was based on the charge that he oversaw the war in Darfur which resulted in the deaths of between 200,000 and 400,000 people and the displacement of a further 2.5 million people in Darfur out of a population of 6.2 million. The so-called leaders of Africa denounced the ICC decision ostensibly because heads of state should have immunity of prosecution. The counter-argument is simply this: as Head of State should the buck not stop with him? Do not forget that Bashir was not merely Commander-in-Chief by virtue of him being President of Sudan. He was a military man who staged a coup in 1989 to come to power. The second charge levelled against the ICC was that it was unfairly targeting Africa. Let us be frank: many of the ICC investigations were initiated by African countries themselves since they did not have the resources to conduct an investigation and engage in a trial themselves. Do not forget, too, that the ICC is a court of last resort. The attack on the ICC is simultaneously taking place at a time when Africa’s own domestic and regional judicial mechanisms have come under threat from Africa’s self-serving leaders who desire to escape accountability at all costs whilst they simultaneously steal from and brutalize their citizens.<br />
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Perhaps the most powerful response to these objections put forward would simply be this: Do African lives matter to African leaders? Their deep concern for Bashir is akin to sympathizing with the aggressor as opposed to the victims. After all who speaks for the hundreds of thousands of innocent victims who needlessly lost their lives in Darfur?Adminhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11143142887187013059noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6718454524502259785.post-9024858922470192292016-10-14T14:02:00.000+09:002016-10-14T14:02:15.537+09:00Lesotho: 50 Years of Independence?<div style="text-align: center;">
<b>by M. K. Mahlakeng</b></div>
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“Sir George Grey restore to me all the land that was in my possession before the arrival of the Afrikaners..” <br />
King Moshoeshoe I - 31 July 1858<br />
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On the 4 October 2016, Lesotho celebrated its 50th year of independence (the Golden Jubilee) from the Great Britain (4 October 1966 – 4 October 2016). But one serious noteworthy question remains. Is Lesotho really independent? Independence refers to sovereignty, self-government and the state or quality of being independent. It is conceivable to argue that Lesotho attained self-rule and sovereignty from the Great Britain, however, “the state or quality of being independent” (i.e. socially, economically and otherwise) is a highly contended issue. It is generally perceived that Lesotho is not truly independent and that its “total independence” is central to regaining the “lost territory”, which is the Free State.<br />
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<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiD0F70D0b8vXNHTBkVaJq-T73_mH1nLYZyAIUDNWfeLfmK2PngsMOg4DOh6x2NH0yb7NsG-me0bqCFgJaP3WrfBqYnocaVMi3p0Linew0MojsMft1SMuGy_aSBW9ZBFRNzcXXwypVbMkIP/s1600/DSC02654.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="300" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiD0F70D0b8vXNHTBkVaJq-T73_mH1nLYZyAIUDNWfeLfmK2PngsMOg4DOh6x2NH0yb7NsG-me0bqCFgJaP3WrfBqYnocaVMi3p0Linew0MojsMft1SMuGy_aSBW9ZBFRNzcXXwypVbMkIP/s400/DSC02654.JPG" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">The Free State, as seen from the University of the Free State, QwaQwa Campus</td></tr>
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50 years later, the Free State which was lost by the Basotho nation to the Afrikaaner following a series of fights has still not returned to Lesotho. The Afrikaner, leaving the Cape Colony as a result of the conflict with the British, showed up on the western borders of the then Basutoland (today Lesotho), and claimed land rights. This eventually led to a series of fights in 1858 between the Afrikaner and Basotho in the “Free State – Basotho War”, thus leading to Moshoeshoe I to lose a great portion of the western lowlands.<br />
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50 years later Lesotho is still heavily dependent on foreign aid (posing a great deal of challenge in addressing socioeconomic issues), and imports 95% of its goods from South Africa. Its geographic location, being an enclave landlocked country entirely surrounded by South Africa, seems to be a negative aspect to its political and economic development which has left Lesotho in a position of being dependent on South Africa for economic survival. Moreover, it has left Lesotho with the inability of negotiating sustainable deals.<br />
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Furthermore, 50 years later Lesotho, with a population of about 2.1 million, has not been able to fully address political and socioeconomic upheavals confronting the country simply due to the lack of resources. However, there is a solution to this. And this solution falls back to the issue of the Free State region. The total retrocession and restitution of the Free State to Lesotho. The retrocession and restitution of the Free State to Lesotho would mean a number of things for the enclave landlocked country. Firstly, it would mean a considerable increase in arable land, which currently stands at 10% of the total of this mountainous country.<br />
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Secondly, this additional land comes with a number of these resources essential in addressing Lesotho’s political and socioeconomic upheavals such as, among others, HIV prevalence, lack of employment and poverty, which has led to serious health issues such as chronic malnutrition of children under the age of 5. These resources include gold in Allanridge, Welkom and Virginia; coal in Sasolburg; and, diamonds in Jagasfontein and Theunissen. Furthermore, The Free State falls under what is commonly referred to as “The Maize Triangle” possessing the best maize. This maize triangle stretches from Lichtenburg (North West Province), Hobhouse (Free State Province) to Ermelo (Mpumalanga Province) thus forming a triangle.<br />
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Furthermore, the same region (i.e. the High Veld in the Free State) is recognized, among four other parts of the World (i.e. the Prairies in Canada, the Pampas in Argentina, the Steppes in Ukraine, and the Downs in Australia), as possessing rich soil able to sustain agricultural life. Despite trade routes, Lesotho remains dependent on South Africa simply because it lacks resources (found in the Free State) essential for the development of a competitive economy and a prosperous social and political life.<br />
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The failure by Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili and King Letsie III, during their respective speeches commemorating 50 years of Lesotho’s independence, to not acknowledge the positive outcomes that would come with the return of the Free State to Lesotho and the fact that Lesotho is not independent until retrocession and restitution of the Free State to Lesotho is final, is detrimental to the knowledge and history of Lesotho and its nation respectively.<br />
Adminhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11143142887187013059noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6718454524502259785.post-71362576931069052512016-09-26T17:52:00.002+09:002016-09-26T17:52:44.932+09:00South African Universities in Turmoil<div style="text-align: center;">
<b>by Hussein Solomon</b></div>
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The university sector is in deep trouble across South Africa. Confronted with a declining subsidy in real terms from the state over several years, universities have looked to make up the shortfall by increasing student fees. Given the stagnant nature of the South African economy with economic growth in a downward trajectory, the ability of students or their parents to pay higher fees was always questionable. Student groups then mobilized nationally last year demanding that there should be no fee increase. As university buildings were set alight and lecture halls vandalized and students and staff intimidated by the more violent student protestors, government vacillated. University management too dithered attempting to reach compromise with students who increasingly viewed compromise not so much as an olive branch but as a sign of weakness. <br />
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<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Demonstrations at the University of Cape Town (Photo: Tony Carr)</td></tr>
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When students marched on the Union Buildings, the seat of the presidency, last year, government panicked. Government promised a zero percent fee increase and set up a commission to investigate the possibility of free tertiary education. In retrospect the establishment of such a commission was simply an exercise in kicking the can down the road. Given South Africa’s small tax base, given the slowing economy, given the other competing social demands, free education is simply not possible. <br />
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Last week, the Minister of Higher Education, Dr. Blade Nzimande, announced a capped fee increase of 8 percent for students whose household income exceeds R600,000 per annum. In practice, this mean there was to be no increase in fees for students emanating from poorer households. Despite this students mobilized once more, now demanding that they pay no fees whatsoever. Once again other students and staff were intimidated for wanting to resume their academic activities. Once again violence accompanied protest action across South African campuses.<br />
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The chaos engulfing South Africa’s universities however is symptomatic of a much larger set of problems. First, there is an economy in the doldrums. A situation which is to be exacerbated should rating agencies downgrade our investment status as is expected in December this year. In this context, different sectors of society are violently mobilizing demonstrating their unhappiness. It is no coincidence that students are boycotting classes and shutting down universities at the same time when workers are on strike and variously townships are on fire, protesting poor service delivery. Second, the Zuma government does not seem to understand the gravity of the crisis nor does it have the necessary political will or skill sets to respond to the crisis. Those senior civil servants in the Treasury who do understand the extent of the crisis and who do have the necessary technical skill sets to at least contain the crisis are being prevented from doing what they know is in the country’s national interest by a corrupt political elite led by President Zuma dedicated to plundering state coffers. The looting of state resources also robs the government of any morality in dealing with students demands from a position of integrity. How does one say to students that there is no money to meet their demands for free higher education when billions are lost each year as a result of corruption?<br />
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Third, there is the issue of the dysfunctional nature of the educational system which practically guarantees failure. Many students emanate from dysfunctional schools not being really taught the skill sets necessary to prepare them either for the world of work or for university. Fearing a confrontation with the powerful South African Democratic Teachers Union (SADTU), government turns a blind eye to corruption, absentee teachers and poor quality teaching generally. Students graduate from high schools and enter universities and find that they do not have the necessary skill sets to make a success of their university studies. Thus, despite valiant efforts on the part of universities with extra tutorials and other interventions, the drop-out and failure rates are extremely high. At the end of the day no matter what interventions universities embark upon, one cannot undo the damage of 12 years of dysfunctional teaching within the first year or two of university education. The dysfunctional nature of the education system is also reflected in the fact that often even those students who do graduate often do not find jobs. The reason for this is that there is a tremendous mismatch between the skill sets graduates have and the needs of the South African economy. Consider the tens of thousands of students who each year enters the humanities and the dismally small number who find their way into the sciences. So graduates leave universities with heightened expectations of a good professional job. Instead they find themselves unemployed or doing menial work for which no degree is required.<br />
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We are all failing our youth. To fix this, we need a growing economy in the first instance. We need government and university administrators to come together engaging in a radical overhaul of the entire education system from primary and secondary school to the higher education sector. They need to develop a vision of the South African economy which emphasises high growth and high employment and they need to do this in conjunction with the business sector to ensure that skill sets taught is what is needed for the economy of tomorrow.Adminhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11143142887187013059noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6718454524502259785.post-65280224045645437562016-08-30T23:52:00.003+09:002016-08-30T23:52:39.536+09:00The End of the Road for the Mugabe Regime?<div style="text-align: center;">
<b>by Hussein Solomon</b></div>
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2016 might well be the year which marks the end of Mugabe’s authoritarian regime. The portents do not look good for the world’s oldest president, Robert Mugabe, who at 92 has misruled his country for 36 years. A number of factors have come together to form a perfect storm around his tottering government. First, the Zimbabwean economy is fast running out of cash. In past economic crises Mugabe and his cronies were bailed out by the International Monetary Fund and the Chinese. Given the ongoing mismanagement of the economy and institutionalized corruption, there are no international actors who are likely to assist him this time. One indicator of this economic meltdown was that on 26 July the daily volume on Harare’s stock exchange plummeted to US $105, from US $1 million at its peak. <br />
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<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">President Robert Mugabe (Photo: GCIS)</td></tr>
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Without money, the ruling ZANU-PF’s patronage networks are crumbling with normally loyal allies turning against the leadership. Earlier this year a group of influential war veterans attacked Mugabe’s “dictatorial tendencies”. The cash crunch has also resulted in the government’s inability to pay the salaries of its bloated civil servants. Elements in the security services are already threatening to join protestors should their full salaries not be made timeously. In an effort to maintain their control given the threat from the security services, ZANU-PF said it will deploy its youth wing to crush any protests. However, following last week’s protests, ZANU-PF’s Youth League could only muster 500 of its members and were compelled to shelve their plans to crush political dissenters.<br />
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The ongoing drought has also added further impetus to the economic crisis. Four million Zimbabweans currently have insufficient food. This too has strategic significance. Over the past two decades, ZANU-PF has lost the support of its urban cities with the rural areas becoming the stronghold of the ruling party. Given the lack of assistance from the government in responding to the drought, there are indications that dissatisfaction against Mugabe’s rule is also spreading to the countryside. <br />
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The urban opposition meanwhile is more united than ever. At the end of August leaders of 18 opposition parties, including a former prime minister, vice president and finance minister, met to forge a coalition against Mugabe’s ZANU-PF. These are further supported by civil society groupings such as Tajamuka and #ThisFlag. Last week’s demonstrations were among some of the biggest in the country with security forces being overwhelmed by protestors and being forced to retreat. The fact that the peaceful protests were given the green light by Zimbabwe’s High Court to go ahead and that despite this the police brutally attempted to crush the protestors demanding urgent electoral reforms ahead of the 2018 poll particularly riled demonstrators. The mood amongst demonstrators was uncompromising, “Beat us all you want, but we shall not yield”, they defiantly roared on the streets of Harare.<br />
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To compound matters for Mugabe, his own party is deeply divided. One faction is led by his wife Grace who sees herself as Mugabe’s natural successor and is supported by Higher Education Minister Jonathan Moyo and Local Government Minister Saviour Kasukuwere. Another faction is led by Vice-President Emmerson Mnangagwa who commands the support of the security services.<br />
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As Zimbabwe burns, as UN Secretary General Ban ki-Moon expresses his concern, the rapidly deteriorating situation in the country does not attract the attention of either the African Union or the Southern African Development Community.Adminhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11143142887187013059noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6718454524502259785.post-62609505929039662682016-08-11T18:09:00.001+09:002016-08-11T18:09:50.047+09:00Lesotho: Dilemmas of a Coalition System of Governance<div style="text-align: center;">
<b>by M. K. Mahlakeng</b></div>
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Since 2012, Lesotho has been characterized by coalition systems of governance. Post 26 May 2012 elections, Lesotho witnessed its first ever coalition government. This pact comprised of 3 political parties i.e. the All Basotho Convention (ABC), Basotho National Party (BNP) and Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD). This coalition government collapsed after only 2 years in office as a result of poor leadership, and tensions and misunderstandings that occurred between coalition partners (especially between the ABC and LCD). This collapse of government led to the 28 February general snap elections which resulted in a second coalition government comprising of 7 parties, i.e. the Democratic Congress (DC), Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD), Marematlou Freedom Party (MFP), Basotho Congress Party (BCP), National Independent Party (NIP), Lesotho People’s Congress (LPC) and Popular Front for Democracy (PFD).<br />
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Coalition governments are political pacts formed in times of crisis in which it becomes evident that a certain action cannot be achieved and/or avoided by working separately. Moreover, coalition governments are a result of splinter parties and/or groups that affect the possibility of one party claiming total majority in elections subsequently forming a government on its own.<br />
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<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Inauguration of PM Mosisili, 2015 (Photo: DoC)</td></tr>
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Coalition governments have their own strengths and challenging weaknesses. What is advantageous for coalition governments is that, having to share mandate leads to broader representation and greater scrutiny of policy-making. However, disadvantageous to this form of governance is the conflict that may occur due to conflicting ideologies leading to policy standstills thus affecting the stability and functioning of government. One complex and detrimental issue in coalition governments is dependency which subsequently creates a “one size fits all” way of life, meaning “your problems and worries become my problems and worries”. This disadvantageous dilemma is true for Lesotho as it was evident in the collapse of the 2012 coalition government, and has resurfaced to challenge the current coalition government.<br />
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The major partner in the current political pact (i.e. the DC), is faced with issues threatening the stability of the party itself and of the government as a whole. The issue that is currently accumulating pressure on the stability of the party and government is central to the leadership of Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili and his grip to power. Despite his grip to power resulting in infightings in his party, however, the PM has shown little signs of relinquishing power, a common notion across the African continent. Undoubtedly, his display of arrogance emanates from him being more than a decade in power. Mosisili has been a PM for 14 years (as the then leader of LCD before its split in early 2012 leading to the formation of the DC) from May 1998 to June 2012 before his defeat to the ABC-led coalition government. It is however important to note that, what has also added to his long stay in power is the ineffectiveness of his deputies (starting in the LCD and now in the DC), at the face of endorsement by a majority of party members, to stand out and outright contest the position of leadership.<br />
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His grip on power has resulted in vicious factions within the party mainly characterised by succession quarrels. On the one hand, one grouping has made calls for him to step down opting for his deputy in the DC, Monyane Moleleki, to be his successor. While on the other hand, another group is standing firmly behind him. This infighting, although not intensely evident at the moment, places immense pressure on the stability of the DC, but more importantly, on the stability of the governing coalition. Having led two governments to-date, it is easy to argue that he can become a key source of advice to the administration of his party and of government even after his resignation.<br />
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One thing is certain. With his continued arrogance, he will face a motion of no-confidence in his party resulting into a political marginalization of him and his loyalists thus affecting, among others, patronage. What is left to be seen however, is whether he will attempt to split once again from the DC, one usual stunt in Lesotho and one of his common traits perhaps inherited from the former PM Ntsu Mokhehle. For instance, in 1997 Ntsu Mokhehle, founder and leader of the BCP since 1952, initiated a split from the BCP, facing pressure from within his party (this split resulted into the political turmoil that witnessed a fumbled South African-led intervention in 1998 commonly known as “Operation Boleas”), thus leading to the formation of the LCD. Mosisili later took the leadership role of the LCD and similarly split from the LCD in 2012 to form the DC also facing pressure from within the LCD. This clearly overrides the illusion that individuals are loyal to their parties to a point of accepting defeat. However, if a split should be the case, then the current governing coalition won’t see the light of day.Adminhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11143142887187013059noreply@blogger.com0