Zimbabwe’s Military Coup in Perspective

by Leon Hartwell

Regardless of statements by Zimbabwe’s military leaders, a coup d'etat has taken place. Some Zimbabweans are already openly celebrating the removal or President Robert Mugabe, who has ruled the country since 1980. How did this military coup come about? What can we expect in the coming months?

The Role of Securocrats
For those who have been close observers of the situation in Zimbabwe, this military coup did not come as a complete surprise. The king maker role of the so-called “securocrats” has been fundamental to Zimbabwe’s political establishment for decades. In fact, there is an old joke in Zimbabwe: “Why do they call it ‘general elections’? Because the generals determine the outcome of elections.”

Since the beginning, Mugabe carved out an important role for the security sector to maintain order and to keep his regime intact. From 1982 to 1987, he used the notorious North Korean-trained Fifth Brigade to crack down on opposition in Matabeleland. It is said that Emmerson Mnangagwa, a crucial figure behind the current coup, was also a key player during that period when almost 20,000 Ndebele were massacred. For a period after that, the military was sent back to the barracks. However, by 2008, Mnangagwa reactivated the military to help secure Mugabe’s victory during the controversial run-off election.

The Timing of the Coup
Many of the securocrats who fought for Zimbabwe’s independence and who kept Mugabe in power, are the same people who have now turned against him. A key factor in the timing of the coup has been the ascendency of Mugabe’s wife, Grace within the ruling party, the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF).

Since Grace entered public life, Zimbabweans have viewed her as a sexually promiscuous, uneducated former typist whose only interest is luxury shopping. By 2014, Grace went into high gear to beautify her image. The state-owned, ZANU-PF-controlled media, constructed an image of a person with a good heart (through her support for young orphans), a sophisticated businesswoman, an intellectual (the University of Zimbabwe controversially awarded her a PhD within two months of enrolment), and a shrewd politician.

By the end of 2014, Grace became ZANU-PF’s head of the Women’s League and she helped to push out Vice President Joice Mujuru, who at the time stood a good chance of becoming Mugabe’s successor. It was a warning to other potential successors.

More than anything else, Grace’s rise to the top in Zimbabwe threatened the interests of Zimbabwe’s establishment, which includes the security sector. She wanted to establish a dynasty and to replace prominent securocrats with Generation 40 (G40), a relatively younger crop of Zimbabweans who showed loyalty towards her.

The removal of Grace was therefore a matter of urgency. In Zimbabwe, power is money, and the being shunned has major financial implications. The coup has nothing to do with genuinely restoring the constitutional order or anything noble, it is an attempt to protect the establishment’s political and financial interests.

Besides, this coup came at a time when Grace’s public image took yet another nose dive, which means there will not be a huge outcry if she is removed from the political scene. In August, Grace viciously assaulted a model in a luxury apartment rented by her sons in South Africa. The incident reinforced Grace’s bad reputation for public outbursts and it sparked greater scrutiny over the First Family’s opulent lifestyles.

Grace’s problem is that she was punch drunk on victory, but little did she realise that she was overplaying her hand. Her most drastic move to date was her open intentions to get rid of Vice President Mnangagwa, arguably one of the most important securocrats in Zimbabwe. Whether her preferred method was poisoning him through thallium, or by convincing her husband to sack him remains unclear. Nonetheless, after Mnangagwa was unceremoniously fired, the security sector had to act rapidly. If Mnangagwa truly believes that he was poisoned by Grace’s minions, the coup was also a matter of life and death as well as revenge. Over the years, Mugabe has thrown too many struggle ‘comrades’ under the bus and this was, “the last straw” as one Zimbabwean described it to me.

The timing of this coup was also perfect, given the state of Mugabe’s health and his extensive traveling. He is 93 years old, and he has increasingly been caught stumbling and sleeping in front of cameras. In 2017 alone, Uncle Bob spent an enormous amount of time (almost 57 percent of his time by mid-May), outside of Zimbabwe, sometimes for medical reasons. This gave the securocrats plenty of time to plot their coup, and if need be, an excuse to say that Mugabe is not medically fit to be President.

A third factor that precipitated the coup, is that the Zimbabwean economy is once again “in the intensive care unit” as some would say. At the end of October, economist Steve Hank noted that the country’s annual inflation rate stood at 348 percent. It is possible that the coup makers calculated that most Zimbabweans will not lose much sleep over the removal of Uncle Bob. In fact, some individuals from Harare to Beijing, might even welcome it.

Looking Into the Crystal Ball
The top four priorities for the coup makers will be maintaining order, controlling the message, cloaking the military takeover in civilian clothes, and rolling out measures to improve the economy. All these issues are ultimately intertwined.

With regards to maintaining order, already, police officers have been rounded up throughout Zimbabwe and Mugabe has reportedly been placed under house arrest. It is unlikely that there will be heavy infighting within the security sector given the broad support for General Constantino Chiwenga (commander of Zimbabwe’s Defence Forces), Air Marshal Perence Shiri, Lieutenant-General Valerio Sibanda (Commander of the National Army) and Mnangagwa.

War veterans have also been brought in to provide legitimacy to the coup. Their role should not be underestimated. For years, Zimbabwean propaganda has praised them as the liberators of the country. The War Veterans, then under the leadership of the late Chenjerai "Hitler" Hunzvi, were also the ones who were instrumental in the country’s land grab.

Current chairman of the War Veterans Association, Chris Mutsvangwa, has thus far praised the military coup leaders for setting Zimbabwe on a path to restore “genuine democracy” after it was captured by rogue elements. It is probable that Mutsvangwa will also play an important role in terms of presenting a friendly face on behalf of the ‘new’ regime. He is a prominent businessman, politician, and diplomat. He was instrumental in developing Mugabe’s Look East Policy where Zimbabwe began to focus increasingly on China to replace Western businesses after the country was hit by sanctions. At the same time, Mutsvangwa has served as a diplomat in the Western world, and he has a positive reputation among Western diplomats.

As for messaging, the coup makers moved rapidly to take over the state-owned media in order to control the message. Their main focus has been, and will continue to be, to legitimise the military coup. This will involve justification of the coup by for example saying that this has been done in the name of national interest and ultimately for the greater good.

At the same time, the coup makers will satanize Grace Mugabe and other G40 members like Jonathan Moyo, Saviour Kasukwuere and Ignatius Chombo. They will parade their wealth and all their dirty laundry in front of the television cameras so as to demonstrate that these individuals were looting Zimbabwe at the expense of the average Zimbabwean. The lines between “us” and “them” and “good” and “evil” will become more pronounced in the coming days.

Another big part of the gaining popular support for the coup will be to make economic development a key priority. For a start, coup makers will have to dampen the country’s hyperinflation. They will also do their best to court Zimbabwean, South African and Western businesses. One can expect them to stress the importance of private property rights in order to bring some form of predictability back into the economy.

The coup makers will also have to call on some favours from China. Despite his Look East Policy, Chinese companies have reportedly had a difficult relationship with Mugabe after they were recently accused by him of siphoning off $15 billion in diamond revenue. Less than a week ago, G40 attempted to finger Mnangagwa for looting the revenues, but in truth, they were all in it together. Chinese companies will therefore have to cough up some diamond revenues in exchange for guarantees that their interests in Zimbabwe will not be harmed. It is likely that this was a central issue that Chiwenga ironed out with the Chinese during his recent visit to the country shortly before the coup. China could also provide Zimbabwe with some protection within the United Nations Security Council if need be, especially if issues such as sanctions of military intervention are raised.

Legitimising the Military Coup and Scenarios
Despite the evidence, the military has claimed that what has transpired in Zimbabwe is not a coup. This is a crucial issue, given that both the African Union (AU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) generally react negatively towards coups d'état. Their reactions to past coups in the region have ranged from membership suspension to military intervention. The latter move is unlikely at present, but there will definitely be a lot of pressure by SADC and the AU to return the levers of power to civilian hands.

Military coups can be flued, but broadly speaking, there are three scenarios to remove Mugabe and to install a civilian government (even if the latter will merely be window dressing). One, coup leaders could force Uncle Bob to resign in exchange for security guarantees for him and his family. They could strategically demand that Mnangagwa be reinstated as Vice President before his resignation. Legally speaking, that would make it easier for the Crocodile, as Mnangagwa is nicknamed, to become President.

In a second scenario, should Mugabe fail to cooperate, coup makers, with the help of their friends in ZANU-PF, could also argue that Mugabe has become “incapacitated” over the past few weeks, which is when Grace became the de facto President. This means that Mnangagwa’s dismissal as Vice President was unconstitutional, and instead of being fired, he should have legally become President of the country. As a result, he will simply be ‘reinstated’ in his ‘rightful’ position.

A third scenario would be to call for an extraordinary ZANU-PF conference. Mugabe can then be officially removed as president of the party (and subsequently also the country) and ‘democratically’ replaced by Mnangagwa or a compromise candidate. This by no means entails that succession will be easy, as succession rules are very murky. But, with G40 out of the way and the military in control, there is a greater chance that ZANU-PF will unite behind one candidate.

Finally, coup leaders could form some sort of a Government of National Unity (GNU) akin to the one birthed by the Global Political Agreement after the violent 2008 elections. This would make the military coup more attractive to Zimbabwe as a whole at it would give the illusion of inclusivity and hope. In this effort, they will attempt to construct another GNU by bringing in representatives, not only from ZANU-PF, but also from opposition parties. One can expect that the military will engage a wide-ranging group of players, including Joice Mujuru, Morgan Tsvangirai, Tendai Biti, and Welshman Ncube. They will also likely promise free and fair elections within a reasonable time period.

Some opposition figures might respond favourably to the coup makers for two reasons: Firstly, after a long absence from government, they will be tempted to be part of it given that it would provide them with access to some form of power and resources. Secondly, they might hope that the military coup represents the possibility to effect change. However, they should not be blinded as to how this military coup came into being. This is the same security sector that helped to keep Mugabe in power for nearly four decades, the very man who is about to be vilified. In the absence of serious institutional changes, the risk is that they will again be disposed as soon as the next general election is announced, and we know why they call it general elections.

What If the Crocodile Comes Out on Top?
As seen, in several of the scenarios, Mnangagwa stands a good chance to replace Mugabe as President. I remember meeting him at a function at the end of 2012 or beginning of 2013 at the Rainbow Towers in Harare. It was during the country’s Constitution making process and I was keen to gage his perspective on the matter. After exchanging a few pleasantries, I asked him about his background in law. I said to him, “They say you are well versed in legalese”, to which he icily responded, “I am a military man.”

Mnangagwa has been a key player within the security establishment from the very beginning. He also has strong links with the political and security establishment in SADC as well as China. But it is his political unpopularity that should raise the most serious red flags. As a candidate, he has proven to be unpopular in past elections. It means that should he be fielded as ZANU-PF’s presidential candidate at some point in the future, he will most likely resort to familiar methods that have served him well in the past - threats, violence and extreme electoral manipulation - in order to stay on top.

In the coming weeks though, the military coup leaders will attempt to soften Mnangagwa’s image. They will present him, not as a “military man” as he put it to me, but as a victim and a humble politician ready to serve the nation. His background and experience in law will certainly come in handy to perform legal gymnastics to legitimise this coup.

Those who already rejoice over the removal of Mugabe in the hope that something better is on the horizon will most likely be disappointed. What has happened represents merely a readjustment of the old older rather than a new beginning.

Leon Hartwell was the Senior Policy Adviser for Political and Development Cooperation at the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Harare from 2012-2013.  He is currently a PhD candidate at Stellenbosch University focusing on conflict resolution and mediation.

President Mugabe's Media 'Freedom'

by Leon Hartwell

The media has an imperative role to play in shaping the societies in which we live. In 1994, the year South Africa became a democracy, then President Nelson Mandela stated, “A critical, independent and investigative press is the lifeblood of any democracy. The press must be free from state interference … It must have sufficient independence from vested interests to be bold and inquiring without fear or favour. It must enjoy the protection of the constitution, so that it can protect our rights as citizens.”

On the 18th of August 2014, Angela Jimu, a photojournalist with the Zimbabwe Mail, was beaten up by police while covering a demonstration in Harare. In Zimbabwe, such attacks against independent journalists and the media have become normalised.

In 1980, then Prime Minister Robert Mugabe was asked by the Swedish magazine Contact whether he would permit “an open, critical press”. He replied, “Yes, sure. This you will see, quite a lot of open criticism in the press. I am for the freedom of the press, really, freedom of expression.”

Newspaper printing press in Bulawayo (Photo: David Brewer)

Looking back at Mugabe’s time in office, the nonagenarian has not been the champion of media freedom that he set out to be. His actions speak louder than his words and there have been many similar and worse violations against media practitioners than that of Jimu’s most recent assault.


One of Mugabe’s problems is that he confuses independence with freedom. He likes to refer to himself and his party members as “liberators” of Zimbabwe. Let us be clear: independence is strictly speaking self-governance and sovereignty over a specific territory. Freedom is much more extensive; it involves “the absence of subjection to foreign domination or despotic government”.

Mugabe’s interpretation of liberation gives him the impression that it is somehow justifiable to oppress Zimbabweans as long as the oppressor is a native of the country (although Mugabe would exclude White natives from this category). However, as explained, true liberation and freedom is much broader than independence as it goes beyond self-rule. Freedom means that Zimbabweans should not be oppressed by anyone, irrespective of the origin of the rulers.

Political scientists claim, as is the case with milk, that political leaders run the risk of becoming ‘sour’. The shelf-life of a president/prime minister is typically ten years (or even shorter). In a (pseudo) democracy, a leader that performs well, have nothing to worry about (unless there are two-term office limits) as voters would presumably affirm a leader’s good work by voting for him/her. But, when a leader is incompetent or cruel and consequently unpopular, they might use a combination of bribes, threats, or violence in order to cling on to power, further augmenting the souring process. The longer a non-performing leader (intent on staying in office) stays in power, the more mistakes he/she is apt to make, the more he/she has to hide, the more people he/she will owe, the more violence he/she needs to use, the more he/she will have to subdue the truth.

As Mugabe and his cronies became sourer, the Zimbabwean media became more critical about their activities. In response, the regime increasingly clamped down on their ability to report without fear or intervention.

Based on Mugabe’s wrongful interpretation of ‘liberation’ (i.e. self-rule/sovereignty), he also set out to ‘liberate’ the media. The 1980s kicked off by replacing a largely White (minority) dominated media, not with a Black (majority) dominated media geared to serve the public interest, but with a pro-Mugabe/ZANU media. Already in 1981, the then editor of the Manica Post, Jean Maitland-Stuart, was forced to resign after she criticised the use of North Korean experts to train the notorious Fifth Brigade (which was used during the Gukurahundi Massacres). In 1985, the first Black editor of the Sunday Mail, Willie Musarurwa, was also fired after reporting on financial scandals related to Air Zimbabwe. Such early examples should have served as a warning as to future prospects for the media.

From 2000 onwards, Mugabe’s regime introduced numerous pieces of legislation with the intent of further restricting media freedom and freedom of expression. In 2002 alone, ZANU-PF introduced three infamous media gag laws, including the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA), the Public Order and Security Act (POSA), and the Broadcasting Service Act (BAZ).

With the formation of the Government of National Unity (GNU) in February 2009, media reform was supposed to have been a priority. Initially the Movement of Democratic Change led by Morgan Tsvangirai (MDC-T) promoted some reforms, but as time went by they became less vocal about the issue. It might have to do with the fact that independent media stopped treating the MDC-T as the underdog outside of government. This meant that the MDC-T, as is the case for ZANU-PF, had to be scrutinized where they made mistakes and when they failed to deliver. Tsvangirai apparently disliked this and wanted the media to treat him and his party with kid gloves. In fact, his aides have on a few occasions threatened and even physically assaulted journalists.

Another reason why the MDC-T perhaps failed to push for media reform, is because there were some slight changes within the media environment, giving the (wrongful) impression that progress has been made. For example, during the GNU years, ZANU-PF licensed five new newspapers, including the Daily News and NewsDay, under the punitive AIPPA.

While the launch of these newspapers was important, they could only reach a limited (largely urban) public as newspapers continue to be expensive for the majority of Zimbabweans. Radio and television therefore remain the most important media to reach the Zimbabwean public. This is why ZANU-PF clings on to the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Commission (ZBC) and would only license new radio stations operated by Mugabe’s cronies.

While there were no new independent television stations launched in Zimbabwe during the GNU years, ZANU-PF allowed the entry of two new radio stations into the market, including ZiFM (owned by ZANU-PF’s Supa Mandiwanzira) and StarFM (owned by Zimpapers, ZANU-PF’s chief mouthpiece).

To be clear, there were several anti-ZANU-PF representatives that had some air time on ZiFM and StarFM, perhaps more so than ZBC. This serves to give the illusion that these radio stations are somewhat objective. But, by and large, these radio stations are pro-ZANU-PF. They allow Zanu-PF to set the agenda and public discourse at the expense of the opposition and other alternative viewpoints. Closer to elections, they also become more political.

As a result of the lack of reforms during the GNU years, ZANU-PF continues its hegemonic hold over public discourse. The big loser, of course, is the media and, ultimately, also the Zimbabwean public. The role of the media is to speak truth to power and to keep the public informed. When governments interfere with the media, the latter loses its value.

Thirty four years after Zimbabwe’s independence and his interview with Contact, Mugabe continues to rule a broken nation. Mugabe could have used the media to promote liberal values and to do nation building, he could have asked the media to promote reconciliation and to report the truth. Yet, he has chosen not to. The nonagenarian (and his inner circle) has been in power for so long that he needs a media that will only tell the public what he wants them to believe. Public information then becomes lies (or at the very least half-truths), all to serve the ruling elite. It is in this context that ordinary journalists, like Angela Jimu, will continue to be victims of a ruling elite, which ‘expired’ a long time ago.

*Leon Hartwell is an independent political analyst

Zimbabwe's Support for Russia Shortsighted

by Leon Hartwell

An alleged telephone conversation surfaced on YouTube between Igor Chubarov, Russia's ambassador to Eritrea, and Sergei Bakharev, the ambassador to Zimbabwe and Malawi. The 5-minute long discussion started with Chubarov stating; “My congratulations! Your country [Zimbabwe] demonstrated very, let’s say, right understanding of the situation on Ukraine.”

Bakharev immediately replied, “And as for yours [Eritrea], they have surprised us. Are they fucking crazy?” Chubarov then indicated that he was not sure how that happened and expressed his surprise as well. He then exclaimed, “[but] your guys were fucking good. The only one on the continent [to reject the UN’s Resolution 68/262 on the territorial integrity of the Ukraine]. Oh no, Sudan as well.”

The conversation then continued with a lot of swearing and a couple of jokes about which territories Russia will annex next. Whether the telephone exchange is authentic or not, the truth is that Zimbabwe supported Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea.

Formal annexation of Crimea (Photo: Kremlin.ru)

Resolution 68/262: Territorial Integrity of the Ukraine
On the 27th of March 2014, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 68/262 by a 100-11 vote with 58 abstentions. The Resolution primarily focused on the dubious secession referendum held in Crimea on the 16th of March as well as Russia’s intervention in Ukraine. It called on “states … not to recognize any change in the status of Crimea or the Black Sea port city of Sevastopol...”

States that supported Resolution 68/262 broadly argued that Russia’s intervention in Crimea infringed on Ukraine’s sovereignty.

Those who voted against the resolution included Armenia, Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Nicaragua, North Korea, Russia, Sudan, Syria, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. As a whole, taking into consideration their lack of respect for human rights, this is not a group of countries that any state necessarily want to be associated with.

Zimbabwe’s President Robert Mugabe, who has been in power since 1980 and who turned 90 years old in February, is a self-proclaimed supporter of ‘sovereignty’. That begs the question; why does Zimbabwe support Russia’s annexation of Crimea?

Sovereignty is sacrosanct
Mugabe never misses an opportunity to talk about the sacrosanct principle of “sovereignty”, which is exactly what has been violated in Ukraine. The nonagenarian leader has gone as far as rejecting both the principle of the Responsibility to Protect (which promotes intervention) and the International Criminal Court on the pretext that it conflicts with the idea of sovereignty.

At the 66th UN General Assembly in 2011, Mugabe stated: “the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) should not be twisted to provide cover for its pre-meditated abuse in violating the sacred international principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of states because to do so amounts to an act of aggression and destabilization of a sovereign state.”
Mugabe’s statement was in response to UN Resolution 1973, which in 2011 essentially led to the removal of his long-time friend and fellow dictator, Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi. In context though, Resolution 1973 was adopted after Gaddafi labelled protestors “cockroaches” and demanded that his supporters should “cleanse Libya house by house.”

Gaddafi’s language, which was reminiscent of Rwanda’s Hutu regime’s message during the 1994 genocide, suggested that he intended to exterminate a group of people. Despite the wave of killings that Gaddafi unleased on his opposition in Benghazi, Mugabe was angered by NATO’s intervention as this, he argued, challenged state sovereignty.

President Mugabe speaking at the UN (UN Photo/Ryan Brown)

Putin justifying support for Crimea
Fast forward to the 18th of March 2014: Russia’s President Vladimir Putin gave an eloquent speech and selectively drew upon history to justify Russia’s annexation of Crimea.

First, Putin referred to the shared history between Crimea and Russia, which helped to soften the idea of a big takeover of the region.

Second, he argued that the Soviet Union’s decision to incorporate Crimea into Ukraine in the 20th century was arbitrary as it “was made behind the scenes”.

Third, Putin portrayed Ukraine’s Euromaidan protestors and their leaders as illegitimate and characterized them as “Nationalists, neo-Nazis, Russophobes and anti-Semites” with the aim of cloaking Russia’s annexation of Crimea under the pretext of humanitarian intervention.

Fourth, the Russian leader stated that there are many ethnic and linguistic Russians located in Crimea, thereby giving Russia an added purpose to intervene (supposedly) on behalf of their interests.

Fifth, Putin argued that Crimea asked for Moscow’s help to join Russia (although he failed mention that a pro-Moscow armed group took over the parliament building in Crimea which enabled pro-Moscow Crimean MPs to approach Russia for ‘assistance’).

Finally, Russia recognized that 82% of Crimea’s electorate took part in the secession Referendum and 96% of them spoke out in favor of reuniting with Russia, thereby legitimizing the outcome.

Mugabe’s support for Putin’s is unwise
How would Mugabe react should the UK demand intervention in Matabeleland based on the same dubious principles that Putin used for annexing Crimea? Like Russia in relation to Crimea, the UK has a history with Matabeleland. The Russian Empire first annexed Crimea in 1780s, while Britain colonized Southern Rhodesia (which is today known as Zimbabwe) approximately a hundred years later. Still, where do you draw that historical line with regards to territorial boundaries? How far back into history can you possibly go?

Furthermore, Mugabe knows that territorial boundaries are as arbitrary in Africa as it is in Crimea. The Scramble for Africa meant that Africa’s territorial boundaries were created in accordance with the interest of European colonial powers. That is why the Democratic Republic of Congo has over 500 ethnic groups in one territory while the Somali people are scattered all over modern-day Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti. The then Organization of African Unity accepted the application of the principle of uti possidetis, which meant maintaining the sanctity of colonial boundaries in an attempt to limit border disputes and to speed up independence. What if Matabeleland today decides that its borders are arbitrary and therefore they should have a secession referendum?

Moreover, as mentioned, Putin tried to build his case by portraying the current Ukrainian government as illegitimate, despite the fact that it came into being as a result of almost three months of protests against Viktor Yanukovych’s draconian regime. What if the UK attempted to justify both intervention and re-colonization of Matabeleland based on the fact that most Zimbabweans speak English, Mugabe is authoritarian, illegitimate, and that his regime has led to the killing of thousands of Zimbabweans?

Based on the above assumptions, imagine if the UK decided to send well-armed groups into Matabeleland to take over government structures and then to support a secessionist referendum where people could vote either to become independent or to join the UK. Voter turnout for a secession referendum in Matabeleland will probably be high. Many people in the region resent Mugabe for generally marginalizing Matabeleland and for Gukurahundi (which lead to the killing of about 20,000 Ndebele).

In short, Russia’s annexation of Crimea is as absurd and unjustifiable as the re-colonization of Matabeleland by the UK would be. Yet, Mugabe supported Putin’s actions in Crimea.

Practicality over principle
Mugabe supported Putin because it is a matter of you scratch my back and I’ll scratch yours. For example, on the 11th of July 2008, Russia and China vetoed sanctions against Mugabe and his inner circle responsible for violence, torture and intimidation that preceded the controversial presidential run-off elections on the 27th of June 2008.

Zimbabwe’s objection to Resolution 68/262 was important for Russia in as much as it needed to demonstrate to the Russian public that there was a small group of states that viewed its actions as legitimate. For Mugabe, Russia’s support in the past (and possibly in the future) has been invaluable given that Russia has veto power in the UN Security Council.

As the world is becoming increasingly globalized, international relations matter more and more. Putin violated Ukraine’s territorial integrity, and in the future this could also have negative impacts in other countries where secessionist movements could demand independence based on some of the same dubious principles. This is arguably why China, Mugabe’s strategic ally, chose to abstain rather than to blatantly reject Resolution 68/262. Mugabe’s regime failed to see the bigger picture. Zimbabwe’s foreign policy stems from the individual interest of Mugabe and his inner circle rather than being based on a strategic approach that serves the country’s long-term national interests.

*Leon Hartwell is an independent political analyst

What Nelson Mandela's Memorial Service Tells Us About South Africa

by Leon Hartwell

Former President Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela’s Johannesburg memorial in December 2013 was in many ways a microcosm of South Africa’s political and economic situation. The events that played out in and around the memorial represented South Africa’s best virtues while flagging a number of challenges that have to be dealt with. Some of these issues will be reflected in upcoming election manifestos as they are seen as imminent. Others might only be confined to footnotes, but they will be equally important for the long-term prosperity of South Africa’s economic and political environment.

The memorial day was characterised by a lot of rain. In many African countries, rain is considered to be a blessing; it symbolises new life and growth. This is very much representative of South Africa, a young democracy with a developing economy. South Africa has lots of prospects, especially given that there is still plenty of scope for the country to grow. Since 1994, the year of the first democratic elections in South Africa, the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has increased by 33%. The end of Apartheid opened up new economic opportunities for local and international businesses and South Africa became more integrated into the world economy.

Rain at the memorial service (photo: GovernmentZA)

Conversely, the expression “a rainy day” also has certain negative connotations to it, as rain could ruin a special day. It reminds us that although there are prospects for hope in South Africa, there will be many spoilers along the way. Even though the overall memorial went rather well, there were several issues that reflected some of concerns that personify the young nation.

Let’s start with the fact that the event was held at the FNB Stadium. It is where Madiba gave his first speech in Johannesburg after he was released from prison in 1990. It has since been upgraded for the 2010 FIFA World Cup, thereby becoming the largest stadium in Africa, attesting to the country’s great achievements in the post-Apartheid era.

Beyond the symbols of greatness, we have to keep in mind that the memorial began one hour late. In economic terms, time costs money and South Africa will have to step it up in order to compete at an international level. Government and businesses will have to become much better with planning and organising their activities. As argued earlier, economically speaking South Africa is moving in the right direction, but it is not happening fast enough. Jac Laubscher recently noted that countries like Brazil, India, Indonesia and Turkey grew by 114% on average since 1994 (compared to South Africa’s 44% growth over that same period).

There is also a real risk that South Africa’s debt overhang is increasing rapidly and that a serious economic crisis might be looming in South Africa. According to Forbes, the country’s debt has been increasingly rapidly since 2008 and external debt currently stands at $136.6 billion, or 38.2 percent of the GDP and “the highest level since the mid-1980s.” It means that there will have to be major budget cuts in the near future, which will also impact on education, health and the general well-being of the nation, especially the youth.

In this context, it was interesting to note that Zimbabwe’s President Robert Mugabe was cheered at Madiba’s funeral. Mugabe, who has been responsible for massacring between 10-20,000 Ndebele, the torture of hundreds of people, and the plundering of a once prosperous economy; was warmly welcomed at a memorial service in honour of Madiba, a man who ardently stood for democracy, human rights and peace. Nonetheless, it is quite possible, that Mugabe was cheered by a group of people who were perhaps disillusioned about the lack of economic opportunities in South Africa and who think that Mugabe’s “land-reform programme” was executed in the name of the poor. South Africa’s unemployment rate is 40% and inequality is extremely high (with a Gini coefficient of 0,6 to 0,7). Inequality is arguably one of South Africa’s most dangerous systemic issues that has to be confronted. If the matter is left in the hands of populists (like the Economic Freedom Fighters), the results could be disastrous, as was the case in Zimbabwe.

Related to the above issue, it is not only about what was present at the memorial that is important, but also what was missing. After the memorial, one reporter rightfully noted, “Where were the children? Mandela loved children …But young South Africans did not feature on the programme.” Almost half of the electorate is under 40 years of age while close to 2 million are ‘born frees'. Yet, to be part of the country’s youth is not always easy. South Africa has high levels of youth unemployment, estimated to be 50% and the 3rd highest in the world according to the World Economic Forum. Tough times might be ahead for the economy and this group risk being even further isolated and marginalised. Again, radical political parties could be attractive to this group, given that the youth have ‘nothing to lose’.

Furthermore, while Mugabe was applauded at Madiba’s memorial, President Jacob Zuma was booed when he entered the FNB stadium, whenever his name was mentioned, as well as when he gave his speech. The booing was not an “embarrassment”, as some commentators remarked. Rather, it was a clear expression of the will of the people, something that Madiba (and once also Zuma himself) fought hard for. The booing was a reflection of discontent towards South Africa’s top leader. This is not the same as saying that the African National Congress (ANC) was rejected in total. Other members of the ANC, including former presidents Thabo Mbeki and Kgalema Motlanthe, were loudly cheered by the same crowd. Even former South African President F.W. de Klerk and US President Barack Obama were cheered. The fact is, many people are fed up with Zuma, and the ANC will lose a lot of votes during the upcoming elections because of him.

The contrasts between Madiba and Zuma are rather remarkable. Madiba publicly regretted not doing enough to tackle HIV/AIDS under his watch, a period marked by a multitude of competing issues all demanding immediate attention. In 2005, Zuma admitted to having unprotected sex with the daughter of a struggle comrade whom he knew was HIV positive and then taking a shower to “cut the risk of contracting HIV.”

Mandela' body lying in state (Photo: GovernmentZA)

Shortly after Madiba became President, he cut his salary by 20%. Furthermore, he donated one-third of his annual salary of ZAR 150,000 to the Nelson Mandela Children’s Fund. Last year it was reported that Zuma’s annual salary is ZAR 2,622,561, more than 17 times that of Madiba. Recently, the Public Protector raised serious concerns regarding the enormous costs at the expense of South African taxpayers. Total expenditure for “security” upgrades at Zuma’s private residence has been “conservatively estimated at ZAR 246 million”. Security upgrades at Madiba’s private house has been estimated at ZAR 35 million (compared to ZAR 12 million for Mbeki, and ZAR 236,000 for de Klerk).

During Madiba’s memorial, South Africa’s state media, the SABC, was allegedly ordered not to report the crowd’s booing of Zuma. The great irony is that a free media is something that Madiba cherished deeply. He understood and preached widely about the importance of a free media that is able to keep government on its toes. Censorship of SABC on the day of the memorial is a warning that should a questionable person like Zuma continue to lead the country, there will be more and more political interference in the judiciary, state institutions, media and even the arts. Zuma seems to treat the state coffers as his personal bank account, and gradually South Africa is turning into a Mobutu-like “kleptocratic state”, as was recently argued by Barney Pityana. The fact is that the more elites have to hide, the more they will silence those that are outspoken about it, particularly also institutions that were created to make sure that those in power will not abuse it. Thus, it was not surprising that there was a delay due to political interference (cloaked in a security excuse) of the Public Protector’s report on Zuma’s “opulence”.

As said by Funeka Gingcara-Sithole, an ordinary attendee, "Mandela had a vision, Mandela lived that vision. But what Zuma speaks, he doesn't live …He should do the honourable thing and resign." If Zuma does not resign, he will lead the ANC to a win in the forthcoming election, but it is unlikely that he will complete his second-term in office. In the past, the ANC has demonstrated that it is not scared to get rid of their leaders.

Moreover, it was rather appropriate that Thamsanqa Jantjie, a man with an alleged criminal record and apparently no sign language qualification whatsoever, was the official translator for Madiba’s memorial. The mistranslation of Madiba’s memorial is perhaps emblematic of how some political leaders misunderstand the true values that Madiba himself stood for. Mandela wanted a liberal democratic government to serve the people and to focus on the future, he did not want to be voted into office based on past glories nor to become president to serve himself and his family.

Moreover, the fact that Jantjie was officially accredited for the memorial is symbolic of a mixture of incompetence, patronage, nepotism, and corruption that South Africans often experience. No one has been willing to take full responsibility for hiring this ‘interpreter’ and there are many question marks as to why this person was there in the first place. Shortly after the incident, ANC spokesperson Jackson Mthembu stated, “the ANC reiterates that the organisation did not take part in the government process to procure the service provider for the memorial service.”

Mtembu’s above statement clearly implies that the state was in charge of the memorial. However, what surfaced over the coming days seemed to have blurred the line between the state and the ruling party. A few weeks after Mthembu’s statement, his personal assistant Cikizwa Xozwa and her husband Reverand Bantubahle Xozwa “resigned” from the ANC after it was allegedly by the media that they were owners of the company that employed Jantjie. More often than not, in countries where the ruling party in effect becomes the state (look at our neighbours in Zimbabwe), it is people who suffer. South Africa has to work towards creating stronger institutions - especially the media, public protector, and the judiciary - that are answerable to the people and not the interests of a specific party.

The fact that there was a burglary at retired Archbishop Desmond Tutu’s house while he was attending Madiba’s memorial was another symbol illustrative of one of the top issues that South Africans rich and poor experience. Compared to other countries, South Africa has a very high rate of murders, assaults, rape and other crimes. If crime affects the Arch, one of South Africa’s greatest icons and most respected individuals, it could happen to anyone. The high levels of crime have to be seriously tackled at it negatively affects victims, it contributes to emigration of some of South Africa’s most talented, it taints the country’s image as a viable tourist destination, and it forces South African businesses to focus more on physical security rather than on other creative ways of making their businesses more sustainable. More importantly, crime leads people to build massive walls and iron gates between one another, and impedes the building of a society. In a word, crime makes South Africans isolated and miserable.

Beyond the domestic symbols that were scattered throughout Madiba’s memorial, there were also signs that were reminiscent of South Africa’s foreign policy. There were close to a hundred heads of state and government at the event from all corners of the globe. It not only symbolised Madiba’s popularity, but it also attested to South Africa’s success to move from being a global pariah to an international player. Madiba and Mbeki were particularly good at resituating the country as a developing nation often punching above its weight. Pretoria is said to have the second largest number of foreign missions in the world. South Africa is also no longer at war with its neighbours and the economy and her businesses are continental (and sometimes global) leaders.

Aside from the fact that South Africa’s wealth is tied to that of the world, the country’s transition is a model that could be emulated elsewhere. South Africa has participated in a number of peace keeping and peace building efforts on the continent. It was thus rather fitting that even in death Madiba could get US President Barack Obama and Cuban President Raul Castro to shake hands. Yet, the handshake also mirrored a wrongful assumption: getting players to shake hands is enough to change the game. Truth be told, peacebuilding requires time and commitment. Sometimes South Africa’s peacebuilding efforts have lacked follow up.

In the end, Madiba’s memorial was to celebrate the life of a legend, which is why the crowd continued to be cheerful throughout the rain. But when the event was over, it reminded us that South Africa no longer has a moral compass with the same stature as Madiba to lead the country into a new critical phase in the country’s history. Madiba was successful because he challenged the injustices of the day, which is what made him transformational. He was also adamant that South Africa’s leaders should look to the future rather than ride the wave of past glories. In 1994, he warned ANC leaders who wanted to have a “liberation election” campaign that “we should forget the past and concentrate on building a better future for all.” As South Africans honour Madiba’s legacy and celebrate 20 years of democracy, we also need to take a hard long look at present issues that threaten the stability of the country. A constitutional democracy cannot thrive in these conditions.

*Leon Hartwell is an independent political analyst

Madiba: My "Terrorist", My Liberator

by Leon Hartwell

People have many stories about the late former President Nelson Mandela. This is my contribution: I am an Afrikaner who grew up during the Apartheid era, a time period marked by deep racism. I was raised in Roodepoort, a conservative White neighbourhood very close to Kliptown (where the Freedom Charter was adopted) before my family and I moved to Pretoria, the administrate capital of South Africa.

The Apartheid system taught Afrikaners how to hate. In the White South Africa in which I grew up, Nelson Mandela’s name was synonymous with “terrorist”. He was one of the top leaders of the “Swart” (Black) and the “rooi gevaar” (red/communist danger). The public media effectively created a hobgoblin motivated to drive all Whites into the sea.

In fact, the African National Congress (ANC) was constructed as the greatest threat to the existence of the Afrikaner nation. It was depicted as a communist movement whose chief aim was to overthrow the state, the ultimate institution tasked to provide law and order. To many Whites, the existence of the ANC’s military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe, justified the use of state violence, sometimes even pre-emptively.

Television in South Africa, controlled by the state broadcaster, the Suid-Afrikaanse Uitsaaikorporasie (SAUK), was officially launched in 1976. During Apartheid, it regularly broadcast footage of Blacks rebelling against the Apartheid system. SAUK never told the story of the true nature of their rebellion nor the truth about the pain and suffering that these people underwent. Rather, images depicted Blacks as savages: they were dirty; they lived in primitive tin houses in townships; and they were throwing stones at policemen (i.e. ‘our’ representatives of security in what we were told was a dangerous state). This made it almost unthinkable that South Africa could ever be a nation consisting of different racial and ethnic groups.

For many years, Mandela’s aspirations of equality, democracy and liberty fell on deaf ears in the Afrikaner community. Even Whites who were against Apartheid found it easier to turn a blind eye on Apartheid atrocities rather than to challenge the system. There were of course Whites that stood up to Apartheid, including a distant relative of mine, the heroic Afrikaner lawyer, Bram Fischer.

Police in Alexandra Township, 1985 (UN Photo)

I did not have a single non-White classmate throughout Primary and Secondary school. My understanding of Blacks was limited to my interaction with our gardener, Speelman, and our maid, Regina, who took care of my sisters and I. In the 1980s, I frequently accompanied my policeman father to Soweto when he inspected police stations. We drove through the township in a Casspir (landmine protected infantry mobile vehicle) witnessing large scale protests against the Apartheid regime often followed by police brutality. I was deeply saddened to see the subhuman manner in which Blacks were treated by the authorities as well as the living conditions that they had to endure.

The “dominees” (ministers) at the churches that we attended (the Gereformeerde Kerk and Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk) saw no contradiction between the “equality” and “love thy neighbour” that they preached, and the inhumanity of the Apartheid system. Sometimes they deliberately suffered from biblical amnesia, selectively interpreting Christianity in accordance with Apartheid gospel.

When former President F.W. de Klerk announced at the opening of Parliament in 1990 that the ANC would be unbanned and Mandela released from prison, shockwaves radiated in the Afrikaner community. De Klerk’s speech also signalled the beginning of the transition, which for many Whites meant a journey into the unknown. Closer towards the first democratic elections, I remember Die Huisgenoot, the most popular Afrikaans magazine, carried a few articles urging readers to stock up on fuel, water, tinned food, biltong and dried fruit.

Ironically, footage of a silver haired, friendly looking Mandela walking free from Victor Verster prison near Cape Town in 1990 was in stark contrast to the terrorist image forged by the Apartheid state. Mandela’s City Hall speech, which began “all in the name of peace, democracy and freedom for all”, signalled the beginning of a new era.

Throughout the negotiation process there were many of spoilers. As the negotiation process unfolded, particularly the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA), a small group of radical Whites wanted to destabilise the democratisation process. It was a tense time in South Africa’s history and conflict could have easily escalated once more, thereby stalling or derailing the peace process. Nonetheless, it became clear that the democratisation process was irreversible. Madela continued to map out an attractive future and called for calm. In the all-White 1992 Referendum, voters were asked to vote for or against the reform and negotiation process to establish a new Constitution. The majority of Whites voted overwhelmingly “yes”.

The assassination of Chris Hani, secretary-general of the South African Communist Party, by a White racist in 1993, was another tense moment in the history of the country’s transition. The country could have descended into civil war. Throughout this intense period, Mandela showed tremendous leadership in calling on “all South Africans to stand together against those who, from any quarter, wish to destroy ...[freedom and democracy].”

Apartheid was designed to divide racial and ethnic groups, but Mandela succeeded in creating processes and institutions to fashion Archbishop Desmond Tutu’s idea of a “Rainbow Nation” in which differences are celebrated. During his Presidential inaugural address in 1994, Mandela stated, “Out of the experience of and extraordinary human disaster that lasted too long, must be born a society of which all humanity will be proud.” On that day, I felt particularly proud of my new President and it became more and more comfortable referring to him simply as Madiba.

What I admire most about Madiba is that he linked his freedom to that of his jailor and vice versa. In Long Walk to Freedom he wrote, “I am not truly free if I am taking away someone else’s freedom, just as surely as I am not free when my freedom is taken from me. The oppressed and the oppressor alike are robbed of their humanity.” This lesson is often forgotten by individuals like President Robert Mugabe, who continue to deliberately confuse the idea of independence with that of freedom. Madiba reminds us, “for to be free is not merely to cast off one’s chains, but to live in a way that respects and enhances the freedom of others.”

Another characteristic that I deeply respect about Madiba was that he never ceased to engage his enemies. Any successful transition requires that enemies become partners. Yet, to change one’s relationship from enemies to partners is extremely difficult. Madiba opened dialogue with his gaolers which must have been extremely difficult for him. Yet, he knew that it would have been impossible to build sustainable peace in South Africa without getting hardliners and the security sector on board. These efforts eventually produced Madiba’s greatest legacy: the creation of a new democratic dispensation guided by one of the best constitutions in the world.

Shortly after the first democratic elections, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was on the horizon. Many Whites were scared of the TRC. In fact, some of my dad’s colleagues in the police force ended up in Denmar, a psychiatric institute in Pretoria, while several committed suicide. Many of the real victims of Apartheid did not have access to facilities like Denmar to deal with their past. Depression among some members of the security sector and Whites in general was largely caused by a combination of guilt (as they came to terms with being part of a vile system) and feelings of hopelessness as a result of losing power. The public mood in South Africa was very tense.  Perpetrators had to share the stage with victims. 

Madiba continued to support the TRC despite major resistance from the National Party and some ANC members. Those who judge the TRC as the only mechanism intended to promote justice and reconciliation view the model as a failure. Although the TRC was unable to once and for all reconcile the nation and deal with injustices committed during the Apartheid era, it was an initial attempt to promote transitional justice. It is significant in that it brought close to 21,000 victims and perpetrators to the table to, as Tutu said, “look the beast in the eye so that the past wouldn't hold us hostage anymore”. No one can ever again deny that Apartheid did not happen.

Address to the United Nations, 1990 (UN Photo)

Madiba was unrelentingly selfless in his efforts to challenge an unjust system. He put his own life and that of his family at great risk for his believes and principles. Today, I would like to honor Madiba, my “terrorist”, my liberator, for inspiring millions around the world. I want to acknowledge his tremendous role and leadership in bringing liberty, equality, and democracy to South Africa. He is the father of the Rainbow Nation. I hope that Madiba’s ideas will continue to guide South Africa for many years to come. He not only leaves behind great historical accomplishments, but a multitude of ideas embodied in one of the best constitutions in the world. If we do not uphold and promote freedom, equality, non-racism, non-sexism, social justice and respect for the rule of law, we will fail to truly honor his legacy.

Madiba knew that South Africa still had many challenges ahead before the country would normalise. He concluded his Long Walk to Freedom by stating; “with freedom comes responsibilities ...”. Leaders and citizens of South Africa, take notice of those words. Amandla, awethu, South Africa!

Leon Hartwell is an independent political analyst

Implications of Zimbabwe's Flawed Elections

by Leon Hartwell

As a South African I am troubled by President Jacob Zuma’s appeal to Zimbabweans to “accept the outcome of the elections”. Why should our northern brothers and sisters accept elections that were not credible? Zuma’s statement is misleading as the real “outcome” of the elections is not the results. Rather it is the betrayal of an ideal for which our liberation heroes in the region fought. Zuma’s initial endorsement of the process disregards the long-term damage that this election will do to an important neighbour who has not yet successfully transitioned from independence to freedom.

Presidents Zuma and Mugabe in Harare (Photo: Government ZA)

President Robert Mugabe and ZANU-PF lay claim to the title of Zimbabwe’s “liberators” yet they continue to purposely confuse independence with freedom. Independence is simply self-rule; freedom is when a person’s liberty is promoted and protected by adherence to a host of rights. One of those fundamental rights is the right to vote under free and fair conditions.

Madiba linked his freedom to the idea of democracy. During the Rivonia Trial in 1964, Madiba stated, "I have fought against White domination, and I have fought against Black domination. I have cherished the ideal of a democratic and free society in which all persons will live together in harmony with equal opportunities. It is an ideal which I hope to live for and to achieve. But if needs be, it is an ideal for which I am prepared to die."

Government exists not simply to rule, but to promote and provide a better life for its citizens. Consequently, the right to vote is essential as it acts as a cyclical safeguard to remove a government that fails to perform.

This year, Zimbabweans were once again deprived of truly exercising their right to vote under free and fair conditions. To be clear, the issue is not that ZANU-PF emerged as the winner of the elections. Rather, the electoral process leading up to ZANU-PF’s victory has not been credible, which will have implications for Zimbabwe. What makes matters worse is that the past three years - both politically and economically – have been some of the best years Zimbabwe has had in almost a decade and a half. A lot of the progress that was made could easily be reversed.

The Global Political Agreement (GPA), which came into being after Zimbabwe’s violent elections in 2008, gave birth to the Government of National Unity (GNU). The GPA was intended to "create a genuine, viable, permanent, sustainable and nationally acceptable solution to the Zimbabwe situation." In essence, it aimed to create a situation of sustainable peace and promote reforms in a host of areas that would make the government of Zimbabwe more accountable and democratic.

The GPA also forced political parties into a series of engagement and negotiation processes which helped to build trust. After several failed attempts by political parties since 1999 to change the highest law of the land, the GNU wrote and enacted a new Constitution earlier this year. Before the elections, actors across the political divide described the process leading up to the creation of the new Constitution as a form of “national healing”. Whether the same sentiments now prevail is doubtful.

The new Constitution could also easily be amended given ZANU-PF’s two-thirds majority in Parliament and the party’s history of tampering with the highest law of the land. Since 1987, ZANU-PF amended the Lancaster House Constitution, each time making it less democratic and accountable. In 1996, ZANU-PF changed the first section of the Bill of Rights to a preamble, thereby diluting fundamental rights. Within hours of the elections, in his capacity as Minister of Justice and ZANU-PF’s Deputy Secretary of Legal Affairs, Patrick Chinamasa reportedly told the media that “the new Constitution may need cleaning up”. It is thus not unforeseeable that the Constitution will be amended.

Even if the Constitution remains unchanged for the time being, there is a risk that important aspects of it will not be implemented. The new Constitution was negotiated with the intent that certain reforms have to be undertaken, thereby changing the relationship between the state and her citizens. More than 90 percent of Zimbabweans, who voted in the Referendum in March 2013, endorsed the Constitution, which means the government has a duty to implement and respect it. Key institutions – like the media, the security sector, and the judiciary – were misused in the run up to the elections. Consequently, how likely is it that the reforms related to these institutions will be implemented? Why would the rule of law and the new Constitution be observed on a daily basis if so many laws were broken in an attempt to manipulate the outcome of the elections?

Economic implications of the flawed election could also be severe, and in the worst case scenario, have a negative impact on the political situation. The importance of the GNU was that it helped to stimulate Zimbabwe’s economy. After years of economic depression and inflation of 6.5 quindecillion novemdecillion (i.e. 65 followed by 107 zeros) percent by December 2008, the Zimbabwean economy grew by more than 9% per annum in 2010 to 2011 before it slowed down to 5% in 2012.

Zimbabwe experienced economic growth, not only due to dollarization of the economy, but also because businesses had more confidence to invest in a country which they thought was moving in the right direction. Both local and foreign businesses will be particularly wary to invest in the Zimbabwean economy because the political and economic environment for the time being remains unpredictable.

During the peak of the crisis years (1998 to 2008), Zimbabweans preferred to acquire foreign assets and keep their money in foreign bank accounts because controversial money printing caused the Zimbabwean dollar to collapse overnight; people feared expropriation and did not have confidence that the economy will bounce back. A 2008 study by Léonce Ndikumana and James Boyce found that Zimbabwe’s external assets were 5.1 times higher than the country’s entire debt stocks, demonstrating a huge lack of trust in the Zimbabwean economy. Today, Zimbabweans remain wary of ZANU-PF’s policy as set out in its 2013 election manifesto to re-introduce the Zimbabwean dollar. Furthermore, according to ZANU-PF’s election manifesto, there could be major problems for the 1,138 “foreign-owned companies” that have been targeted for indigenization.

Zimbabwe’s external debt, which is said to be $10,7 billion, is unsustainable and requires careful management as well as possible debt forgiveness. It will be interesting to see how creditors will react to Zimbabwe’s flawed electoral process. If Zimbabwe is unable to deal with the debt situation and fails to channel more money (including diamond revenue) into the country’s treasury, then attempts to get lines of credit from non-transparent sources could increase, leaving the country in a more vulnerable position.

Zuma’s statement urging Zimbabweans to simply accept the results of the elections pays little attention to the seriousness of the situation at hand. Many Zimbabweans feel cheated because the credibility of the process that produced ZANU-PF’s victory was deeply flawed, thereby also betraying the essence of democracy. The implication is the return and increase of mistrust and suspicion, and possibly also the reversal of many political and economic achievements by the GNU. For the time being, the country’s transition from independence to freedom remains unresolved.

*Leon Hartwell is an independent political analyst

Zimbabwe's Election Was Not Credible

by Leon Hartwell

Shortly after the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) announced the disputed election results, President Jacob Zuma was quick off the mark to applaud President Robert Mugabe and endorse the elections. He sent his “profound congratulations to His Excellency President Robert G Mugabe on his re-election as President of the Republic of Zimbabwe following the successful harmonised elections held on 31 July 2013.” He further urged “all political parties in Zimbabwe to accept the outcome of the elections as election observers reported it to be an expression of the will of the people.”

A peaceful election day by itself is not enough to declare it free and fair. One of the basic premises of assessing the credibility of an election is look at the electoral process as a whole. There were many irregularities with Zimbabwe’s electoral process.

To put things into perspective, during South Africa’s first democratic elections in 1994, under the leadership of Madiba, the ANC garnered only 62% of the vote compared to ZANU-PF's supposed 68% win in Parliament during Zimbabwe’s latest election.

The period leading up to Zimbabwe’s elections already paved the way for a dubious process. In October 2012, Mugabe assigned nine important Acts under the office of the President. These Acts include the Commission of Inquiry Act, Emergency Powers Act, Interception of Communication Act, Presidential Powers (Temporary Measures) Act, and the Zimbabwe National Security Council Act. Mugabe’s excuse was that “those functions have not been assigned to some other minister”, yet each act allowed Mugabe to gradually usurp more power and exploit it to ZANU-PF’s advantage.

Still in power: President Robert Mugabe

On the 13th of June 2013, Mugabe used his Presidential powers (thereby bypassing Parliament) to amend the Electoral Act and unilaterally set the election date for six weeks later. This is despite the fact that many outstanding issues in the Global Political Agreement (GPA) were unfulfilled. Although it was unrealistic that the entire GPA would be implemented, the purpose of the agreement was to promote sustainable peace and development. Thus, it required that some of the most important issues agreed upon by the Government of National Unity (GNU) be dealt with before Zimbabwe headed for another election.

Zimbabwe had a special vote on the 14th and 15th of July intended for civil servants and the security sector. Due to major delays and irregularities on the special voting day, some observer missions and civil society organisations described it as “chaotic”. Even before the process commenced there was a lack of transparency about the process. ZEC announced that 87,000 applicants were approved to participate in the process. The full list of those approved for the process was not made public, which rightfully provoked suspicion among civil society and some political parties that some of the special voters were not eligible to vote. On the eve of the actual election, it was also unclear how to remove names of special voters from the voters’ roll to avoid double voting.

Before the harmonized elections, several potential voters in urban areas complained that they struggled to register as voters. This is significant given that the MDC-T appeals to urban voters. Some Zimbabweans that have voted in previous elections also claim that they were surprised to find out that they have been de-registered to vote without their knowledge.

Once the proclamation was made on the election date, the state-owned media went into full throttle in rolling out overwhelmingly pro-ZANU-PF and anti-MDC propaganda. State media provided ZANU-PF with mostly positive coverage and whenever any of the MDC formations were mentioned it was generally in a negative context. Compared to any other party, Mugabe’s ZANU-PF received the bulk of coverage on press briefings and campaign rallies. According to the Media Monitoring Project Zimbabwe, most hate speech throughout the election period in Zimbabwe can be attributed to the state-owned media, and it is often attributed to ZANU-PF members, including the President.

Vote-buying by ZANU-PF also became rife in the run-up to the elections. For example, almost two weeks before the elections, Grace Mugabe, the First Lady, allegedly handed out 22 tons of foodstuff in Mashonaland Central. In a country where, according to the Zimbabwe Statistical Office, an average person lives on $1.16 per day, the politics of the belly remains a potent tool to influence the vote.

During the period leading up to the elections ZEC outsourced the registration of voters, as well as updating, inspection and custody of the voters’ roll to Registrar General (RG). Voter registration, as argued, has been flawed but it is worth mentioning that the RG’s office has numerous court orders against him that relates to the failure to perform this function and allow for inspection of the voters’ roll. Furthermore, the final voters’ roll was not made public in advance of the elections. This is despite the fact that it should be provided to the public in electronic or hard copy within a reasonable time. Currently, the MDC-T is reportedly claiming that there are 870,000 duplicate names on the voters roll, representing almost one sixth of the total voters on the voters’ roll.

On polling day there were reports that youths, some of whom seemingly did not look 18 (the official voting age), were bussed into MDC-T strongholds where they presented fake voter registration certificates enabling them to vote. One such youth group was caught on film in Harare – they presumably travelled from the Honde Valley which is located at the border of Zimbabwe and Mozambique, situated approximately 300 kilometres from the capital.

Several polling stations were set up at the last minute and their locations were not published in advance. As a result, party agents and election observers could not be deployed in time to properly monitor the electoral process. These polling stations were often in tents with no electricity, making it impossible to count votes under decent light.

According to ZEC own statistics, 3,480,047 Zimbabweans cast their votes during the harmonized elections. Almost 305,000 voters were turned away (mostly in areas considered to be MDC-T strongholds) and, despite the country’s high literacy rates, another 206,000 received “assistance” from election officials. This is serious as it represents more than 15% of votes cast.

There were also reports of stuffed ballot boxes, the extent of which remains ambiguous. ZEC nonetheless announced some results, which were very suspicious. In the 1980s, during Gukurahundi, almost 20,000 Ndebele were massacred by Mugabe in Matebeleland. Yet, according to ZEC, voters in Matebeleland overwhelmingly voted for Mugabe and ZANU-PF, which would be the equivalent of Apartheid victims voting for Hendrik Verwoerd and the National Party.

Another important questionable aspect of the elections is to the credibility of the judicial system, especially those that will be used for disputing the process if need be. The Constitutional Court and the Electoral Court dealt with most cases related to the elections. The former consists of the Chief Justice, Deputy Chief Justice and seven judges from the Supreme Court, while the latter is composed of the Chief Justice and several judges from the High Court.

Mugabe unilaterally appointed numerous judges shortly before the election in anticipation that some electoral issues will be legally challenged. He made all the appointments without consulting his then partners in the GNU and the Judicial Service Committee. For example, almost before the ink was dry after signing the new Constitution at the end of May 2013, Mugabe appointed two Supreme Court judges (and by implication judges serving on the Constitutional Court). Again on the 14th of July, two weeks before the actual election, Mugabe appointed six new High Court judges while one judge was elevated to the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe. Given the circumstances in which these courts were stacked in favour of ZANU-PF, one cannot expect them to deliver a fair judgement.

As argued, the electoral process as whole remains deeply flawed. Many of the above issues are in conflict with SADC’s own guidelines on elections. Zuma’s rush to wish Mugabe “profound congratulations” is thus hard to come to terms with.

*Leon Hartwell is an independent political analyst